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3Chapter 1: Ambiguity and adaptation
1. 1 European integration and institutional adaptation
The topic of this dissertation is the relationship between comprehensive
environmental changes and institutional responses. More specifically, the
dissertation examines how and to what extent increased European integration
has led to adaptations and changes in the domestic administrative institutions
of the nation state.
The theoretical point of departure is an interest in institutional change and
continuity. The dissertation argues that while European integration has
dramatically changed the environments of the domestic administrative
institutions, they have responded to these changes in a modest, incremental and
differentiated manner. Rather than making extensive structural changes, the
domestic administrative institutions have primarily adapted to the new tasks
and functions within their existing structures. These findings challenge the
commonly held assumption about the tight linkages between environmental
shifts and institutional changes. The findings indicate that an understanding of
the processes of European integration and domestic administrative adaptation
require a better understanding of the match between ambiguous external
demands and domestic institutional characteristics.
1. 1. 2 A fragmented picture of Europeanization
European integration is a political, social and economic experiment, involving
institution-building at the European level and institutional adaptation at the
domestic level. The scale, extent, significance and dynamics of the peaceful
integration and disintegration in (Western) Europe have surprised many and it
is adequately viewed as ‘an extraordinary achievement in the modern world
politics’ (Moravcsik 1998: 1).
Scholars interested in issues related to European integration have primarily
been interested in explaining the dynamics enabling and preventing European
integration (Moravcsik 1998, Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998), and in
revealing the ‘nature of the beast’ and conceptualizing the emerging European
polity and its policy-making processes (Schmitter 1992, Peterson 1995, Risse-
Kappen 1996, Laffan 1998). However, there has recently been an increasing
4interest in examining the impact of European integration on the policies,
identities, politics and polities of the nation state (Arena 1997). This shift in
research focus has led to increased scholarly attention to the issue of the
relationship between European integration and domestic administrative
adaptation (Siedentopf and Ziller 1988, Olsen 1996, Rometsch and Wessels
1996, Hanf and Soetendorp 1998, Bulmer and Burch 1998, Knill and
Lenschow 1998, Veggeland 1999, Trondal and Veggeland 1999, Risse et al.
2000).
The literature on the effects of European integration on the domestic
administrative institutions contains rich and detailed empirical descriptions of
the changes, as well as numerous attempts to conceptualize and theorize such
changes. Three questions have been at the centre of these discussions. First, to
what extent have the key administrative institutions of the nation state adapted
to European integration? To what extent have they demonstrated robustness
and remained unchanged, and to what extent have they been radically changed?
Second, if the domestic administrative institutions have changed, to what
extent, and under which conditions have they gradually moved towards
increased convergence across the borders, and to what extent have their
responses been different, indicating that differences in administrative styles and
structures have prevailed? Finally, to what extent and under which conditions
are the driving forces of the domestic institutional changes best understood by
examining the external environmental pressure, the intentional design by the
political and administrative leaders, or by unveiling the institutional
characteristics, histories and routines of the administrative institutions that are
involved?
While there is an emerging consensus on the importance and relevance of these
questions, the answers that are given to them are contested.1 The relationship
between European integration and the domestic administrative institutions is
frequently seen as quite simple. When adaptation is advantageous, institutions
adapt to European integration. As European integration increases in any
specific domain, so do the costs for the governments of maintaining disparate
                                                                
1 An extensive review of the vast literature of Europeanization is needed. Such a
review should cover studies of different institution, in different states, conducted
within different traditions and in different languages. This is a difficult and demanding
task, since several of the studies are designed as limited case studies weakly linked to
a theoretical program. The volumes by Hanf and Soetendorp (1998) and Rometsch
and Wessels (1996) serve as good starting points for getting an overview of the field.
For a review in Norwegian see Veggeland (1999). For an overview of the research on
European integration in the field of political science see for instance Azzi (1996).
5domestic rules and institutions. Moreover, as these costs rise, so do the
incentives for the governments to adjust their positions and institutions
(Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998: 4). When adaptation are disadvantageous,
institutions are not adapting. When the level of European integration is low, the
costs of maintaining the domestic structures are limited and the incentives for
changing them are small, there will thus be few domestic institutional
adjustments. The dynamics driving these changes and securing continuity are
believed to be of two kinds. Either they are driven by external pressure from
the European level and competitive selection by the environment or by
strategic adjustments to shifting environments by the domestic political
leadership. Both of these dynamics share the assumption that the linkages
between the environment and the specific institution are tight, and that the
domestic administrative institutions are adapting precisely and effectively to
environmental ‘necessities’ or to human will and intention.
These dynamics are important in explaining institutional change and continuity
in relation to European integration. Although necessary for an adequate
understanding of the processes of change and continuity, they are not
sufficient. Nor do they fit all the empirical findings in the literature, in
particular, the institutional continuity reported in many studies. Rather than
confirming these simple ideas, the literature paints a patchy and complex
picture of both convergence and divergence in the domestic administrations
leaving us with few shared understandings (Haverland 1999:18).
Indeed, some scholars claim that ‘there is no strong reason to believe that
Europeanization necessarily brings with it any substantial changes in the
national administrative structures of the member states (Page and Wouters
1995: 203). It is argued that ‘[n]ational administrations are not coming to
resemble one another, nor are they coming to resemble a sort of synthetic EU
prototype. The administrations of the member states have, for the most part,
retained their distinctive structures and operating procedures’ (Harmsen 1999:
82). Adaptations to European integration in the domestic administrative
structures have been moderate, and it has rarely affected the highly embedded
administrative arrangements (Knill and Lenschow 1998: 610). Moreover, if
there are any signs of convergence in the domestic administrative institutions,
these tendencies are perhaps much better explained by the spreading of new
public management ideas and techniques, through ‘harmonizing agents’ such
as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as numerous private consulting
firms, rather than resulting from European integration (Lerdell and Sahlin-
6Andersson 1997). These findings support the idea that the building bricks of
the nation state are largely unaffected by European integration and that the
nation state is still the core unit in securing effective and legitimate democratic
governance.
Another branch of scholars holds an opposing view. They argue that the
domestic administrative institutions of the nation state are currently being
radically transformed as a result of increased European integration. The
European level is viewed as exerting a reforming action on the domestic
administrative organization and its procedures. The processes of institution
building at the European level is seen to create a permanent challenge to the
national political and administrative systems, which are forced to adapt to a
new normative and functional environment (Mény et al. 1996: 8-9). The
outcome of the European integration process, on the action, behaviour and
structures of the domestic administrations are considered dramatic, leading to
the convergence of a specific type of a European regulatory state (Majone
1996: 265). Increased European integration is leading to the standardization of
political agendas, forms of interest representation across the borders and a
‘spectacular convergence of the modes of operation of various actors involved
in public decision-making’ (Mény et al. 1996: 8-9). These findings support the
view that the era of the nation state is ending, since the nation state is out of
step with the environmental ‘necessities’ and it is no longer functional
(Beetham 1990: 219, Bell 1987).
1. 1. 3 The aim of the dissertation
These divergent positions call for a clarification. The aspiration of this
dissertation is to improve our understanding of the dynamics of European
integration, and in particular its effects on the domestic administrative
institutions. This will be done by examining a limited set of fundamental
questions regarding the conditions for, and processes of, institutional change
and adaptation.
The first aim is to shed light on how and to what extent the domestic
administrative institutions are adapting to European integration as a result of
their interaction at the European level, and to what extent the domestic
administrative institutions are adapting to European integration as a result of
anticipation and autonomous adjustment.
7The second aim is to examine how and to what extent the adaptations of the
domestic administrative institutions to European integration are dependent
upon a specific type of formal relation, or association, with the European
Union (EU).
The third aim is to examine how and to what extent the adaptations in the
domestic administrative institutions to European integration are dependent
upon the existence of pre-established professional networks and institutional
ties.
The fourth aim is to examine how and to what extent the domestic
administrative institutions are able to adapt to their European environment, by
seeking to alter the structures and process of European integration, rather than
adapting their domestic structures, processes and policies.
The dissertation is organized as a set of articles. Each article address one of the
above mentioned aims. The articles have been written independently in
different period of time, they cover different time periods, and they address
different audiences. In spite of the fact that the dissertation is organized as a
collection of articles, and not as a monograph, the dissertation is still
integrated, constituting a unit, in which the articles share several theoretical,
empirical and methodological properties. This introductory chapter provide a
framework for understanding the various chapters, and to show that the
findings in the various articles, separately and when taken together, contribute
to enrich our understanding of the dynamics of Europeanization of the
domestic administrative institutions.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, the key concepts are
defined and briefly discussed. In section three the analytical approach is
presented. In section four, the research questions are presented and discussed in
somewhat more detail. On the basis of a brief theoretical discussion, a set of
specific research questions is formulated in relation to each case. In section
five, the research sites are discussed. Each set of research question is
empirically examined in a case selected on the basis of its fit with the research
question. In section six, certain aspects of the methodology and the research
design of the dissertation are discussed. In the final section, the research
findings are briefly presented and some general conclusions are made in
relation to the dynamics of Europeanization and institutional adaptation.
81. 2 Key concepts
The concept of Europeanization is frequently used when describing the current
transformation in Europe. Here, the term Europeanization refers to the process
in which European integration become an increasingly more relevant and
important point of reference for the actors, leading to adaptations and changes
in, and within, policies and institutions at the domestic level (Olsen 1996, Hanf
and Soetendorp 1998: 1).
However, there are several alternative interpretations of the concept of
Europeanization. For instance, the term Europeanization is sometimes defined
as the emergence and the development at the European level of distinct
structures of governance (Risse et al. 2000). It is also defined as the mutual
dependencies and co-evolving processes between the national and the
European level, describing the processes through which the administrations at
the domestic and European level are being gradually ‘fused’ together (Wessels
1998). And finally, the term Europeanization sometimes refers to how
European ideas have come to influence the development outside their points of
origin, for instance, how certain aspects of European history, culture, economy,
society and policy have spread beyond the borders of Europe (Mjøset 1997).2
Each of these aspects of the term are important, however, in the dissertation
these aspects of Europeanization will be referred to as respectively European
institution building, co-evolving processes and diffusion.
The key dependent variable is the adaptations of the domestic administrative
institutions to European integration. The domestic administrative institutions
are here understood as the patterned and stable elements in the governance of
                                                                
2 According to the current version of Merriam-Webster's dictionary, Europeanization
means ‘relating to, or characteristic of the continent of Europe or its people’. In the
1913 Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary, the term Europeanize meant ‘to
become like the Europeans in manners or character; to habituate or accustom to
European usage’. These cultural aspects of Europeanization are also found in the
academic literature. When Max Weber used the concept ‘Europeanization of
America’; he referred to what he saw as the universal and inescapable processes of
bureacratization (Scaff, 1973: 134). James Coleman wrote, when analysing
nationalism in Tropical Africa, that ‘the conscious Europeanization pursued by
Christian missionary societies has been a frontal assault upon traditional religious
systems and moral sanctions (Coleman 1954: 411-12). In social anthropology,
Europeanization is used as a term describing the processes leading to a redefinition of
forms of identification with territory and people, and the development of
organizational and administrative power at the European level (Borneman and Fowler
1997: 488).
9the nation states, affecting and structuring domestic decision-making. More
specific, the domestic administrative institutions are here delimited to the
formal and informal administrative and co-ordination apparatus, the procedures
and rules, the accounts and the information systems, as well as the time
rhythms and the political calendars that organize and structure the domestic
decision making activity. Institutional adaptation is the long-term substitution
of existing practices and structures with new practices and structures. Processes
of institutional adaptation can include reorganization of institutional forms,
rules and standards, reinterpretation of principles, doctrines and frames of
understanding and justification, as well as reallocation of resources and
capacities, and changes in the principles governing the allocation of resources
and capacities (Olsen 2000).
Institutional adaptation in processes of Europeanization means that the
domestic administrative institutions of the nation states are becoming
structurally tighter connected to the European level. That is, the
interdependence between the domestic administrative institutions increases,
and the beliefs, values and objectives that are held in the domestic
administrative institutions are being shared across the borders.
The key independent variable in the dissertation is European integration. To
integrate is the process of co-ordinating or incorporating separate parts into a
larger unit and a functional whole. In an integrated political entity, the beliefs
and objectives are shared, the units are interdependent and they are structurally
connected (March 1999: 134-35). In a disintegrated unit the objectives are not
shared, the units are independent and they are not structurally connected. Each
of these three dimensions are important aspects of integration and
disintegration, but they are not necessarily highly correlated. A system can for
instance have strong interdependencies and structural connections but diverse
objectives. The process of integration involves the co-ordination of policies,
the development of common rules and standards, the building of shared
institutions with capacities and resources, the development of a public sphere
for deliberation and eventually the development of shared beliefs and political
identities (Olsen 2000). European integration is the process of co-ordinating
and incorporating the nation states of Europe into a European political, legal,
economic and administrative order.
Four factors make the relationship between European integration and the
responses of the domestic administrative institutions important for students of
democratic governance. First, the adaptations in the domestic administrative
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structures are important for comprehending the scale and scope of the
European integration process, and in determining the possibility for a
legitimate and effective governance structure at the European level. European
integration is also a highly technical co-operation, populated and operated by
the executives and bureaucrats. The domestic administrative institutions are
largely responsible for providing information, negotiating, implementing and
monitoring the decisions that are made in the EU. Concurrently with the
increased capacity and autonomy for the EU institutions, the domestic
administrative institutions have become increasingly more involved in EU
decision-making (Rometsch and Wessels 1996). Effective and legitimate
governance at the European level is therefore increasingly dependent upon the
abilities and functioning of the domestic institutions. Consequently, in order to
understand the properties and the workings of the EU, the processes of
adaptation of the domestic administrative institutions are becoming
increasingly important (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998).
Second, for a proper assessment and evaluation of the conditions for future
effective and democratic governance in the nation state it is important to
determine the extent, quality and character of the domestic administrative
responses to European integration. A core feature in analyzing democratic
governance is to examine the conditions for institutional design and to clarify
the possibilities for the political leadership to shape and alter their institutions
(Mill 1991, Goodin 1997, Olsen 1997a, Olsen 1997b).3 This dissertation is
rooted in a tradition analyzing democracy and political life by combining
studies of administrative institutions with theories of democratic governance
(March 1997), acknowledging that the ‘roots of political science are in the
study of institutions’ (Peters 1999: 1). Historically, the domestic administrative
institutions have constituted the fundamental building-bricks in the nation state
in three ways. First, the domestic administrative institutions have been
instrumental in effectuating the decisions of national leaders. Second, the
domestic administrative institutions have been important in securing
procedures for effective and legitimate democratic governance (Badie and
Birnbaum 1983). Finally, for a long period of time, the domestic administrative
institutions played an important role in building the nation, and in creating a
                                                                
3 The philosopher John Stuart Mill discussed the problem of to what extent forms of
government are matters of choice. He challenged the idea that political institutions are
just a political instrument, by arguing that institutions are not designed easily from a
deduction of the matching of certain means and distinct ends. However, Mill was also
sceptic to the idea that they grow and evolve according to their habits in an organic
fashion, and that we must accept institutions as we find them (Mill 1991).
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sense of community, trust and identity within the borders of the state
(Desrosières 1998). The various developments of the nation state have been
matched by a corresponding development in its domestic administrative
institutions (Wessels 1990). Significant changes in, or within, one or several of
the domestic administrative structures thus indicate that fundamental aspects of
governance in the nation state have been altered.
Third, compared with other domestic institutions, the domestic administrative
institutions are more affected by European integration. The domestic
administrative institutions and executives have better access to information and
participate more frequently at the European level, than other domestic
institutions, such as for instance the national parliaments and political parties
(Egeberg and Trondal 1999, Nordby and Veggeland 1999, Smith 1996). The
popular involvement in European politics is a recent phenomenon, and it is still
at a low level compared with the interest and involvement in national and
regional politics (Niedermayer and Sinnot 1995).4 The coverage by the media
of the EU is also relatively weak and a recent phenomenon (Schlesinger 1997,
Slaata 1999). This bias in exposure and involvement in European issues has
triggered a discussion on to what extent European integration increases the
importance and influence of the executives at the expense of the
parliamentarians and nationally based interest groups (Moravcsik 1994).
However, others argue that the capacity of the executives to act independently
is more weakened than strengthened by the obligations, decision making styles
and so on, following from membership or close ties to the EU (Schmitter
1999). A third view does not consider these arguments as mutually exclusive,
but seeks to reconcile them. For instance, Fritz W. Scharpf (1999a) argues that
the absolute control of domestic policy choices is greatly reduced if European
directives evolve from negotiations among fifteen national governments, still it
may well be that the nation states might experience a relative shift of powers
from the parliament to the executives and the administration. Since the
domestic administrative institutions are more affected by European integration
than other domestic institutions, it is more likely that they will experience more
changes than other institutions.
                                                                
4 One indicator of the low interest in European issues is the low turnout on the election
to the European Parliament. In 1999 the average turnout in EU 15 was 49,4 per cent.
Although it varied considerably between different countries, the rate has dropped
steadily from 63,0 per cent in 1979, the first time the European Parliament was
directly elected, to 61,0 per cent in 1984, 58,5 per cent in 1989 and 56,8 per cent in
1994 (http://www2.europarl.eu.int/election/results/en/rmenuuk.htm).
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Finally, the scale and historical significance of the European integration
process has created a political and institutional laboratory for students of
political transformation. It is argued that ‘[t]oday the EU provides the best
laboratory for studying theoretical issues’ related to regional integration and
domestic institutional adaptation that are ‘only just emerging elsewhere’
(Moravcsik 1997: 4). The EU and its impact on the domestic administrative
institutions provide scholars with unique opportunities for improving their
understanding of the nature of politics in general, and their theories of how
well established institutions, like the domestic administrative institutions, are
responding to extensive shifts in their environments in particular.
1. 3 The analytical approach
Different theoretical perspectives offer competing views on the relationship
between environmental shifts and domestic administrative adaptations (Olsen
1992).
The ‘environmental determinism perspective’, one the one hand, locates the
explanatory factors at the environmental level. Variation in the domestic
structure is explained by the characteristics of the environment, while the
particularities of the institutions involved, as well as the abilities and
capabilities of the reformers, are considered irrelevant. The fundamental
assumption is that different functional environments place different
requirements, functions and tasks on the specific institution (Lawrence and
Lorsch 1969). The institution that has its internal structure best fitting the
demands of the environment will be achieving the best results and have the
best possibility of surviving. The best way to organize the domestic institutions
is therefore dependent upon the nature of the functional environment to which
the institution relates (Scott 1981: 87). The mechanism of change in this
perspective, is that of competitive selection in relation to for instance
performance, effectiveness or technological development. Through competition
and selection, inefficient and maladapted institutions experience decrease in
their effectiveness, and in the longer run they will disappear.
Another version of this perspective argues that selection is not only based upon
functional demands, but on the fit between the domestic institutional structure
and an environment imposing norms, beliefs and values on the specific
institution (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). The values and norms of the
institution must be in correspondence with the values and norms held in the
13
wider society or in the environment in order to have legitimacy. When
institutions are maladapted to the dominant norms of the environment, their
legitimacy and support will decrease, and they will be effectively eliminated
(Meyer and Rowan 1977).
The ‘reform perspective’, on the other hand, belongs to a rational
instrumentalist tradition in the social sciences, locating the explanatory factors
at the level of the leadership. Institutions are viewed as instruments for
realizing the goals of the leadership. Institutional structures are perceived as
tools mirroring the intention, will and power of the decision-makers. A specific
institutional structure exists because it fulfils the goals of the decision-makers.
It is assumed that there is a tight linkage between a distinct kind of institutional
design, and the behaviour within this institution. It is thus assumed that there is
a certain element of hierarchy and that the leadership has the power, will and
skill to shape the institutions in ways that increases the likelihood for effective
goal realization. The path from the intention of the decision-makers to the
actual design is believed to be unproblematic and straightforward. The goals
and positions of the leadership is clear, the causal relationship between goals
and the specific design is easy and transparent, while the actual implementation
and realization of the design is seen as unproblematic. A specific institutional
structure thus follows from the strategy of the leaders (Chandler 1962). The
mechanism of change in this perspective is changes in the goals of the
leadership. Such changes can result from changes in the preferences, strategies,
and allocation of resources or simply by shifts in the composition of the
leading coalition. When the goals and preferences are shifting, it is assumed
that the institutional structures will be smoothly reformed and designed in
order to reflect the new strategy of the decision-makers.
The dissertation takes an institutional approach to the study of the
Europeanization of the domestic administrative institutions. This perspective
challenges both the view that there is a tight linkage between the environment
and the specific institution, as suggested by the ‘environmental determinism
perspective’, and the view that there is a tight linkage between the will of the
leadership and the institutional response, as suggested by the ‘reform
perspective’.
During the last decade, the interest in institutions and institutional change has
exploded, and several scholars now take an institutional approach to the study
of continuity and change. As the number of scholars working in the field of
institutional theory has increased, the meaning of the label ‘institutional theory’
14
has become equally more ambiguous and contested, and there are therefore
numerous approaches to institutions in political science, law, economics and
sociology. 5 In parallel with this development in the general social sciences, the
students of European integration and domestic administrative adaptations have
turned their eyes on institutional theory (Jupille and Caporaso 1999, Puchala
1999, Risse et al. 2000, Aspinwall and Schneider 2000). The institutional
approach is termed ‘the central element of the EU toolkit’ (Bulmer 1993: 378)
and it has been coined the approach of the ‘third generation’, or the third wave,
in the flow of work on European integration (Caporaso 1998:2).6
The version of institutional theory applied here is rooted in one version of
institutional theory in political science (March and Olsen 1989, 1995, 1998).
By institution we mean a fairly stable set of rules and practices defining
appropriate behaviour for groups of actors in specific situations. Rules,
practices and meanings are embedded in structures of resources, enabling
individuals to act in a certain manner, and the collective to sanction non-
compliance (March and Olsen 1989, 1995, 1998). Institutions are not neutral
arenas where autonomous actors meet, but they have an independent affect on
decision making and they mobilize bias (Schattschneider 1975). Institutions
matter and have an independent effect on decision-making and changes
because they structure, affect and skew decision-making in significant ways.
Institutions structure decision-making in two ways: by changing the behaviours
of people by establishing formal rules and creating incentives, and by changing
                                                                
5 See for instance Guy Peters (1998) for a recent discussion on the various branches of
institutional theory in political science. He discusses what he calls the normative
institutionalism, rational choice theory, historical institutionalism, empirical
institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, international institutionalism, and
institutions of interest representation. Richard W. Scott (1995) has written an
overview of the development of institutional theory within sociology.
6 The turn towards institutional theory is one attempt to ‘main-stream’ the study of
European integration. For a long period of time the EU was treated as sui generis.
Comparisons with other polities or political processes were considered impossible and
even unfruitful. For instance, Peter Ludlow (1992: 119) argued that ‘the Maastricht
Treaty should be judged not in relation to federal models created out of quite different
materials in quite different circumstances. It should instead be assessed in relation first
to the Community system as it has developed, sui generis, and second to the goal: a
European Union’. This approach has been subject to increased criticism. There is now
growing awareness that the EU -- and its effect on the institutions of the nation state --
can, and should, be understood by applying methods, concepts and theories from the
general political science, economics and legal studies (Olsen 1996, Moravscik 1998,
Hix 1998:42, Risse 1999). The increased interest in institutional theory is one -- out of
several -- attempts to bring the study of European integration in line with the general
theoretical developments in political science, sociology, economics and law.
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the people and the way they interpret, create meaning and reason, through for
instance experiential learning and socialization. When analyzing how
institutions emerge, are maintained and change, this version of institutional
theory, takes into account both the ‘thin’ institutional factors, such as rules,
incentives, formal arrangements, and the ‘thicker’ aspects of institutions, such
as meanings, norms, identities and standard procedures (Checkel 1999).
An institutional perspective on the dynamics of domestic administrative
adaptation rests upon certain assumptions. It is assumed that action is rule-
driven. Actors are believed to act in accordance with conceptions of
appropriate behaviour and act on the basis of a logic of appropriateness.7 That
is, action depends on the answers of three key questions. ‘What kind of person
am I? What kind of situation is this? What does a person such as I do in a
situation such as this’ (March and Olsen 1995:7). The answering of these three
questions constitute the alternative that is chosen. The logic of appropriateness
is partly based on normative evaluations, but it is also, and equally important, a
matter of perception and cognition under the limitations of bounded rationality.
In a complex world, with limited time and energy it is assumed that people act
upon their simplified understanding of the world, their experiences, rules, and
their understanding of what is appropriate behaviour. However, in most
situations there are numerous and often ambiguous norms, identities, rules and
loyalties. One important dynamics of change are therefore created by collisions
of norms and shifts in the interpretation of their relative importance.
Institutions are believed to evolve in a path-dependent manner (Krasner 1988,
March and Olsen 1989). That is, decisions made at one point in time structure
and affect the range of possible decisions at a later stage. Adaptations and
decisions of the past structure the adaptations and decisions of the present.
Institutions gradually learn and develop experience based standardized and
‘taken for granted’ responses for handling environmental shifts. Search for new
solutions tend to be close to existing solutions (Cyert and March 1992).
                                                                
7 I am well aware that institutions as such do not act. Collectives, like a nation, an
organization or an institution, can not, at least in a restrictive meaning, have
consciousness and intention. Only individuals can act, choose and decide. Social
phenomena should therefore be analyzed from the actions and interactions of
individuals. However, explanations can not be complete when referring to actors
regardless of the structures they operate within or when ignoring the ‘uniqueness’
created by interaction among individuals in a collective (Hovi and Rasch 1996). When
referring to institutions as adapting, or being passive or responsive, I therefore mean
that these actions are outcomes produced by individuals acting within these
institutions.
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Resources and capacities are linked to existing practices and make certain
alternatives more likely than others (March and Olsen 1995). During a period
of time certain practices and arrangements have become institutionalized. The
process of institutionalization is characterized by routinised responses,
standardization and authorization of codes of meaning, methods of reasoning
and accounts, and it also implies that administrative resources, staffs, budgets
etc. are linked to certain values and world-views. Institutionalization does not
however imply rigidity, but it means that institutional changes are continuous
routine processes of adaptations to a confusing and complex environment
(March 1981).
From an institutional approach, institutional change is seen as a process of
historical inefficiency (March and Olsen 1989). The opposite, a model of
historical efficiency, assumes that pressures from the environment lead
institutions to adapt effectively and precisely. The institutions that are not
adapting are expected to loose out of the competition and deteriorate. A model
of historical inefficiency, however, assumes that the changes are less
determined by the environment, and instead follow a slower and internal course
allowing for multiple equilibria. In this perspective, institutions are not seen as
static, nor as effective and smooth adapters. Institutions are often loosely
coupled to their environments. The environment of an institution is rarely
uniform and it does not provide a consistent set of factors that the institutions
are forced to adapt to. Institutions are faced with confusing and often
inconsistent environment. Often the demands from the environment on one part
of the institution are different and inconsistent with the demands of another
part. The term loose coupling means that the coupling between two or more
units is not dense and close in its structure and that there is certain flexibility
and slack in the coupling (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972). If the specific
institution is responsive to its environments, but retain evidence of
separateness, distinctiveness and identity in the adaptation process, the
relationship between the environment and the institutions can be characterized
as loosely coupled (Glassman 1973, Weick 1976). The external pressure is
therefore seen as sporadic and coarse, rather than continuos and refined, and
the linkage between environmental pressure and the administrative institutions
is seen as imprecise, discontinuous, and frictional, instead of precise,
continuos, and smooth. Institutional adaptations are therefore perceived as
depending upon a complex match between environmental pressure and
institutional characteristics
In order to understand the matching between environmental demands and
17
institutional characteristics it is important to make an assessment of the
experiences, culture and the history the institutions is embedded in, that is, to
understand the routes and the roots of an institution (Berman 1983). It is
generally assumed that it is most likely that institutional adjustments will be
incremental and stepwise, often characterized by routinised responses,
reflecting experiential learning, internal capacity and various institutional
characteristics. Under certain conditions it is likely that more radical and
extensive institutional adaptations can occur. These situations are typically
characterized as deep crisis in performance or legitimacy, or when the
institution are experiencing extensive external shocks which in dramatic ways
alter the conditions under which the institution operates. Extensive reform
attempts involving considerable political energy, attention and resources over a
long period of time can also lead to more extensive changes (Knill 1998).  In a
situation with considerable external demand for change and when there is good
fit between these environmental pressures and the fundamental characteristics
and values of the domestic institutional arrangements, the likelihood for
domestic administrative adaptations increases. In situations characterized by
weak environmental demands, few reform attempts and strong domestic
institutional resistance, it is less likely that change will occur.
When the domestic administrative institutions are adapting to European
integration, they are faced with ambiguity. By ambiguity we mean processes
that are indistinct, as well as phenomenon that can be understood in two or
more possible senses or ways. Ambiguity in the study of institutional
adaptation means situations characterized by unclear goals, difficulties in
interpreting histories and experiences, unclear organizational boundaries and
structure of participation, as well as unclear technologies, (March and Olsen
1976: 8). The EU fits all of these general characteristics of an ambiguous
system.
The goals of the EU are ambiguous. The goals listed in the Amsterdam Treaty
are vaguely defined and difficult to reconcile.8 Since the EU has unclear goals,
                                                                
8 Article 2 in the Amsterdam treaty states that: ‘The Union shall set itself the following
objectives: to promote economic and social progress and a high level of employment
and to achieve balanced and sustainable development, in particular through the
creation of an area without internal frontiers, through the strengthening of economic
and social cohesion and through the establishment of economic and monetary union,
ultimately including a single currency in accordance with the Provisions of this
Treaty’ . In the same article it is argued that the EU shall also asserts its identity on the
international scene, strengthen the protection of rights and interests of the national of
its Member States, maintain and develop an area of freedom, security and justice, and
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the European integration process is frequently described as a ‘journey to an
unknown destination’ (Weiler 1993). The goals are certainly more specific in
some areas than in others, but ambiguous goals can be revealed in most areas
of the EU.
In the EU there are ambiguities in interpreting histories and experiences. For
instance, there is no consensus on the basic mechanism driving the European
integration process (Milward et al. 1993, Kohler-Koch and Jachtenfuchs 1996,
Moravcsik 1998, Schmitter 1999, Sandholtz and Sweet 1999, Weiler 1999).
The EU is not a federal state, nor is it an international organization and there is
no shared understanding of how to interpret the emerging European polity. In
order to conceptualize the emerging polity, some turn to history for appropriate
parallels (Schmitter 1992), others compare it to federal systems (Sbragia 1992),
an even others, like Jacques Delors, the former President of the European
Commission, claimed that the EU is an Unidentified Political Object (UPO).
The boundaries of the EU are unclear and the structure of participation is
ambiguous. The multi-level structures of the EU are vertically and horizontally
differentiated and only loosely coupled (Benz 1998). The boundaries of the
EU, as well as their significance, have continuously changed through
enlargements, the increasing number of member states, as well as increasing
external and internal fragmentation (Kohler-Koch 1998, Leslie 2000).
Compared with other institutions, the patterns of participation in decision-
making in the EU are more fluid and less organized (Andersen and Eliassen
1995, Richardson 1996).
In addition, there is ambiguity in the EU about the technology and causal
relations. The key question; what specific type of domestic institutional
arrangement matches the European level effectively and legitimately, is
unanswered and badly understood. In the EU, there is no well-developed
encompassing public administration policy, nor is it an ‘institutional blueprint’
for the domestic administration to adapt to. There are no shared understandings
of a distinct ‘best practice’ for the domestic administrations to adapt to (Hanf
and Soetendorp 1998, Lerdell and Sahlin-Andersson 1997: 59). The capability
and legitimacy for the EU to impose changes onto the domestic administrative
institutions are limited, compared with the capacities of the nation states to
                                                                                                                                                                          
maintain its full acquis communautaire. In Article 6 it is stated that the Union is
founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, and that the Union shall respect national
identities of its member states.
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develop a public administration policy within their boundaries. However, to
state the obvious, when we dig into the specific policy fields and various
institutional spheres, fragments of a general public administration policy is
revealed, and the EU is not longer as ambiguous. In certain areas there are
more clear goals, detailed rules, established codes of conduct, standardized
patterns of participation, shared understandings and a well established acquis
communautaire, than in others. Still, an encompassing public administration
policy is lacking.
Ambiguity is not only an adequate description of the EU, but also important in
explaining the dynamics of the EU. Decision making in the EU is operating
under a veil of vagueness -- twisting John Rawls’ concept of the ‘veil of
ignorance’ (Olsen 1997a, Gibson and Goodin 1999). The veil of vagueness
means that the parties do not know precisely how decisions at the EU level will
affect them in the future. In such a system, there is a tendency that the level of
generality, and thereby ambiguity, increases to a point at which the actors can
reach an agreement without serious threat to their interests. In the EU, for
instance, the ‘short term preoccupation of institutional designers have led them
to make decisions that undermined long-term member state-control’ (Pierson
1996: 156). In addition, the EU is a consensus-seeking system (Hayes-
Renshaw and Wallace 1997), tending to result in vague policies, since it is
easier for the parties to ignore disagreements as long as the text can be
interpreted in various manners.9
The ambiguous character of the EU and the European integration process
makes it difficult to develop a general theory about what the domestic
administrative institutions are adapting to when adapting to European
integration, and through which processes they are adapting. Cardinal questions,
like; what are the domestic administrative institutions really adapting to; which
institutions are adapting to European integration and which are not; what kind
of institutional designs are most likely to be successful in the adaptation
process, are still just barely understood. It is thus evident that an adequate
understanding of the dynamics of European integration and domestic
                                                                
9 An early illustration of this aspect is provided by Ernst B. Haas. He explained the
convergence of positions among the six initial member states to ratify the treaty for the
European Steel and Community in the early 1950s by reference to ambiguity. He
argued that the very ‘ambiguity of the Treaty made this pattern of convergence
possible. Something seemed to be ‘in it’ for everybody and a large enough body of
otherwise quarrelling politicians was therefore persuaded to launch the deliberate
peaceful integration’ (Haas 1958: 154-55)
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administrative adaptation require a richer understanding of the complex
linkages and loose couplings between the ambiguous environment and the
characteristics and histories of the domestic administrative institutions. Rather
than seeking to develop a general theory of how the domestic administrative
institutions are adapting under such circumstances, we should therefore take a
middle-range approach, carefully examining how European integration in
certain fields and certain areas are triggering adaptation in certain domestic
administrative institutions.
1. 4 Research questions
The dissertation addresses four sets of questions that are relevant for a better
understanding of the dynamics of European integration and domestic
administrative adaptations. In the following section these questions are
elaborated more in detail and certain specific expectation are formulated.
1. 4. 1 The shadow of the future
The first set of questions is related to the role of interaction in creating
institutional adaptations to European integration. To what degree are the
domestic administrative institutions adapting as a result of processes of
learning and accumulated experiences of interactions within the EU, and to
what degree are they adapting as a result of processes of anticipation of future
possible functional and normative demands raised by European integration?
The literature on the dynamics of institutional adaptation provides different
answers to this question.
Adaptation as a result of interaction
One important branch of theories assumes that participation and interaction at
the European level leads to adjustments in the domestic administrations. As
politicians and civil servants are increasingly interacting with the new
European system of governance, by attending meetings, drafting plans, sharing
information, participating in joint decision-making, and developing trust they
will gradually accumulate experiences of co-operation. Through participation
in a wide number of meetings and committees under various institutions at the
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European level, the domestic administrations interact.10 These experiences of
interaction, it is argued, will gradually lead to alteration in focus of attention
and to changes in interests, positions and loyalties, as well as reorganization
and changes in domestic administrations, in order to accommodate and respond
these new patterns of interaction (Deutsch 1953, Haas 1958, Lindberg 1963).
Increased exchange across the border provokes behaviours and processes that
are decisively shaped by the institutional context of the EU. The more a unit is
participating in European co-operation, the more likely is it that the unit will
adapt to the new demands. As a result, variation in pattern of adaptation can be
explained by patterns of interaction.
From this perspective, the extensive interaction between domestic
administrations from various countries are therefore both an indicator of, and
the main driving mechanism of, the gradual merging of public administrations
and their adaptation to increased European integration (Wessels 1998: 217). As
the level of interaction increases at the European level, the likelihood that the
domestic administrative institutions adjust their policy positions and
institutional arrangements increases (Sweet and Sandholtz 1998: 4-5).
Adaptation as a result of anticipation
Another theoretical branch is less concerned about the importance of
interaction. It is argued that anticipation and autonomous adaptation can drive
processes of change. For instance it is argued that processes of European
integration has ‘forced all countries aspiring for membership’ to adopt a
distinct policy and to rearrange their institutions  (Scharpf 1999b: 116). The so-
called Copenhagen criteria, for instance, indicate a number of conditions that
should be fulfiled before new applicants can become member states. These
conditions are: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market
economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and
market forces within the Union; and the ability to take on the obligations of
                                                                
10 Estimates of the number of committees in the EU differ. Wolfgang Wessels listed
more than 1,500 existing committees in the mid 1990s, including 600 committees for
the Commission, 270 working groups under the Council, 410 comitology committees
and 53 with third countries (Wessels 1998: 219).  Van Schendelen (1996) estimated
that each year about 50,000 domestic officials are involved in the daily administrative
work of the European Union (van Schendelen 1996).
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membership (European Council 1993).11 The important driving mechanism is
thus the shadow of the future rather than the practice of the present.
Such a process is characterized by an institution adjusting to the decisions that
are either already made in the EU or are expected to be made in the EU. The
domestic institution does not seek, as a condition of making its adaptation, a
response from the EU or experiences from interacting with the EU. However,
the domestic administrative institution deliberately avoids impinging adversely
on EUs values, as they are perceived by the domestic institutions at the time
the institution adapt. The mechanism of anticipation is a supplement to the one
claiming that the idea that interaction generate experiences of a certain
functional and normative demand. The mechanism of anticipation is
characterized by the domestic institutions perceiving and anticipating a
potential mismatch between its structural arrangement and those of the EU,
hence the domestic institution sets out to explore new ways of pursuing its
mission, which would not impose losses or make any conflicts with the EU.
Processes of autonomous anticipation are often characterized by transforming
complex environments into a relatively simple series of tasks and adjustments.
They do not necessarily cause ideal results but the results can be perceived as
satisfactory and sufficient (Lindblom 1965).
If the processes of adaptation were resulting primarily from experiences of
interaction, they will occur after participants have accumulated experiences of
interaction within the EU and therefore expected to be gradual and stepwise. If
the processes of adaptations were resulting primarily from processes of
anticipation they will occur at an early stage.
If adaptation and institutional reorganization is seen as a requirement for
membership in the EU, and the possibilities for the domestic institutions to
change these demands when they become members of the EU are perceived as
limited, the likelihood of anticipation and autonomous adjustment increases. If
there are few institutional requirements for membership, and the possibilities
for the domestic institutions to change such demands at a later stage are
perceived as rich, it is more likely that the processes of adaptation will be
characterized by experience based adaptation and less by anticipation.
                                                                
11 In 1995 the European Commission published a list of 899 measures in 23 sectors as
a mean of helping applicants prepare for entry in the EU. The score of each state on
this ‘Harmonogramme’ is an index of the extent to which domestic legislation and
institutions are adapted to meet the requirements of the Single Market before
becoming members of the EU (Bainbridge 1998: 94).
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Moreover, if membership and close relations to the EU are perceived as
desirable and attractive, it is more likely that the domestic administrative
institutions will adapt through processes of anticipation and autonomous
adjustments. If membership is seen as undesirable and perceived as a threat to
certain fundamental values and core principles of the domestic administrative
institutions, it is less likely that they will adapt autonomously and it is more
likely that adaptations will result from interaction.
1. 4. 2. The relevance of form of association and formal boundaries
The second set of questions is related to what extent the adaptation of the
domestic administrative institutions is dependent upon the type of formal
linkages or association to the European integration process.
Formal membership in the EU and form of association is perceived as one of
the most important distinction in relation to processes of Europeanization. The
issue of membership in the EU has appeared as a significant cleavage in
European politics (Marks et al. 1996, Hix 1998, Tarrow 1995), and it has been
the subject of intense political debates and political struggles in most European
countries. Referendums on the issue of membership have led to close results
and high turnout (Todal Jenssen et al. 1998). In many countries, political
parties have been divided, or suffered considerably, by internal disputes on the
issue of formal membership (Heidar and Svåsand, 1997, Young 1998). In
Norway, for instance, the policy of ‘No’ to formal membership, but ‘Yes’ to
close co-operation with the EU, is one indicator that formal association is
perceived as important.
The dichotomy of boundaries
Formal membership in the EU is often treated as dichotomous. Either states are
members of the EU or states are not members of the EU. Formally, this
distinction is easy to draw. States that have signed the treaties of the EU are the
members of the EU, and the states that have not signed the treaties are not
members of the EU. Member states have certain rights and obligations in
decision making and their actions are limited by shared decisions in the EU,
whereas the states that are not members of the EU do not share the same rights
and obligations.
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In most of the literature on European integration and domestic administrative
adaptations, it is argued that membership matter. It is assumed that states and
institutions that are members of the EU define their interests and arrange their
institutions differently as members of the EU than they would outside of the
EU (Sandholtz 1993: 3). Moreover, it is claimed that with membership in the
EU the domestic administrations will start moving in the direction of
convergence, whereas countries outside the EU will not follow this direction
until they have gained full membership (Wessels and Rometsch 1996: 357).
It is thus assumed that there is a strong causal relationship between form of
association and the pattern of domestic adaptation. Through legal pressure and
financial incentives, as well as interaction and accumulation of experiences at
the European level, it is believed that the form of association will be important
in shaping the pattern of adaptation at the domestic level. Since the non-
member states are not experiencing the same legal and financial incentives and
pressures, they will not adapt to European integration in a corresponding
manner.
The ambiguity of boundaries
While the boundaries of the EU are often treated as dichotomous, they are
frequently also treated as ambiguous. The concepts such as; flexibility,
enhanced co-operation, a-la carte, Feste Kern and concentric circles, all
indicate that the boundaries of the EU are ambiguous. The boundaries of the
EU are internally fragmented since various member states have ‘opted out’ of
certain aspects of the integration process. The flexibility clause in the Treaty of
Amsterdam has for instance allowed different member states to take on various
obligations and responsibilities (Stubb 1997). The boundaries in the EU are
also externally fragmented. Several non-member states are associated with the
EU through extensive formal and informal arrangements. For instance, the
Europe-agreements for the applicant countries in East and Central Europe, and
the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement for the former EFTA countries,
have blurred the boundaries between member states and non-member states
(Egeberg and Trondal 1999, Claes and Tranøy 1999, Leslie 2000).
In areas where formal membership is best perceived as a dichotomy, it is likely
that form of association will be important in explaining the variation in patterns
of domestic institutional adaptations. In areas where the boundaries of the EU
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are more ambiguous, it is less likely that form of association will be as
important in discriminating the pattern of adaptation in the member from the
pattern of adaptation in the domestic administrative institutions of the non
member states.
While the form of association to the EU is one important factor for
understanding processes of adaptation in the domestic administrative
institution, it is not necessarily a sufficient condition. Functional and real
dependencies can force non-member states to adapt. Moreover, states and
domestic administrative institutions that are not members of the EU can adapt
to the EU on a voluntary basis in order to reduce uncertainty and gain
legitimacy. States and domestic administrative institutions that are not
members can also seek to adapt to the EU because they consider it as being in
their own interest, or being consistent with their standard procedures and
established developmental course.
1. 4. 3 The relevance of pre-existing networks
The literature on Europeanization reveals considerable variation in the extent
and character of adaptation between different spheres and issue areas. The third
set of questions is related to the fact that the domestic institutional adaptations
to European integration are more likely to occur in certain areas and under
certain conditions than under others.
Adaptation to new standards and institutions
It is commonly assumed that European integration is characterized by the
creation of new forms of co-operation and the development of new institutions.
New functions and tasks are believed to lead to new organizational forms.
Within such a perspective, domestic institutional adaptations are believed to
adapt to these new forms and structures.
The extent of domestic adaptation is dependent upon the external demand for
change, and how this external pressure fits with the interests of the affected
domestic administrative institution. The European level can increase the cost of
not adapting by introducing legal sanctions, creating financial and economic
incentives, or introducing political pressures. In areas where there are strong
capacities at the European level to impose changes in the national
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administrative systems through legal instruments or by creating economic
incentives, it is expected that it is increased likelihood that changes will occur.
Moreover, in areas that are high on the European agenda and issues that attract
considerable political interest and attention, it is more likely that changes will
occur.
In contrast, in areas where there are few capacities at the European level to
impose legal instruments or to create financial incentives or give financial aid,
it is believed that that the domestic administrative institutions will have limited
interest in adapting to European integration. Moreover, it is believed that in
areas that are low on the agenda and attracts limited political attention, it is less
likely that domestic institutional adaptations will take place.
Adaptation as exploiting pre-existing networks and established ties
An institutional perspective is less concerned about the ‘demand’ for change
and more concerned about the ‘supply’ side. The way institutions are created,
emerges and adapt is often a function of how they are represented and
interpreted by existing institutions, and how they are fitting the existing logic
of appropriateness.
When developing new institutions, decision-makers seek solutions that are
close to existing solutions (Cyert and March 1992). Since administrative
adaptation often is a routine activity exploiting existing institutional structures
and experiences, successful reform and institution-building is often dependent
upon the existence of pre-established networks and institutional apparatuses.
Adaptations and changes are more likely to occur if it is possible to develop
and build new forms of co-operation on established domestic institutional
arrangements and by exploiting slack resources.
The likelihood for adaptation is also dependent upon the possibility of
exploiting existing patterns of international co-operation. If there are pre-
established European professional networks, established patterns of contact,
and shared models of the world, for instance fairly homogeneous professions or
epistemic communities, it is more likely that institutions would adapt easily.
However, if there are few pre-existing institutional ties, weak professional
networks, few standards and divergent models of the world, it is less likely that
adaptations will take place.
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Moreover, adaptation are more likely to be supported and be smooth if the
suggested reforms are consistent with other domestic and global reform
attempts, than if the suggested reforms are isolated reform attempts at the
European, coming into conflict with existing institutional and other
international practices.
1. 4. 4 The shadow of the past
The fourth set of questions is related to how institutions under certain
conditions can seek to alter and change their environments. Institutions can
respond to their environments by adapting their institutions to meet new
functional and normative demands, but they can also adapt by changing their
environments (Nystrom and Starbuck 1981a, 1981b). Do governments adapt to
European integration by designing their environments, rather than adapting
their domestic institutions and policies?
The choice for Europe
Some argue that the member states are the ‘masters of the treaties’ and that
they are able to alter and design the European level in a manner that is
consistent with their preferences and powers (Moravcsik 1998). Such reforms
can be attempts to affect the institutional framework and structure of the EU,
thereby creating the fundamental course of development at the European level
in manners that are consistent with their own preferences. For instance, in the
1993 ruling on the validity of the Maastricht Treaty, the German Constitutional
Court used the term ‘Herren der Vertrage’, indicating that the member states
are the ‘masters of the treaty’ and that the ultimate competence in the
integration process is in the hands of the member states (Kirchhof 1999).
However, the view that the national governments can design their
environments is not only confined to the areas of treaty reform, but it equally
found when examining the day-to-day politics within the EU. It is for instance
argued that: ‘[t]he indirect institutional influence of Germany and the strong
European and multilateral ‘mission’ of its political elites have come to shape
the rules and norms of the EU and the integration process itself’ (Bulmer
1997:50), thereby creating a development at the European level that does not
impose a strong pressure for change at the domestic level.
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In addition, some view the EU as an arena in which the political leadership and
elite are able to bypass domestic hindrances and create domestic political
reform. The strategy of blame avoidance or ‘scape-goating’ indicates this
dynamic. It means that governments participate in shaping policies and
institutions at the European level, but later blame the EU for any changes in
domestic policies and institutions, thereby reducing the political costs for the
national politicians of unpopular policies and institutional changes (Moravcsik
1998: 74). This view rests upon the similar instrumental assumption that the
domestic administrative institutions, and the national governments, through co-
ordinated efforts, are able to shape and alter their environments in manners that
are consistent with their own preferences and positions.
The path-dependency of the EU
An institutional perspective is less optimistic on the possibilities for the
member states to be the ‘masters of the treaties’ and to arbitrarily alter and
reform the institutional arrangements at the European level. Decision making at
the European level is not dependent only upon the preferences and the powers
of the nation state, but also affected by certain institutional characteristics at
the European level, reflecting the shadow of the past. Increased
institutionalization at the European level decreases the possibility of choosing
institutional arrangements.
The development at the European level is following a path-dependent course
(Pierson 1996). Previous decisions have created a developmental course that
structure decision making of the present, thus creating difficulties for the
member states of the EU to alter the course. European decision making is
taking place within a distinct institutional setting and an institutional
framework, with established rules, norms and a certain logic of
appropriateness, that skew decision making in distinct directions. Established
institutional practices and rules make certain alternative more likely than
others. Finally, decision making in the EU is situated in a distinct temporal
setting and the agenda for reform is ambiguous, being affected by other current
events and ongoing processes of reform and change, which is beyond the
control of the member states and the national governments.
If the level of institutionalization is weak, and there are few structures that bind
the member states to past decisions, it is more likely that the domestic
institutions are able to adapt to their environment by altering their environment.
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However, if decision making at the European level is more strongly
institutionalized and path-dependent, it is less likely that the domestic
institutions are able to adapt to their environment by altering their environment.
As the EU emerges as an increasingly more institutionalized and established
polity, the legacies of the past and the existence of rules and practices play an
increasingly more important role in shaping the evolutionary route of the EU
If there is consensus among the governments that they should seek to alter the
policies and institutions at the European level, it is more likely that the
governments will be successful in doing this, than in a situation characterized
by ambiguity and disagreement among the governments.
1. 5 Research sites
These research questions are formulated in a general manner. The dissertation
aims at investigating them empirically through a set of case studies. The
empirical focus is on the European integration process that has been taking
place within the framework of the European Union. The legal, administrative
and economic capacities of the EU, combined with its multiple functions and
extensive tasks, has made the EU into the most significant institution for
political and economic integration.
The history of Europe can be phrased as a history of attempts to integrate and
disintegrate the continent. Efforts of integration have been supported by
violence, military force and coercion, and by the use of peaceful, diplomatic
and political means. The idea of European integration has a long history, 12 and
several of the attempts to create European integration have affected the
domestic administrative institutions, some of which have left lasting imprints.
More recently, and concurrently with the emergence of the EU, the domestic
administrative institutions have been affected by other international
organizations. For instance the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
                                                                
12 For instance, as early as 1306 there was a proposal for the development of a
permanent assembly of princes in Europe to secure peace. In the 16th century William
Penn argued for the establishment of a European parliament. In the 18th century
Jeremy Bentham argued for the same and even the establishment of common army. At
same time Jean-Jacques Rousseau suggested to create a European federation. In 1814
Henri Saint-Simon argued for the establishment of a unified institutional apparatus in
Europe. By the end of the ninetieth century these issues were discussed extensively
and there was even a journal with the name of ‘United States of Europe’ (Urwin 1995.
2-3).
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Development (OECD), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the
Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) etc., which have been important and integrated in the activity of the
domestic administrations. In principle, it would have been fruitful to
investigate the importance and impact of all of these organizations on the
domestic administrations, however, the scale and scope of such an inquiry is
too extensive for a single dissertation. By focusing on the EU, the focus is on
the far most important political, economic, legal and cultural institution that is
presently imposing challenges on the nation state.
Analyzing the integration and disintegration processes in relation to the EU
also serve to limit the time perspective of this inquiry. The time horizon of the
dissertation is the European integration process and the domestic
administrative adaptations as they have evolved from the end of the 1980s until
the end of the 1990s. This is a crucial ten-year period characterized by an
intensification of the European integration process, and a significant increase in
the involvement of the domestic administrative institutions.
The first case investigates the importance of the dynamics of interaction and
the dynamics of anticipation in explaining domestic administrative adaptation.
In order to examine this question it is necessary to investigate the character and
extent of the processes of change that takes place before the member states
start interacting as regular members of the EU. The empirical focus of Chapter
2 is on the processes of adaptation that took place in two Norwegian domestic
administrative institutions when they were seeking closer relationship to the
European co-operation. The focus is on the processes of adaptation that took
place in the period from 1987 until 1993.
The second and third case investigates the relevance of a distinct formal
association to the EU.  In order to examine this question we have to examine
the pattern of adaptations that are taking place in countries that have different
forms of association to the EU. Two articles are devoted to this issue. Chapter
3 is an extensive analysis of the adaptation that has been taking place within
the Norwegian domestic administrative system. Chapter 4 is a comparison
between the processes of adaptation in Norway and Switzerland as a result of
increased European integration.
Norway and Switzerland are small European countries that are not members of
the European Union. They have different formal linkages and types of
association to the EU. While Norway has several formal linkages to the EU and
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participates in multi-lateral co-operation, Switzerland’s relationship to the EU
is less formalized and more dependent upon informal and limited bilateral
agreements. Norway is member of the EEA, the Schengen agreement and has
developed some linkages to the third pillar in the EU, while Switzerland has
not signed the EEA agreement, is not a member of the Schengen Agreement,
and has less tight linkages to the third pillar in the EU.
These two chapters were published as two separate entities. Since they are
designed for different audiences, there is some overlap in the data presented in
the two chapters. However, there are still important differences between them.
The first chapter is a more intensive analysis of the domestic institutional
adaptation in Norway, while the second chapter is a more extensive analysis
comparing the Swiss and the Norwegian case.
The fourth case investigates the balance between the European level pressure
for change, and the importance of pre-established institutional networks and
structures, in understanding the dynamics of Europeanization. The empirical
case is the development of a European statistical system and the
implementation of new statistical regulations and requirements by the domestic
administrative institutes. Statistics and accounts play an important role in
political processes. They provide interpretations, explanations and codification
of experiences, and they are providing an informational basis for governmental
decision-making. The empirical focus in Chapter 5 is primarily on the
development of European statistics in relation to the convergence criteria,
which was crucial in determining membership in the Economic and Monetary
Union in the EU. This is a case of considerable external pressure for change,
but at the same time, there were pre-established institutional arrangements and
practices for international co-operation within a fairly homogeneous
community of professional statisticians.
The fifth case is an analysis of the possibilities for the national governments
and the domestic administrative institutions to adapt to their environments by
seeking to change and adapt their environments. The empirical focus in
Chapter 6 is the 1996-7 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which led to the
Amsterdam treaty. If the national governments are the ‘masters of the treaties’
it is believed that they are able to alter and change such treaties in manners that
are consistent with their preferences and powers. But how, and to what extent,
are the possibilities for the national governments and the domestic
administrative institutions to alter their European environments constrained by
the shadow of the past and the increasing institutionalization of the EU?
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The case of the 1996-7 IGC offered a unique match between a specific
theoretical model and an empirical situation, which it was supposed to fit well.
Viewing treaty revision processes as stemming from bargaining among the
member states is consistent with the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism.
The ambition of the liberal intergovernmental perspective is to explain ‘the
substantive and institutional development’ of the EU through the sequential
analysis of national preference formation and intergovernmental strategic
interaction (Moravcsik 1993: 480). This perspective is supposed to fit
particularly well with a key bargaining situation of a constitutional nature
(Weiler et al. 1995: 24). The good match between this particular theoretical
perspective and the case of the 1996-7 IGC thus created a unique opportunity
for testing the theory on the basis of a single-case design.
It is worth noting that while the empirical cases examine certain aspects of the
questions in detail, the cases do not allow for an equally extensive coverage of
all aspects of these questions. Rather than developing general and universally
valid answers to these questions, the dissertation aims at improving our
understanding of the dynamics of European integration and domestic
administrative adaptation, by exploring and revealing the dynamics of
institutional adaptation in certain critical cases, under certain conditions in a
specific period of time. A more general and universally rigorous examination
would require a more extensive research design, with more cases and a longer
time perspective. The research questions are not treated as mutually exclusive,
i.e. as either/or questions. Instead, the empirical investigations seek to reveal
the mixture and combination of these different dynamics when examining
processes of Europeanization of the domestic administrative institutions.
1. 6 Research design
Although there are some differences in the research design applied in the
different articles, they share several fundamental empirical and methodological
properties. The empirical material is based upon qualitative method for data
collection. The main sources of information have been open sources. Official
documents from the relevant European institutions, as well as the relevant
domestic administrative institutions have been systematically collected and
analyzed. At the European level these sources have been green papers, white
papers, legislation, speeches and various annual reports and publications. At
the domestic and institutional level these sources have been internal reports,
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strategic plans, budget documents, speeches, and various domestic
documentation and research material. In addition, some archival materials in
the Norwegian Ministries have been used in the first three chapters. Interviews
and meetings with key personnel have been used as an important source for
completing, supplementing and cross-checking the official documents.
Open sources and public documents can generally be perceived as valuable and
reliable sources of information. When studying the adaptations in the domestic
administrative institutions to European integration, we focus on the formal and
informal, normative and functional pressure they experience. Large parts of
these pressures for change are expressed in official documents. Written and
open sources are particularly helpful, since the European integration process is
a process were legal texts and documents play prominent roles. Relying upon
open sources and official documents has therefore proved to be very fruitful
when examining processes of Europeanization. 13
Other open sources have also been used extensively. The daily news bulletin
Agence Europe, which cover a wide range of issues and policy developments at
the European and domestic level, has been a useful source. The Agence Europe
has had extensive coverage of the issues examined in chapter five and six. I
have also benefited from investigating more specialized journals and
periodicals relevant for the various topics. For instance, the newsletter/journal
Sigma on European statistics, has been a valuable source in analyzing the
Europeanization of the statistical system in Europe. In addition, ‘European
newspapers’ covering European issues broadly, like the Financial Times, the
Guardian, the European Voice, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Die
Zeit, have been helping sources. The Scandinavian newspapers; Dagens
Nyheter (Sweden); Aftenposten (Norway);  Dagens Næringsliv (Norway);  and
Politiken (Denmark), in addition to the Swiss newspaper Neue Zürcher
Zeitung, have been important in finding relevant information related to the first
three chapters. In addition, I have made use of a vast amount of secondary
literature discussing issues that have been relevant for this study. The
secondary literature stretches beyond the literature in political science, and
covering research in the field of history, economics and law, giving a valuable
                                                                
13 For instance, when George Ross wrote his acclaimed investigation of the Delors
Commission it became obvious that the open sources were very valuable and reliable.
Ross states: ‘He assigned me to read the bulk of Delors’s speeches after 1985. If I
wanted a short cut into what the cabinet had done over the years, this was the best way
he claimed (…) Delors’s strategic ideas and announcements, along with cogent and
persuasive arguments to support them were all there’ (Ross 1995: 55).
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additional dimension to certain of the topics discussed.
Increased popular and academic interest and involvement in the EU have led to
improved quality and richness of this material. Extensive use of these sources
has also made it possible to track political processes and decision-making
processes over time, thereby providing a better understanding of the processes
of change. By combining and holding together information from various open
sources, with information in internal or gray documents and the information
found in more specialized periodicals, and in the secondary literature, it has
been possible to create a fairly reliable picture of the changes that are taking
place.
All the articles, except chapter six, are designed as exploratory research. An
exploratory research design starts out with some basic theoretical assumptions,
with a well-defined purpose and with relatively clear evaluation criteria. An
explanatory design, in contrast, start with clear and well refined propositions
that are tested in experiments and surveys. Although there is a rich empirical
base in the field of Europeanization, the established systematic knowledge of
the actual dynamics involved is not very strong, rather it is, as already noted,
patchy (Haverland 1999). It is therefore difficult to make strong and refined
statements and propositions and then go out and test them in a rigorous
statistical test. Under such conditions of uncertainty an exploratory research
design is preferable. Chapter six, however, is designed as a test of a dominant
theory on the basis of a single case.
Case studies rarely allow for generalizations. When making statistical
generalizations an inference is made about a population on the basis of data
collected about a sample. The design of this dissertation gives limited
possibilities for generalizations, because of the sample of the cases and the size
of the sample. However, the consistent focus on institutional theory is
important for the possibilities for making general conclusions. When a fairly
well developed theory, or a set of basic assumptions, is used to establish a
ground for comparing the empirical results of the cases studied, and when the
cases support the same theory, or the same basic assumptions, there is a
potential for making an ‘analytical generalization’ (Yin 1994:31). Since, each
of the articles takes an institutional approach to the study of Europeanization of
the domestic administrative institutions, this research design can allow for
making analytical generalizations.
Scholars taking an institutional approach have been criticized for being
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occupied with the historical evolution of a specific institution in the European
integration and disintegration process. Case studies are frequently seen in
isolation from other cases. It is argued that the emphasis on case studies are
burdening the studies of European integration, tending to underdetermine the
outcome of the processes, and lending itself too much towards ‘Sonderweg’
explanations (Moravcsik 1998: 79). The particular cut of this dissertation --
investigating a set of cases but still closely linked to a set of clearly formulated
interrelated theoretical questions -- is one response to this methodological
critique. By increasing the number of cases, and by designing comparative
cases, we are in a better position to map out certain general features and
dynamics involved in processes of Europeanization and domestic
administrative adaptation, and perhaps thereby move beyond the Sonderweg-
trap.
However, the dissertation does not escape some general methodological
difficulties involved in examining processes of Europeanization of the nation
state. In particular, two problems are obvious. In relation to studies of
Europeanization we are faced with the difficulties of controlling for the fact
that different independent variables might lead to the same result on the
dependent variable. If we observe that there is a relation between x and y,
without being aware of, or ignoring, the factor z, which might have caused y,
we might be dealing with spurious effects. It is a difficult challenge to isolate
the effects of Europeanization from other external and internal dynamics. For
instance, certain changes that we ascribe to European integration could in fact
be a result of larger processes of globalization (Keohane and Milner 1996). In
order to cope with the risk of spurious effects the dissertation seek to identify
the independent effects of these factors by process-tracking and carefully
examining the temporal order of various events.
Second, when analyzing institutional adaptation we are well aware that
processes of institutional change often take time. When institutional stability
and robustness are reported, we should ask whether this result due to having a
too short time perspective. Furthermore, since we are observing an ongoing
process of change we should be aware that we might observe stages of
transition, rather than permanently new states. Any students of current
institutional changes are faced with these difficulties. The only way to cope
with this challenge is to expand the time-horizon, enlarge our sample and
express modesty when making the conclusions.
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1. 7 Research findings
When confronting the research questions with these sites and this design, we
are left with a set of interesting findings. Let me briefly summarize some of
them.
In chapter two it is argued that the adaptations and changes in the Norwegian
domestic administrative to increased European integration, where to a large
degree resulting from processes of anticipation and autonomous adaptation,
and not resulting from experiences of interaction at the European level.
The Norwegian political leadership perceived the development in Europe both
as a potential threat and as an opportunity. Through a series of conscious
initiatives and reforms, the leadership initiated administrative reforms enabling
the domestic administrative institutions to handle the new challenges stemming
from European integration. International deadlines, rather than legal and
financial pressures, triggered the attention of the administration and lead to
reallocation and shifts in the priorities of the administration.
Despite of the fact that European integration was perceived as a considerable
challenge and was perceived as a break with the past, the domestic
administrative institutions were primarily passive and reluctant. The new tasks
did not lead to major reforms and extensive reorganization. The administration
allocated few permanently new resources to the field. New tasks were
primarily resolved within the existing administrative apparatus, and few new
institutions were established. This institutional robustness, however, did not
lead to a dramatic crisis in effectiveness or legitimacy. The domestic
administrative institutions were able to resolve the new and demanding tasks
stemming from increased European integration within the existing institutional
structure, thereby demonstrating considerable flexibility within fixed
institutional structures.
In chapter three and four it is argued that the form of association with the EU is
important in understanding how the domestic administrative institutions adapt
and respond to European integration. However, formal association is not
equally important in all fields, and it is perhaps not as important as most of the
literature in the field of European integration and domestic administrative
institutions suggests.
Both Norway and Switzerland have seeked closer relationship with the EU.
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Norway has applied for membership in the EU, while Switzerland seeked
membership in the EEA. In both countries, small majorities have turned down
the proposal in national referendums. Nevertheless, the governments in these
countries have made substantial efforts to re-orient their political and
administrative system toward increased European integration. New
organizations have been established and new procedures for securing sufficient
co-ordination and control have been developed. Cross-border contacts between
domestic institutions and institutions at the European level have increased in
scope and importance. European contacts and regulations are considered
important within most policy fields, even in the fields traditionally dominated
by domestic considerations. Increased attention, time and energy have been
devoted to European issues and they have been able to develop shared decision
making institutions with the EU.
These findings challenge the standard assumption, that the effects of the EU on
the non-member states are significantly different than its effects on the non-
member states. It is showed that domestic institutions and policies are affected
by the linkage between the EU and the nation state, as well as by the domestic
institutional structures and the policies involved. The evidence indicates that
while membership in the EU does matter, it is not sufficient in determining the
extent and direction of national institutional adaptation. It is demonstrated that
non-member states and member states are linked to the EU in formal and
informal ways. Non-member states experience a higher level of uncertainty
regarding access to EU markets compared with the member states. In order to
reduce uncertainty and increase legitimacy non-member states make extensive
adaptations in their political and administrative systems, enabling them to cope
with changes in their environment. They develop linkages to the EU system,
try to influence European policy, and activate side-arenas to promote their
interests. Aiming at reducing their costs of non-integration and at increasing
their effectiveness in European co-operation, non-member states adapt in more
or less similar ways as member states do. However, since they also have fewer
possibilities and capacities to influence and control decision-making in the EU,
than the member states, these arrangements raises questions about the
legitimacy and sustainability of such forms of association. In addition, there are
variations between Norway and Switzerland in the extent and dynamics of
Europeanization. These could be explained by the variation in their form of
association with the EU. Norway is linked to a legal process of continuos
adaptation within the EEA framework, Switzerland is linked to the EU through
political agreements based on case-by-case co-operation.
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Chapter five examines the balance between the creation of radically new forms
of co-ordination and organization at the European level, on the one hand, and
the exploitation of pre-existing institutional ties and networks, on the other. I
argue that the Europeanization of the domestic statistical institutions were
dependent upon a specific match between a political pressure for achieving a
satisfactory level of adaptation to new standards, and the possibility of
exploiting pre-established professional networks.
The issue of implementing the Economic and Monetary Union, brought the
issue of integrating the national statistical systems, and developing a joint
statistical system in Europe, to the top of the political agenda. The new tasks
and political goals of creating the EMU sparked a wave of efforts to develop a
new statistical system, and the new statistical system was one instrument
designed for measuring and monitoring economic activity. The political
initiative and commitment for creating the EMU gave legitimacy to developing
extensive statistical co-operation, and it gave momentum to the domestic
administrative adaptation. The newly created European statistical system and
the European statistical institution (Eurostat) could be perceived as a normative
environment imposing changes and providing new standards for the domestic
statistical institutions. However, since the Eurostat had limited capacity,
administratively, legally and financially, to impose such changes, the power of
the Eurostat was not the one of an independent strong supra-national body and
a strong functional environment demanding changes.
The driving mechanism of change was rather the exploitation and use of pre-
established networks and professional communities. There had been a long
history of international statistical co-operation within the UN and OECD, and
there was a professional statistical community with shared understandings,
methods and standards. In creating the statistical system required for the EMU,
the Eurostat, close co-operation and interplay with the domestic statistical
institutions, developed and authorized the statistical system in accordance with
standards consistent with other international regimes. This commitment to
comply with the international standards and the professional logic of
appropriateness of the statistical community eased the adaptation process.
Still, the adaptation to the new standards and tasks proved to be an uneasy
process. Statistical systems were firmly entrenched in the nation state, and
statistical agencies differed in their capacities to adapt and resolve the new
tasks. Strict deadlines, few resources, a strong political willingness to meet the
convergence criteria, combined with ambiguous European standards and rules
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for approving the statistical indicators, led to an extensive use of creative
accounting, rather than actual economic changes. Consequently, as the EMU
triggered a wave of increased technical specialization and refinement of
European statistics, it also fostered a wave of politicization of statistics,
questioning the normative bias of statistical indicators.
In chapter six, the examination of the decision-making in the 1996-7 IGC
shows that the increasing institutionalization at the European level, limited the
possibilities for the domestic administrative institutions to respond to their
environments by seeking to manipulate their environments.
Three mechanisms were particularly important. First, past decisions created the
framework and the agenda for the 1996-7 IGC. This path-dependency dictated
the issues on the agenda, and determined the manner in which they were
framed, limiting the possibility of radical solutions to existing problems.
Second, the very model of intergovernmental bargaining in the EU had
changed from previous conferences. The increase in the number of member
states and the changes in the procedures for handling the IGC increased the
complexity of the bargaining process. Information and communication became
more costly and more complicated, reducing the possibilities for the national
governments to affect and manage the agenda. The Europeanization of the
domestic administrative institutions of the nation states made it difficult to
maintain the idea of a clear separation between domestic position formation
and international negotiation, as argued by Moravcsik (1993, 1998). The
normative crisis concerning the democratic deficit in the EU had ultimately
transformed the mode of institutional reform in the EU, altering its logic of
appropriateness. The gradual democratization of the EU made the process of
treaty revision different to that of secret bargaining among national
governments within a system of technocratic diplomacy. Finally, a series of
other pressing events, as well as the location of the conference in a distinct
temporal order created an ambiguous agenda and ambiguity about the issues
addressed during the treaty revision process. These three factors; the path-
dependency of the EU; the organization of the conference and the impossibility
of the national governments to firmly control the agenda, contributed to
reduced the possibility of the national government to act as the masters of the
treaty and adapt to the EU, by seeking to alter their environments.
40
1. 8 Conclusions and implications
These findings have implications for how we think about processes of
Europeanization of the domestic administrative institutions. Three questions
have played a prominent role in relation to the Europeanization of the domestic
administrative institutions. First, to what extent are the domestic administrative
institutions adapting to European integration? Second, if they are adapting, to
what extent can we observe a move towards convergence? Finally, are these
changes best explained by reference to external developments, domestic
leadership or institutional characteristics? The point of departure of this
dissertation was that these questions were badly understood and the answers
provided to them were fragmented. While some claimed that the EU had
limited impact on the domestic administrative institutions, others argued that
the EU imposed radical demands on the domestic administrative institutions,
ultimately leading towards convergence in the domestic administrative
institutions. The findings in the dissertation indicate different balances of
change and continuity, and they show some of the mechanisms leading to this
variation.
The considerable extent and scope of the Europeanization process
demonstrated in this dissertation challenge the view that the Europeanization
does not bring with it any substantial changes in the national administrative
structures of the member states (Page and Wouters 1995). The findings
demonstrate that the processes of European integration are affecting most areas
of the domestic administrative institutions, and that the impact of the EU is
significant. Domestic administrative institutions have incorporated European
rules and standards into their ordinary activity. The agendas, beliefs, values and
objectives that are held in the domestic administrative institutions are being
increasingly shared across the borders. The interdependencies between the
domestic administrative institutions have increased within and among the
countries.
Moreover, processes of Europeanization are not limited by the formal
boundaries of the EU. The impact of the EU stretches well beyond the impact
on the member states, and onto the states that are not members of the EU, and
even states that have weak linkages to the EU. Naturally, the states that are not
members of the EU have experienced less extensive pressures for change, and
are affected by the EU in fewer areas, and to a lesser extent, than the member
states. Like some of the member states, the non-member states are also able to
buffer themselves from the EU agenda in certain areas. Nevertheless, the
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domestic administrative institutions of the non-member states are still affected
by the EU to such an extent, that it challenges the view that non-member states
are adapting in a pattern that is radically different than the pattern in the
member states (Sandholtz 1993, Wessels and Rometsch 1996).
Europeanization is therefore not dichotomous. We should clarify the magnitude
of Europeanization, instead of asking whether or not these states are affected
by European integration.
However, while the dissertation demonstrates that the EU has had significant
impact on the domestic administrative institutions, the findings are not
supporting the view that there is a move towards administrative convergence
(Majone 1996, Mény et al. 1996). Three different mechanisms explain this lack
of convergence. First, the ambiguities of the European level are creating a
fragmenting pressure on the domestic administrative institutions, creating
considerable leeway for local and domestic variation in the pattern of
adaptation. In the EU, there is no clear general European public administration
policy, and there are few institutional blue-prints for the domestic
administrative institutions to adapt to, and there are no shared understanding of
a ‘best practice’ to adapt to. Since there are ambiguous pressure for change, the
leeway for local variation in the adaptation increases, and the likelihood for
convergence decreases.
Second, in coping with the challenges faced by increased European integration,
the domestic administrative institutions have experienced few attempts of
comprehensive domestic administrative reorganization. The new tasks and
responsibilities have primarily been handled within the existing administrative
structures. New tasks have been resolved through the use of existing domestic
administrative structures, and by exploiting slack resources. Since, the
adaptation process is exploiting existing arrangements; it is thus less likely that
there will be a process of convergence of the domestic administrative
institutions across the borders.
Third, processes of Europeanization are not characterized by the development
of co-operation in radically new areas. In many areas the European integration
process is driven by, and benefiting from, other forms of international co-
operation, and by exploiting pre-established professional networks of co-
operation. Since the domestic administrative institutions have already well
established procedures and institutions for handling these issues, the likelihood
for further convergence decreases.
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These findings, indicating adaptability combined with modest institutional
structural changes, raises important challenges for students of institutions and
institutional change in general, and students of Europeanization in particular.
Since changes primarily seem to take place within existing institutional
arrangements, we are reminded that we have to be careful when assessing how
institutions operate and change. Rather than perceiving institutions as fined
tuned ‘Formula 1’ racing machines, fitting perfectly with a competitive
environment, or being fine tuned instruments for the domestic political
leadership, the institutional perspective suggest that institutions should perhaps
be perceived as rough ‘terrain vehicles’ able to perform and reform a wide
variety of tasks. Institutions have a large repertoire of standard operating
procedures, enabling them to resolve many tasks within fixed structures
(March and Simon 1993). Students of institutions and institutional change
should therefore be careful when treating institutional structures as
determining, and instead perceive them as holding a wider repertoire of
potential actions and rules, which could be activated under different
circumstances.
The dissertation also contributes to improve our understanding of the
fundamental driving mechanisms of processes of Europeanization. Processes of
Europeanization are not tightly coupled to a clear environmental pressure, nor
are they carefully designed and planned by the domestic leadership. The
processes of adaptation should be seen as loosely coupled and co-evolving
processes. Loosely coupled processes mean that the European level is not
imposing imperatives, but causes some kind of responsiveness. The domestic
administrative institutions adapt in a distinct manner, and their adaptations can
take some time and follow different routes. This loose coupling is evident
because the European level affects the domestic administrative institutions
negligibly rather than producing a specific pattern, often indirectly, rather than
directly, and eventually rather than immediately. European integration is thus
giving direction to a co-evolving developmental course rather than creating
imperatives for administrative and political organization at the domestic level.
When examining loosely coupled processes it is not obvious that one specific
theoretical model is superior to the others in capturing these complexities
(March and Olsen 1998: 958). The dissertation indicates that the processes of
Europeanization seem to depend upon a matching between environmental
pressures, domestic reform attempts, and institutional characteristics in a
specific period of time, involving several layers of adaptation. In the EU, the
variation in these matches varies considerably. Since the processes of
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Europeanization are complex, involving many problems, solutions and
institutions, it is likely that we as students need to enlarge our repertoire of
explanatory models.
Despite a prevailing ambiguity at the European level, and considerable
variation in the degree and extent of adaptation at the domestic level, the
dissertation suggests a development towards less ambiguity and less leeway for
domestic institutional variation. As the EU is becoming more institutionalized,
with more and better established collection of rules, practices and regulations,
it is becoming increasingly more likely that for new members the processes of
adaptation through anticipation will take precedence over processes of
adaptation through interaction. The EU is widening its boundaries, through a
range of formal and informal linkages to countries not yet being members of
the EU, reducing the likelihood that even non-member states pursue an
alternative course. In addition, the path-dependent development of the EU with
a growing collection of rules and procedures makes it difficult for the member
states to adapt individually to their environments, and to alter and change the
European level.
These tendencies indicate that the processes of Europeanization are moving
from loosely coupled processes, towards more tightly coupled processes. The
ongoing reforms of the European Commission can be viewed as one attempt to
develop an encompassing European public administration policy. 14 This reform
is primarily aimed at altering the European institutions, but it is also
representing challenges for the domestic administrative institutions. The
demands imposed upon the domestic administrative institutions of the
applicant countries from Eastern and Central Europe (Biernat 1997, Friis and
Murphy 1999) can be perceived as another attempt to impose demand on the
domestic administrative institutions. Both of these reforms can be potentially
be the embryo of a more extensive and wide-ranging European public
administration policy, indicating more tight couplings between the European
level and the domestic administrative institutions.
However, there are also counter-forces to this development. The crisis of the
                                                                
14 For instance: ‘Kinnock began work on his reform program by asking two questions:
What tasks and functions will the Commission perform in years to come, and what
sort of organization must it be in order to fulfil those duties. These are questions which
have rarely been addressed in the years past, and never answered until now, and yet
they are crucial for the institution if it is to rise to the challenges facing it’ European
Voice, 20-26 January 2000.
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European Commission, which revealed fraud and mismanagement, has
contributed to decrease the status, legitimacy and relative importance of the
European institutions in general, and it has strengthened the relative
importance of the role of the member states in decision-making within the EU.
Moreover, as more of the attention and interest in the EU is being allocated to
areas where the EU is weakly institutionalized, for instance in areas like Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA), as well as in the development of a Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP), the balance between the European level and the
domestic level might, at least temporary, shift.
The developmental tendency towards less loose couplings in processes of
Europeanization raises opportunities and challenges for the possibility of
effective and democratic governance at the European and national level. On the
one hand, the local variation in pattern of adaptation, and the lack of a clear
general European public administration policy can be perceived as a threat to
the EU. The lack of a uniform European public administration, and the lack of
a converging pattern of domestic administrative institutions, leads to
heterogeneity in interpretation and implementation of EU regulations. This
variation creates a growing ‘implementation deficit’, threatening the co-
operation within the EU and in the longer run potentially undermining the very
foundation of the EU (Metcalfe 1994). It is argued that domestic variation
leads to reduced ability and capability of the domestic administrations to fulfil
their responsibilities following from being EU member. Local notions of
‘justice’ and local rationality are weakening the overall effectiveness of the EU
(Dehousse 1997). Similarly, difficulties of accountability and transparency are
reducing the legitimacy of the EU system (Everson 1998). By tightening the
couplings and developing a less ambiguous European public administration
policy, the effectiveness, legitimacy and sustainability of the integration
process might therefore increase.
On the other hand, as this dissertation has demonstrated, the lack of a clear
overarching public administration and the relatively weak European powers to
impose specific changes in the domestic administration might also be
considered as a factor facilitating European integration. Since there is no ‘blue-
print’ to adapt to, the likelihood that the domestic administrative institutions
are exploiting existing institutional arrangements, rather than exploring and
experimenting with new institutional forms increases. Moreover, the lack of a
fixed European public administration policy has created slack for the domestic
administrative institutions enabling them to exploit existing arrangements and
increase their ability to resolve problems in a satisfactory manner within short
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deadlines. Since processes of reorganization and administrative reform, in
general, tend to be filled with conflicts and trigger resistance to change (March
and Olsen 1989), adapting to European integration through the dynamic of
exploiting existing institutional arrangements can therefore seen as one way of
smoothening the adaptation process. A tighter coupling in processes of
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Chapter 2:Adaptation as anticipation: The Norwegian
Administration in the EEA Process
2. 1 Introduction15
In May 1992, the EC and EFTA signed the agreement to create the European
Economic Area (EEA). The parties agreed to create a dynamic and
homogeneous European economic space, based upon common rules and equal
conditions for competition. In addition, the parties agreed to develop a set of
institutions securing that the initial agreement could be implemented and
effectuated.16
This chapter is an examination of how and to what extent the creation of the
EEA agreement affected the Norwegian domestic administrative institutions.
The EEA process carried both challenges and possibilities for the political-
administrative system in Norway. In the work with the EEA agreement the
administration faced new and different tasks. A high degree of political
attention and short deadlines together contributed to give the adaptation
process a special manifestation. This article analyzes the adaptation process in
the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police and in Ministry of Finance.
The empirical material article builds partly on the results from the more
extensive analyzes of the Ministry of Justice and the Police (Farsund 1993) and
of the Ministry of Finance (Sverdrup 1994). Both of these ministries are
significant in the Norwegian political organization; both have long histories
and traditions and could show robustness when it came to changes.
Domestic administrative institutions play a central role in the formation and
implementation of policies within the European co-operation. Earlier studies
nevertheless have either been directed toward the European institutions, for
example the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European
Court of Justice and the European Parliament, or toward different policy areas
                                                                
15 This chapter was first published as ‘Norsk Forvaltning i EØS –prosessen – noen
empiriske resultat’ published in Nordisk Administrativt tidskrift, Vol 75,  1994, pp 48-
67.  The article was written in co-operation with Arild Aurvåg Farsund. Many people
have contributed with invaluable comments to earlier versions. We would especially
like to thank Johan P. Olsen, Linda Sangolt and Lars Chr. Blichner. The work has
been partially financed by the LOS Centre and by ARENA (Advanced Research on
the Europeanisation of the Nation-state).
16 The content of the EEA agreement and the shape of the EEA institution is presented
in chapter 3 and chapter 4.
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within the EC co-operation such as agriculture, the environment, energy and so
on. Few systematic studies have so far been done of the changes and adaptation
found in EC and EFTA countries’ national political and administrative
institutions. Nevertheless it appears that there is increasing interest in political
science to understand the national political and administrative adaptation
processes (Siedentopf and Ziller 1988, Klöti 1991, Toonen 1992, Olsen 1992,
Keohane and Hoffman 1992,  Jacobsson 1993, Blichner and Sangolt 1993).
Our approach to the study of policies is what is called a (new) institutional
perspective (March and Olsen 1989, Olsen 1993, March and Simon, 1993).
These approach views political processes as highly imprinted by the historical
and institutional structures they operate within. Institutional structures provide
possibilities and determine limitations as to what policies it is possible to carry
out. This article argues that national and institutional traditions and character
contribute to shaping different and unique solutions to the same possibilities
and challenges.  Institutional and political changes are thereby just as much
expressions of characteristics of the domestic political system and traditional
institutional solutions as responses determined by the European co-operation,
or following from intense interaction at the European level.
In this article, attention is directed toward the processes of Europeanization
(Olsen 1992, Blichner and Sangolt 1992, Jacobsson 1993). Europeanization
includes adapting to and participating in a political, administrative, cultural and
legal change process. The process can also be understood as a part of a larger
historical transformation or modernization, where expressions of national
identity, sovereignty and democracy are challenged, and it can involve change
of meaning and content. Approaching the Europeanization process will demand
historical studies with long time horizons. In the shorter term, Europeanization
also includes a question about the terms for controlling, co-ordinating and
governing the changes. Here we concentrate on this last understanding of
Europeanization. For Norway the term is tightly associated with the binding
European co-operation within the frame of the EEA agreement and an eventual
EC membership (Blichner and Sangolt 1993).17
                                                                
17  Blichner and Sangolt (1993) also show how the ‘neutral’ term internationalization
is systematically preferred in the Norwegian public documents over the presumptively
more politically controversial term Europeanization. Internationalization means that
there has occurred a graduate growth of networks of organizations, communication
and transactions across countries’ borders (Underdal, 1984).
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Thematically, the article is divided into four main parts. In the first part three
different points of view of domestic institutional adaptation are discussed. In
the next section three central frames within which the adaptation process took
place are presented. The institutional approximation that is chosen has a basis
in history’s relevance; therefore a good deal of space is dedicated to analyzing
framework conditions. Additionally, the adaptation processes in the two
ministries are analyzed. The analysis is divided in three phases representing
three time periods. In each of the phases features of both EEA process and
institutional adaptation are analyzed. The conclusion discusses some possible
challenges that Europeanization represents for democratic control and co-
ordination of European policies.
2. 2 Explaining change – three different points of view
There are different contexts regarding the processes society and the
administration are faced with when it comes to increased participation in
European co-operation. It is possible to identify at least three different points of
view or pictures of reality in the public debate. These contexts can be found
among politicians, as well as in the academic debate. Often, the different
explanations are used more or less unconsciously about each other.  Here,
however, we shall try to isolate the different viewpoints. The aim is to clarify
which political change mechanisms are implied in the different points of view.
The first point of view is tied to the concept that Norway is forced to adapt
more or less to already established European norms, standards, rules and
behaviours. In such an understanding adaptation has no reference to individual
actors or isolated occurrences. The development is an adaptation to forces
outside of the institution, such as for example the economy or technology. The
mechanism in such a point of view is that if the Norwegian society in general,
and the administrative institutions especially, is not able to adapt effectively to
the external terms, they will lose in the competition. If Norwegian institutions
are not able to further their viewpoint, they will lose legitimacy. It can also be
expected that institutions can have different rates of adaptation. It is therefore
possible to divide adapters into fast and slow adaptive institutions due to,
among other things, space for learning. The logic is the same; there is one best
solution and some are more effective in relation to tempo in the adaptation
process. Statements of the type, ‘the logic of economic and social integration
continuously demonstrates the need for increasingly tighter political unity in
the EU system’, illustrate that adaptation is more or less a compelled necessity
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that is a result of forces outside of the Norwegian system (Andersen and
Eliassen 1993: 267). In the same manner, it has been asserted that the
administration, through increased European co-operation, is forced to adapt to
a new administrative culture and working methods (Smidt 1989). In principle
there is no possibility for free choice in a functional explanation such as this.
The second point of view is tied to the concept that increased participation in
European co-operation is an expression of conscious political design and
attempts at control. While the first view implies that there is limited, if any,
possibility for deliberate design, the second point of view is characterized by
optimism as regard to the condition for design. The logic in this model is that
there is a clear differentiation between politics and administration. The
administration is viewed as an instrument for realizing the sitting government’s
goals and priorities. Narrowly formulated it can be said that the institutional
structure is a result of the political leaders’ strategy. Institutional solutions are
therefore a result of design (Egeberg 1984). In such a model, changes will be a
result of changes in goals by the political leaders or shifts in political leaders.
Statements of the type, ‘Organizational solutions in the administration in
Norway will be a Norwegian choice’, illustrate such an understanding of
reality. 18 There are degrees of freedom for the political leadership to make real
choices. This view assumes that the political leaders have insight, have
willingness, and are able to realize their goals.
The two first points of view hold that change in itself is relatively
unproblematic. Either it is a result of a necessary forced adaptation or a result
of free choice. Neither of these points of view emphasizes that institutional
change often can be difficult and some cases take a very long time. Often,
change occurs only as rhetoric or as symbolic change, while the fundamental
institutional structures and forms of behaviour remain unchanged. Statements
of the type, ‘One does not sweep away several hundred years tradition and
administrative culture with a stroke of the pen’, illustrate a minimal belief in
fast and flexible adaptations.19 A third view of the adaptation process asserts
the importance of the individual institution’s historically developed routines
and experience. Conscious control attempts are often viewed as difficult and
will seldom succeed. Institutions are autonomous, and over long periods can
exist out of step with their surroundings. An extreme variant of this point of
                                                                
18 Europe report, 1992, p. 65.
19 The leader in the Danish Personnel and Administration Ministry Søren Christensen
quoted in Stat og Styring, 1991.
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view is where institutional changes only occur to the degree they conform to
the institution’s internal behaviour logic, goals, procedures and identities.
It has been argued that there is a need for more complex and constitutive
contexts for what control is and for what terms exist for control in an
Europeanization process than the views that are presented in the three previous
models (Olsen 1992). An analysis of the Europeanization process should be
understood as the coupling over time between the environment, political choice
and the institutional identities, in order to get a more adequate presentation of
which conditions and possibilities exist for political control. Such a constitutive
adaptation has three basic assumptions. The first is that rules, standard
procedures, routines and norms steer behaviour. The second is tied to the
opinion-forming processes that exist in organizations. Experience forms the
context for what is appropriate, right and wrong ways to behave. Experiences,
interpretations and symbols are often more important than actual decisions for
understanding organizational behaviour. The third assumption is tied to the fact
that organizations do not adapt quickly and effectively. Adaptation to the
environment can take a long time and often follows a path-dependent
development. Earlier choices and decisions provide possibilities and at the
same time set limitations on decision that can be taken at a later stage.
State administrations in such a model are therefore viewed as loose couplings
of different autonomous institutions with their own identity, history and self-
dynamic. Such a point of view means that there can be space for political
control, but such control must be carried out within and with consideration for
the already existing historically developed institutional frames. It also follows
with such an approach that different institutions will have differing
experiences, histories and identities. Controlling the Europeanization process
therefore must build on understanding of the institutional character. Using
these different points of views as background, we shall analyze how this
coupling has taken place and changed over time in the Norwegian EEA
process.
2. 3 Frames for the EEA Process
An understanding of the political and administration adaptation process must
have a basis in the history and framework of the EEA process. In connection
with the Norwegian policy and attitude towards Europe, our research shows
that there are especially three factors that have large significance.
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First, the development of the European co-operation was a central factor for the
European question once again becoming an actual political area in Norway. In
the relatively short time period of 10-15 years, the co-operation within the EC
experienced extensive changes. From a period of stagnation in the 1970s,
integration gained speed during the 1980s. The Single European Act in 1986
gave at least three contributions to the realization of the Single Market by
1993; working out common rules within 279 cases areas, carrying out a
principle regarding mutual recognition when it comes to technical standards,
and implementing qualified majority decisions in the Council of Ministers.
These changes contributed to the revitalization of the EC co-operation. Central
decisions by the European Court of Justice during this period also contributed
to forwarding a quicker harmonization (Weiler 1991). The deadline for
carrying out the Single Market promoted an increase in the tempo of
expectations for integration. In many ways it can be said that the renewed idea
about an integrated Europe was actualized and seriously established as myth
and reality during the 1980s through the plans for establishing the Single
Market by 1992. 1992 became almost like a magic number. In this period
European integration as a political phenomenon was not seen as very
problematic. Integration was primarily viewed as a good in itself, without
anyone demanding a reason for why it was preferred. Many of the questions
that later created difficulty within the EC co-operation, for example the lack of
publicity and low popular participation, were only to a small degree considered
problematic and these issues ranked low on the agenda.
The EFTA countries perceived the Single Market both as a threat and a
possibility in relation to their economy and business and industry. There was a
fear that the EFTA countries would be shut out of the large market through the
building of toll barriers. At the same time, the Single Market was viewed as a
possibility when it came to increasing sales of their own goods. The intensified
co-operation in the EC therefore contributed to realizing a renewed debate
around the political and economic ties between EC and EFTA countries.
The second factor that formed the background for the Norwegian Europe
policies was the historical experiences of the Norwegian society on the
question of European co-operation.  The Norwegian historical experiences in
this area were mixed. Firstly, adaptation and internationalization through small
steps characterized the experiences. Even if there had been large political
controversies around some central decisions, for example NATO and aid
policies, it is correct to say that there was broad political support for increased
internationalization. More and more political and administrative tasks were
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acquiring an international dimension. Already in the 1970s it was shown that
three of four employees in the Norwegian administration worked with
international cases. During the period after the War, international units were
established in a number of departments and external services (Egeberg 1978,
Einstabland 1987). It is fair to say that much of both policies and the
administration have been internationalized. For a long time therefore it has
been possible to talk about the establishment of a fourth level of government in
the Norwegian steering system (Egeberg 1980). The developments have given
the Norwegian political system experience and knowledge about dealing with
international cases. They have become routine and thereby institutionalized as
a natural part of the administration’s daily work.
In addition to the gradual continual involvement, historical experiences also
represent a jolt or shock. The traditional consensus-oriented Norwegian
steering system went through a wide political battle in 1972. The EC dispute
involved large public resistance and division that left a deep imprint. The
bureaucracy was roundly criticized for their role in the conflict both during and
after the EC dispute.20 The administration participated in the public debate and
directly forwarded partisan debate to the advantage of the yes side. Scientific
evaluation was set aside for the benefit of political interests. The criticisms of
the bureaucracy helped weaken the legitimacy of and confidence in the
administration, and in retrospect the ‘EC fight’ has come to be viewed as an
historical exception in the relation between the bureaucracy and politicians in
Norway (Erichsen 1988).
Both the yes and no sides experienced the political unrest around Norwegian
membership in the EEC in 1972 as an unfortunate and difficult development.
Just a short time after the dispute was resolved, there was total calm on the
subject of Europe policies in Norway. The EC and Norway’s relationship to the
European co-operation in a short time had gone from being the most important
political topic to being a non-topic.  Political parties, the administration and
research and educational institutions omitted discussing both the developments
in the EC and Norway’s relationship to European co-operation. The absence of
a real debate lasted for 15 years. In this period it was deemed to be politically
impossible to create a new debate on Norway’s relationship to Europe. The
importance of this historical understanding of Europe politics is further
emphasized by the fact that the old political dividing lines have been
                                                                
20 For analysis of the EF dispute in 1972 see Gleditsch, Østerud and Elster (1974) and
Gleditsch and Hellevik, 1977. All of these authors were on the no side.
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reconstructed and strengthened in the new Europe debate, that gradually arose
by the end of the 1980s.
The third factor was the framework that was given the Norwegian
administration in connection with the EEA process. The Norwegian
administration had to carry out the work within the ordinary budget frames.
Norway during the 1980s was one of very few countries within the OECD area
that increased the use of resources in the public sector.21 It was still a political
goal with the EEA process that extra resources would not be used. It was
emphasized that the increased tasks and functions following from closer ties to
the EC, were not tasks in addition to -- but rather a natural part of --  the
ordinary work within the administration. At the same time it was emphasized
that when it came to the EEA process this could be the basis to save money,
rather than to increase spending on the administration (Godal 1992).
The Ministry of Finance took a routinely skeptical attitude that there should be
a link between increased resources and new tasks. The Ministry of Finance
worried that the EEA process would be used as an excuse for the other
ministries to increase their resources. The ministry had a very sober budget in
relation to the EEA process, based on the desire to be a role model for other
ministries. This of course contributed to it being difficult for other ministries to
have access to means. Even if some units, for example the Foreign Ministry,
received appreciable resources in connection with the process, the process as a
whole was characterized to a large degree by resource shortages and strict
budgets (Sverdrup 1994). In the first phase of the work with the EEA, the
government was criticized for having a minimal staff (Sverdrup 1994). A
comprehensive and more extensive plan for expanding the administrative
apparatus in such a politically controversial case would have been difficult,
potentially providing the no-side with additional arguments against Norway
seeking closer ties to the EC.
The three factors -- the European co-operation, the historical experiences, and
the resource situation -- are creating the background for understanding of the
adaptation process. The next part of the article analyzes the adaptation
process’s progress. In the analysis of the change process it is possible to
identify three different phases. The transition between the phases is smooth, so
that it is not possible to put exact times on them. Each of the different phases
                                                                
21 See the general outline of the administration and personnel policies in
Stortingsmelding no. 35 (1991-92).
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has a dominant logic in relation to explaining the progress of the adaptation
process.
2. 4 Political response and control
The first stage of the Europeanization process can be called initiation phase.
Time-wise this period stretches from 1986 up to the summer of 1989. This
period saw the national political leadership forming an institutional apparatus
for handling European cases. The political leaders actively controlled the
European policy. They interpreted the changes in the environment both as a
threat and as a possibility for political and economic development. On the other
hand, the bureaucracy was largely noncommittal and passive to the
developments.
The Norwegian Europe policy was based on a report to the parliament
(Stortinget) called ‘Norway, the EC and European co-operation’, which was
put out in 1986 (Stortingsmelding 61 1986-87). The document was the first
report on Europe and Norway’s ties to the co-operation that was put forth to the
Storting since 1972. The report was based on the EC countries’ plans for
establishing the Single Market and concluded by recommending that Norway
adapt to and harmonize with these processes. The Storting supported the
government’s plans. This meant that the Norwegian Europe policy was placed
under an already existing time frame for implementing the Single Market. The
Norwegian political leadership took the initiative to establish a formalized co-
operation between EFTA and the EC, which later became the EEA. The
declaration from the EFTA meeting in Oslo in March 1989 illustrated the will
to establish a binding two-pillar system between the two organizations.
Up until now the Norwegian administration had only to a limited degree
participated in the process. The attention in the bureaucracy was primarily
directed toward other cases, and the Europe policy was not evaluated as
especially important. In the Ministry of Finance’s international work, for
example, attention was primarily on co-operation within the frame of OECD
and the ongoing changes in the American economy (Sverdrup 1994). The
Ministry of Justice and the Police was primarily occupied with criminal
policies and EC cases were only taken up after direct requests from the Foreign
Ministry (Farsund 1993).
The Norwegian political leadership had as a goal to pull into the work
representatives from all ministries. The participation of professional expertise
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was viewed as important so that the Europe policy was not reduced to a purely
‘foreign policy’. The Prime Minister’s office closely followed the Europe
policy and thus signaled that this was a political priority area. Strong steering
from the Prime Minister’s office contributed to bringing in the other ministries
into the process, at the same time as the control made a supra co-ordination
possible. One of the key means that was employed in the work was the
publication of the information pamphlet, ‘Who in the State can answer
questions about the EC’. Here were presented and portrayed those responsible
for EU questions in the different departments, something that was viewed as an
untraditional method in the public sector. The work with European issues was
assigned to the existing units and the different ministries did not set up their
own Europe units. Therefore, with the exception of some changes in the
Foreign Ministry, there were no new institutions or extensive structural
changes internally in the individual ministries. Similarly, the ministries were
not given appreciably more positions because of the EEA process. They were
given some new positions later in the process, but shortages and reticence
distinguished their treatment. How to deal with tasks was primarily solved
through reprioritizing, increasing working hours or through putting off other
cases.
The priority that the political leadership gave the Europe case was emphasized
by their broad participation in the process. In the bureaucracy there was
widespread uncertainty and ambiguity regarding what kind of processes they
were involved in. The continuity of the Norwegian Europe policy was broken
because of 1972. In addition to the low level of knowledge when it came to the
EC, the memories of the criticism and unrest around the bureaucrats’ role in
1972 were present 15 years later. The bureaucracy took a cautious and
professional role. They experienced the Europe policy as a first and foremost
as a political process that demanded initiative and steering from the political
leadership.
It was with small steps and caution that Norway approached the Europe policy.
The political leadership wanted to establish consensus regarding adaptation.
Gro Harlem Brundtland emphasized the relevance of history in her speech to
the European Parliament, where it was said ‘The 1972 debate left us with a
trauma that has still not been overcome’.22 The search for consensus was
supported through the organizational apparatus that was built up for handling
                                                                
22 Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland’s speech, ‘Norway, the European
Community and European Co-operation’ to the European Parliament, 26 October
1988.
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Europe cases. In addition to the broad ministerial participation, most large
interest organizations also participated.  In the post war period, there had been
a tradition of broad participation by affected parties in Norway. The
participation of the major interest organizations, such as the Labour
Organization (LO) and the Confederation of Norwegian Business and Industry
(NHO) had been regarded as legitimate, and even as an extension of
democracy. In spite of the fact that the involvement of national interest
organization has been exposed to increasing criticism, this pattern of corporate
involvement proceeded in connection with the Europeanization process. The
organizations’ participation was taken as given and was never a question of
debate or criticism. The same occurred in Sweden in spite of the fact that
corporate involvement there have been subject to much more criticism than in
Norway (Eklund 1993). The affected parties got to participate in what was
called the Contact Committee/EC Committee. In this way the organizations
received information on the adaptation process and they were able to put forth
their own viewpoints on the process. Some organizations rightly enough did
not get to participate or always have the chance to directly discuss the
negotiating position Norway would take.
The caution and the historical experiences also contributed to explaining how
parts of the Europe issues were taken out of the bureaucracy and given to the
newly established State Secretariat Committee for European Cases. The
committee was responsible for informing and administering reports on
Norway’s ties to the EC so that the criticism that was raised against the
bureaucracy in 1972 would not be repeated. The establishment of this
committee for handling and controlling political cases that the political leaders
gave high priority later became a standard procedure.
In addition, there were established a total of 16 inter-ministerial working
groups. Their tasks were to compare the EC’s regulations with the Norwegian,
to uncover eventual exceptions, and thereby clarify the Norwegian negotiating
position. Even if the Foreign Ministry was the dominant actor in the group, the
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Local Government and Regional
Development and the Ministry of Justice and the Police, among others, were
active participants. Parts of the bureaucracy received first hand knowledge
through the working groups of the content of the EEA process and the
challenges and possibilities they were facing.
In the summer of 1989, the process had proceeded to such a point that there
existed the basis for putting into action negotiations for an EEA agreement. To
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this point, consensus and political steering had distinguished the Norwegian
process. Uncertainty around what the EEA meant was still large both in the
bureaucracy and in society. In this first phase the political leadership had taken
the initiative and emphasized the importance of the adaptation process.
2. 5 Bureaucratic expertise and negotiations
The second stage is called the negotiation phase. This phase lasted from the
summer of 1989 to the summer of 1991. In this period political attention was
not as much directed toward the EEA process in general, but rather much more
toward individual select case areas. At the same time the Norwegian Europe
policy became more politically controversial and conflict-filled. The
bureaucracy with its professional and legal expertise became an active
participant in a negotiation process with a very high tempo and great working
stress. Short, pre-set European deadlines and national co-ordination and co-
operation created the dynamic of the negotiation phase.
The negotiations themselves were organized in five different negotiation
groups that were to negotiate within the different areas. The groups were: 1)
free movement of goods, 2) free movement of capital and services, 3) free
movement of people, 4) adjacent areas, and 5) legal and institutional questions.
This was the organization of work that EFTA and the EU had agreed on.
The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Local Government and Regional
Development had responsibility for leading two of the groups in Norway
(groups 2 and 3), while the other groups were led by the Foreign Ministry. The
Foreign Ministry pulled in the Ministry of Justice and the Police to act as
juridical counsel for some of the groups. The Ministry of Justice and the
Police’s traditional retiring counseling role in such cases also applied to the
EEA process (Farsund 1993). Each of the groups also established their own
reference groups comprised of representatives from different ministries,
external services and affected parties.
It was initially intended that there should be a forum for information and co-
ordination of the different Norwegian viewpoints. Some of the groups
functioned well and it became a fruitful place to exchange views. Other groups
met very seldom and therefore there was no real exchange on the different
negotiation positions. Because of short deadlines there was often no time to set
up meetings. Instead, information was sent to those who were assumed to have
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interest in the case. Afterwards contact was more or less informal and
unwritten between those who had received information. The high degree of
informal conversations and contact, together with the lack of reporting from the
different groups, made handling cases overly complex and difficult to follow
for outsiders.
After the election in 1989 the country was ready for a shift in government. The
conservative-centre coalition created the Syse government, which took over
from the labour government lead by Brundtland. The changes in political
leadership had little significance. The negotiation position continued pretty
much unchanged, personnel were not changed in the bureaucracy, and there
were only small changes in the political administrative apparatus in connection
with the shift. As the negotiation between EFTA and the EC progressed it
became clear that all the EFTA countries had to give up their demands for
exceptions. This led to the question of, among other things, the concession
law23 becoming more and more difficult internally in the Syse regime the fall
of 1990. This eventually provided the basis for a new shift in government. The
question on the concession law was solved only a few days after the new
Brundtland government was in place, and the process continued forward at a
high tempo.
The level of political conflict and participation from the bureaucracy increased
in the negotiation phase. The increased participation from the bureaucracy is
attributed to cases needing more technical expertise and also to the political
leadership later turning their attention to a few special areas such as fish, the
concession legislation and questions on the constitution. The sequential
attention from the political leadership, combined with a steadily increasing
degree of work with ‘technical’ and ‘legal-technical’ questions contributed to
the bureaucracy receiving more responsibility and influence in the process. The
initiative to a certain degree was taken from the political leadership and left to
the bureaucracy. Concurrently, there was a gradually intensified debate around
the content of the EEA process, and organizations were created that worked for
and against an EEA agreement. Participants in the negotiation process were
always cautious in relation to the political conflicts surrounding the situation.
Constant orientation from the government and an assurance that they had
political ‘coverage at their backs’, was viewed as very important for the
Norwegian negotiation position. A great deal of attention and high priority was
                                                                
23 The Norwegian concession law provided the possibility to keep foreign citizens
from taking over property in Norway.
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also given the national co-ordination regarding the negotiations. The goal of
being able to forward a co-operative national interest under the negotiations
went ahead of different institutional and sector interests. In practice, it was the
ministries that were early in achieving influential positions in the Norwegian
Europe apparatus that had first-hand access to information and rights of
participation in the different co-ordinating organs.
The quantity of work in this phase was large. The negotiations kept a high
tempo and the deadlines therefore were short. Additionally, there were few
people who were involved in the different areas, so that working stress on the
individual participants was great. For example, information work, co-
ordinating, policy approval and carrying out the negotiations were done by a
small group of civil servants in the Ministry of Finance. Similarly, the stress
was great on a couple of people in the Ministry of Justice and the Police. There
were primarily two civil servants in the Ministry of Justice and the Police that
worked with the EEA up and including this phase. That EEA was existent in
only a very limited number of areas and in only two departments in the
Ministry of Justice and the Police. This says something about the working
stress and about the institutional scepticism to new cases. The attention and
resources that were set in motion against the time limits were nearly non-
existent.
It is not an exaggeration to say that the organizing principle was the use of
deadlines.  This applied both to set European deadlines through the EC or
EFTA and to a large degree those in the Norwegian apparatus. Deadlines were
made national in that they were accelerated in order to co-ordinate and
politically manage the established time limits. This meant that the working
stress, at least in the short term, was increased significantly. The Foreign
Ministry’s understanding that international deadlines were ‘absolute’ became
the dominant perception in the administration. Other ministries, such as the
Ministry of Finance, which traditionally had controlled and set time limits
within the Norwegian administration by controlling the budget cycle, had had a
more flexible and loose interpretation of deadlines. This procedure for dealing
with deadlines in the Ministry of Finance was also replaced under the
adaptation process by the Foreign Ministry’s interpretation of the international
time limits as unalterable.
The negotiation phase was characterized by large parts of the Norwegian
administration being faced with new and challenging tasks. Fixed European
frameworks and institutional procedures marked the adaptation process in the
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administration. The increased degree of specialization and bureaucratizing
contributed to the political leadership directing attention toward some
especially important cases, in a gradually more politically controversial
process.
2. 6 Institutional distinctions and normalization
In the implementation phase the work was still characterized by a very high
working stress, but the work took on another character than in the negotiation
phase. While there earlier had been uncertainty and ambiguity regarding what
the EEA would mean, the work in this phase became normalized and adjusted
to the existing national and institutional rules and procedures. This phase
stretches from the fall of 1991 to the beginning of 1992, the period when the
agreement should actually be implemented.24
Even if the final agreement was not signed before the beginning of May 1992,
negotiations in most of the areas were completed already in late summer of
1991. At this time pretty much all that remained were the fishing questions and
the question on the institutional formation of the EEA organs. The Norwegian
bureaucracy was therefore in full swing with making the necessary adjustments
and changes in the Norwegian legislation such that the EEA could be operative
from 1 January 1993, simultaneous with the implementation of the EC’s Single
Market.
The working tasks were primarily carried out in the units that had traditional
responsibility for the individual case areas. Very few tasks were moved around
and there were few shifts in responsibility. The legislative changes were done
in a totally traditional way and based on standard procedures in the Norwegian
bureaucracy. The tempo was also high in this phase. In the implementation
phase the Foreign Ministry, which through the entire process emphasized the
importance of maintaining the international fixed deadlines, was also a
powerful influence over the other ministries. In questions on simple changes in
the legislation the tempo became so high that it affected the professional
quality of the changes. The ministries emphasized the need for the changes
being done in a professionally defensible way so that the legislation could be
used in the future. However, the strict deadlines were in conflict with the need
for adequate professional evaluation. Loyalty obligations went before own
                                                                
24 The EEA agreement was made effective from 1 January 1994.
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professionalism and they tried to maintain the deadlines. Nevertheless, in some
areas in the Ministry of Finance some doubt was raised about whether the
changes was professionally defensible and questions of legal protection were
experienced as not having been adequately evaluated (Sverdrup 1994).
Hearings for eventual legislative changes are a part of the standard procedures
in the administration. Hearings in connection with the EEA were carried out,
but they were marked by the high tempo in the process. The deadline for
hearings in the Ministry of Finance was set at only 10 days, something that was
characterized as very short. Several of the hearing bodies answered that they
were not able to provide good and adequate comment when the deadlines were
so short.25 Additionally, it came out that at this time the institutional frames
themselves around the EEA were unclear, something that contributed
considerably to increasing uncertainty. Also, in other institutions the hearing
bodies were challenged on the grounds of time pressure.  For example in
several cases the Ministry of Justice and the Police neglected to send law
changes out for hearing and did not invite parties to a hearing meeting so that
they could meet the political goal of quick changes.
The EEA case had a high political priority. This means that other case areas
had to wait. The large working stress meant that there was established queue
arrangements for other cases and many cases were postponed for unusually
long periods of time (Sverdrup 1994). The effect of low resource setting was
also reflected in other tasks and case areas that the administration had to
handle. In the Ministry of Justice and the Police’s legal department this led to,
among other things, an understanding that other cases could be postponed
because other ministries were busy with the EEA and therefore did not have
time or resources to work with them.
As the Norwegian administration organs gradually became more
knowledgeable of the EC’s regulations and the content of the EEA agreement,
uncertainty around the process was reduced. An understanding that the new
regulations did not vary substantially from the traditional Norwegian
regulations began to spread. The Ministry of Justice and the Police sent around
a letter where it was written that the rule of thumb rule for changes should be to
follow the traditional Norwegian legal principles because Norwegian law
pretty much would be in accordance with the EEA decisions (Farsund 1993,
                                                                
25 Comments around the hearings are found in, among others, the Odelsting
propositions that were put forth by each ministry.
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Sverdrup 1994). The development and modernization of Norwegian
regulations that had been carried out in the decade before EEA process could
explain that the EEA regulations did not vary significantly from the
Norwegian. Different types of standardization and change work have primarily
been a result of Nordic and international bilateral or multilateral co-operation.
Broad procedures for Nordic and international legal co-operation have been
developed for a long time. For example, the EEA agreement contains only
limited changes regarding content for the rules in the Ministry of Finance’s
area. The regulation changes that have gone before the EEA -- capital and
currency liberalization through among others the OECD -- strongly contributed
to the EEA regulations not being experienced as varying from the original
Norwegian regulation. The changes therefore in some areas were viewed as
work- and time-intensive technical changes and not substantial changes. In
some instances it could be said that parts of the Norwegian administration was
Europeanized even before the EEA process.
As we have seen from this passiveness, the EEA was experienced as a threat
towards the institutions’ identity and ways of dealing, more so, than as a
possibility for expanding the institutions’ domain. Most units remained largely
passive and cautious to an uncertain and politically conflict-filled case. For
example, the Ministry of Justice and the Police was asked if they couldn’t take
the responsibility for co-ordinating for law adaptation and control with the
other ministries’ adaptation. The Ministry of Justice and the Police would not
have these tasks and preferred to keep to their traditional duties rather than
expand their influence and task load (Farsund 1993). Passivity and institutional
logic therefore characterized the administrative adaptation.
The implementation phase was distinguished by a normalization of the work
with the EEA in the administration. The existing knowledge and the
established procedures and organizational solutions were interpreted as being
adequate for meeting the new demands they faced with the EEA process. The
work in the last phase was resolved within, and with consideration to, both
national and different institutional systems. The different ministries’ self-
dynamics led to different ministries facing different challenges. While some
ministries were a lot more Europeanized before the EEA and therefore did not
experience the process as at variance with traditional work, other ministries
through this process were faced with new challenges.
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2. 7 Norway – an enthusiastic adapter
The article started with the different contexts about how one should view and
explain the adaptation process regarding the EEA. The explanatory factors in
the three points of view were ascribed to the environment, individual actors or
the institutions. The three phases illustrate the necessity for empirical analysis
of Europeanization processes over time. Aspects at the European level and
conscious attempts at political control characterized the first phase. The second
phases was characterized by bureaucratic negotiation with a high degree of
professional and technical expertise. This contributed to institutional aspects
and aspects of the European regulations to a large degree characterizing this
process. In the last phase, the institutional procedures and self-dynamic
characterized the EEA process. The implementation process was marked by
considerable institutional autonomy. At the same time, an acknowledgment
spread that these were cases that were primarily like the traditional Norwegian
ones. This reaction pattern has much in common with how the political and
administrative systems in Norway responded to the development of the
petroleum sector (Olsen 1989). In both cases institutional specialization
contributed to fast and effective treatment of a new, but related, field.
The different explanations contribute to clarifying different parts of a larger
process. The analysis illustrates the need for more empirical studies of what
actually happens, rather than more or less loose speculations about what may
happen. The period examined in this article is tied to a special negotiation
situation, and it is not an unqualified given that it will be representative for the
further progress of the Europeanization process. The results must be handled
with a certain caution. Much therefore hangs on the adaptation process in
connection with the EEA having considerable relevance for the further
understanding of Europe policy’s impact on the national administration
apparatus.
In conclusion we try to identify some characteristics of the EEA process and to
bring forth some factors that are expected to be actual problem areas in the
further Europeanization process. There are especially three aspects that appear
to be important. The first is connected with the Norwegian will to adapt. Along
with the program for modernization and development of the public sector,
Norway has been characterized as a ‘hesitant reformer’ (Olsen 1992).
Contrarily, with the EEA process, Norway can be characterized as an
enthusiastic adapter. The tempo in the Norwegian adaptation has been very
high and many rules have quickly become part of the Norwegian regulations.
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Other countries have not had the same tempo in the adaptation process
(Siedentopf and Ziller 1988). This illustrates that there has been considerable
political attention and will to be a leader in the process. Clear political goals
and international fixed deadlines have contributed to Norway quickly working
the EEA into the routine regulations.
The adaptation process in the Finance and Justice Ministries demonstrated that
professional qualifications and knowledge was primarily experienced as
benefits. There was understanding that the knowledge was adequate for
meeting the challenges the administration was facing in respect to the EEA.
The knowledge of the EC and the EEA regulations had gradually been
developed through the EEA process. A generally high professional level in the
administration had contributed to easing the work and thereby making for a
quick adaptation process. There has been a political and administration
tradition in Norway that agreements they entered into should be enforced --
pacta sunt servanda. It was important that agreements and obligations would
be adhered to. This general political-administration culture can also help
explain why the adaptation process occurred so quickly in Norway.
The second aspect is linked to adaptation variation. The analysis shows that
national tradition and institutional self-dynamic contributes to explaining
adaptation process’s progress. This implies that the rate of change can vary
between countries and between different political sectors and institutions.
Administrative units and sectors will have different historical experiences and
interpretations of the Europe policy. At the same time, there will be differing
degrees of affects and identification with the European co-operation.
Institutional variation can contribute to a segmented state becoming
increasingly segmented through this process. The term the segmented state
refers how the state is organized around different decision arenas with different
participants, solutions and problems, and how there are weak learning
mechanisms between the different segments (Egeberg et al. 1978). Governance
of the Europeanization process in such a perspective means making sure those
institutions that are passive and hesitant make the necessary adjustments, so
that common national interests are accounted for.  This in itself is a difficult
political administrative area that raises basic questions about the conditions for
governance. The challenge is in the formation of a general and co-ordinated
policy that is able to account simultaneously for sectional and institutional
variation. Such control assumes a certain formulation of institutional solutions.
The Ministry of Government Administration has had special responsibility for
ensuring that administrative adaptation and change is carried out in a manner
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that the administration is in the best possible position for realizing political
goals. Up until now there have been few attempts to analyze and deal with the
questions around a total Europe policy from this ministry. The ministry was
late entering into the process and it appears to be difficult to change the
direction the development took regarding the EEA where few ‘heavy’
ministries achieved influential positions. At the same time, weakened political
attention around institutional formation and adaptation in the individual
ministries was instrumental in there being many unanswered questions today
about, among other things, co-ordination, autonomy and resources.
The third aspect has to do with the dynamics of the adaptation process itself.
There has been a steady increase in co-ordination and harmonization over a
long period through international co-operation. The development has
proceeded in small steps. Changes in rules and standards have been an
incremental process. Established and well-developed networks, contact
patterns and problem definitions have been used in the EEA process and the
work’s character has not been perceived as new and different. Institutional
identity and characteristics have thus been carried into the Europeanization
process.
Such an understanding of the change process’s progress contrasts with the
understanding found in parts of the literature, and in the political debate. There,
attention and the rhetoric are primarily directed at the large and rapid upheavals
and transformations. The understanding of Europeanization is often that we are
standing before an historical fork in the road, where new and dramatically
different forms of political organization and practice are necessary. This
understanding is tied to developments occurring through large leaps. These two
different understandings of development raise totally different challenges and
questions about the basis for democratic governance. Analysis of the
conditions for democratic governance of the Europeanization process’s content
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Chapter 3: Norway – an adaptive non-member
3. 1 Introduction
Norway has been invited to become a member in the European Community
(EC)/ European Union (EU) twice, but two times a small majority have turned
down the proposal in national referendums. The voters are deeply divided on
the question of European integration, and the governing Labour party is split in
half on the issue. Nevertheless, the government has during the last decade
made major efforts to adapt the organization and orientation of the Norwegian
political system toward increased European integration. New organizations
have been established and new procedures for securing sufficient co-ordination
and control have developed. Cross-border contacts between domestic
Norwegian institutions and institutions at the European level have increased in
scope and importance. European contacts and regulations are considered as
important within most national policy fields, even in the fields traditionally
totally dominated by domestic considerations. Furthermore, increased
attention, time and energy have been devoted to European issues, and the
political leadership has been able to develop shared decision making
institutions with the EU.
As this listing indicates, the Norwegian political system is in a process of
becoming Europeanized. The term Europeanization is understood as a process
in which Europe, and especially the EU, becomes an increasingly more
relevant and important political community for the Norwegian political system.
Moreover, the process of Europeanization is understood as a process of
gradually increasing homogenization. However, this does not necessarily imply
standardization, but rather it should be interpreted as process which reduces the
variance between, and within, different European states in how political
processes are perceived, and how they organize in order to solve problems
(Olsen 1996). The Norwegian political system did not respond to the process of
Europeanization by exploring radically new solutions Responses reflected
historical experiences and stemmed largely from endogenous dynamics of the
Norwegian political system. Existing routines and capabilities were considered
as effective and appropriate in coping with the new challenges and
possibilities. Europeanization of the Norwegian administration is therefore best
understood as an incremental process of gradual adaptation, rather than a
dramatic break with the past (Farsund and Sverdrup 1994, Christensen 1996).
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This way is also consistent with the traditional mode of reforming political
institutions in Norway
Why should we pay interest in the development in a non-member state? Truly,
the Norwegian case has limited relevance in understanding some of the
functioning of the European polity. Scholars in the field of Europeanization
have traditionally focused upon adaptations in member states, but this approach
is too narrow. Only comparative analysis has the potential to critically examine
the distinct characteristics of Europeanization. Without the comparative
dimension it is impossible to isolate changes related to Europe from the more
general processes of administrative modernization and internationalization.
Such comparisons of member states as well as non-member states are currently
lacking. Thus, investigating the Norwegian case give us a unique opportunity
to shed light on the significance of formal membership in the EU.
Two propositions could be put forward. The first proposition suggests that
formal membership in the EU imply a strong pressure for administrative
adaptation. Increased European integration will lead to reorganization and
destabilization of the domestic political and administrative system (Toonen
1992). It is assumed that non-member states are less affected than member
states, and therefore have more leeway in organizing their political and
administrative system. According to this proposition, membership is a
significant parameter in understanding the current administrative changes in
Europe. The second proposition suggests that differences between member and
non-member states be of less importance. Non-members are affected by
decisions in the EU, but they have less influence and control of decisions in EU
than the member states, thus, non-members experience a higher level of
uncertainty in relation to the EU. In order to reduce uncertainty, and increase
their legitimacy, non-members undertake extensive adaptations in their
political and administrative systems. As Prime Minister Gro Harlem
Brundtland suggested short time after the referendum: Norway must act more
or less as if it was a member (Brundtland 1995).
The concept of membership is problematic. A wide range of informal and
formal linkages exists between Norway and the EU. Furthermore, the ‘variable
geometry’ in Europe makes it hard to draw a clear distinction between member
and non-member states. In addition, there are considerable variations between
different policy sectors. For instance in a field like science and research policy,
where Norway participates and contributes to the funds, Norway is probably as
affected by European integration as the member states. Furthermore, isolating
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the effect of membership is difficult since administrative changes in Norway
were part of a pre-accession process together with some other EFTA countries.
It is too early to assess whether the referendum in 1994 was the first step in a
series of choices which in the long term will create a ‘continental divide’, or
whether other dynamics and linkages will make the result of the referendum
less relevant. So far, the development in Norway is uncertain, and it seems to
vary from one political field and sector to another.
In order to comprehend the adaptations that have taken place in Norway, we
have to take into account the historical background. It is only possible to
explain the Europeanization of political institutions through an analysis of the
historical roots, routes and internal dynamics (Olsen 1996). In the following
section I will therefore briefly outline Norway’s historical relationship with the
EU, and the gradual internationalization of the political and administrative
system. I will also include a brief presentation of the Agreement on the
European Economic Area (EEA), which is the core institution in regulating the
relationship between Norway and the EU. Then, I turn to analyze in more
detail how Norwegian administration and political leadership adapted to the
challenges and possibilities raised by increased European integration. Since
Norway is less involved in influencing the decision-making processes in the
EU than the member states, I will primarily focus on national adaptation and
implementation. I argue that increased European integration has led to a
considerable reorganization of the relationship between Norwegian and
European institutions, as well as in the relations within the Norwegian political
and administrative system.
3. 2 A history of reluctance
Norway is larger than Italy, and is almost the size of Germany in terms of total
land area; however, with only 4,2 million inhabitants it is still a small state.
The unique topography and geography has influenced the political and
economic development of the country. The key to growth and development has
been an effective exploration and exploitation of natural resources. Especially
important are the resources of the sea, through the industries of shipping,
fishing, and more recently, production of oil and gas. Norway is probably more
dependent upon the its territory and the territorial boundaries than most
continental European states.
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Norway has a tradition for isolationism, due to historical experiences. Political
leaders have often felt little in common with the larger and more powerful
states of the continent. This is particularly true regarding the idea of creating
Pan-European co-operation. European political integration has never received
strong support, and most Norwegians have expressed scepticism towards any
attempt to develop supranational political institutions in Europe (Løchen 1993,
Urwin 1995). The sceptic attitude is illustrated by a remark made by Jørgen
Løvland, the first Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs after Norway’s
independence from Sweden in 1905. He stated that his prime task was to keep
Norway out the ‘combinations and alliances that can drag the country into
belligerent adventures together with any of the European warrior states’ (cited
in Røhne 1991: 4).
However, isolationism is not a good description of Norwegian policy and
polity, rather the opposite. Norway has been an active participant in a wide
range of international co-operation during the Post War period. Norwegian
foreign policy developed in the interplay between three separate pillars: the
Atlantic pillar, the Nordic pillar and the continental European pillar (Riste
1991). Norwegian membership in NATO in 1949 paved the way for close
contacts with the United Kingdom and the USA. In the period since the end of
the 1940s, the Atlantic pillar dominated the Norwegian foreign policy
orientation (Riste 1995). The Norwegian political and administrative system
became increasingly internationalized also in other policy areas. The
administration participated in a growing number of international organizations
and a number of international departments were established in the Ministries
during the 1970s. Already by the end of the 1970s scholars conceptualized the
Norwegian political system as having a fourth level of government (Egeberg
1980).
In spite of increased internationalization, Norway’s relation to the EEC/EC
remained ambiguous. Norway applied for membership in 1961. A decade later
she applied a second time. Also this time was the application primarily a
response to the British and Danish application. Norway’s first referendum was
held in 1972, and a majority of 53,5 percent voted against membership. The
campaign created, and unveiled, deep cleavages within the Norwegian society,
cutting across and within political parties. Some of the controversies
represented a troublesome break with the political tradition of consensus and
low level of conflict (Furre 1991). When preparing for membership in 1972 the
administration made some minor adaptations in order to prepare for
membership, but they were all minor and temporary (Underdal 1972). Since
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most of the administration supported the pro-membership side, the referendum
resulted in reduced legitimacy for the administration, especially the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (Gleditsch, Østerud et al. 1974). The historical experiences
from 1972 are necessary in order to explain the careful approach of the
political leadership and administration during the campaign in 1994.
 European integration was removed from the political agenda, and Norway’s
relationship with the EC became a non-issue. Interest in European politics
declined, thus, knowledge of the development in the EC decreased in every
part of the society. During a period of fifteen years the relationship with the EC
was not subject to any political debate in the Parliament; neither did any
political party show interest in the issue. Memories of the referendum and
political conflicts in 1972 prevented them from taking the steps. However,
external changes in the mid-1980s brought an end to this silence. The decision
to create the Single Market in the EC created a window of opportunity for
political initiatives. The government drafted two white papers on the relation
with the EC and European integration in 1987 (St.meld. no. 61 1986-87,
St.meld. no. 63 1986-87). Neither of them suggested membership, but both
recommended that Norway should pay increased attention to the development
of EC. The documents resulted in the establishment of a permanent Norwegian
delegation in Brussels, and an invitation to the EC to establish a delegation for
the European Commission in Oslo. These two administrative changes were the
first step in building a stronger institutional framework for the Norwegian
process of adaptation. Later, during the negotiations, the delegation was further
strengthened and played an important role in developing the relationship
between EU and Norway. At present thirty-five bureaucrats work there, and a
majority of the experts come from other Ministries than the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. After the referendum their main tasks were to report on the activity of
the EU, participate in meetings, and to try to influence decision making.
Figures from the delegation show that, while more than 3,200 people visited
the delegation in 1994, this decreased to 2,300 in 1995. The number of national
bureaucrats visiting the delegation decreased by 68 percent during the same
period.
The European issue was brought to the political agenda with great care, and it
was primarily motivated by economic concerns. The small and vulnerable
EFTA-members were afraid anxious of possibly being excluded from the
Single Market. In order to resolve the ‘EFTA problem’ President Jacques
Delors suggested increasing the integration between EC and EFTA. He
considered it as a natural extension of the slowly moving Luxembourg-process,
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which had started in 1984 (Delors 1989:18). Negotiation between the
Commission and EFTA representatives started in June 1990. After intense and
complicated negotiations, both within EFTA and between EFTA and the EC,
an agreement was signed in May 1992. In January 1994 the EEA Agreement
was implemented.
Already during the EEA negotiations major changes dramatically altered the
situation. Firstly, the political map of Europe changed. The dramatic
transformation of Central and Eastern Europe challenged the fundaments and
borders of Europe, and called for reorganization. What used to be an issue of
integration of Western Europe became an issue of integrating Europe.
Exogenous changes and the EC’s response to these challenges led some neutral
EFTA states to reinterpret their political situation (Luif 1996). Secondly, it
became increasingly obvious during the negotiation that the EFTA-pillar would
be weak and has a built-in democratic deficit. The EFTA countries would have
limited access and control over decisions, which would have considerable
impact on the domestic political and administrative system. Hence, a growing
number argued that only full membership would give sufficient influence and
democratic control. These two developments led to the applications for
membership. Austria applied in 1989, Sweden in 1991, Finland in 1992 and
finally Norway by the end of 1992. Through the sequence of applications a
self-enforcing loop was created. By applying for membership the EFTA pillar
was further weakened. These snowball-effects explain the timing of the
Norwegian application. Of particular importance in triggering the Norwegian
application were the changes in the Swedish attitude and policy. The political
leadership in Norway wanted initially to slow down the process and stick to the
gradual and careful approach, in order to reduce domestic conflicts and gain
sufficient popular support.
The negotiations on the agreement on membership went on at an even higher
speed than the EEA negotiations. Since most of the issues had been resolved
during these negotiations, it was possible to complete the negotiations on
membership during a period of barely two years. The most difficult fields were
related to fishery quotas, agriculture subsidizes and food industry. These
aspects were important in the Norwegian opinion, and it is likely that Norway
played the ‘national card’ in these negotiations. Important and controversial
issues related to the Economic and Monetary Union, and the development of a
Common Foreign and Security Policy did not receive much attention, nor did
they create any major obstacle in the negotiations (St. meld no. 40 1993-94).
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In the aftermath of the European Council meeting in Crete in June 1994, the
new applicant countries were invited to participate as observers in the EU with
the right to speak. During the so-called ‘Interim period’, from June until the
day after the referendum in November 1994, Norway acted as if it was a full
member. Norwegian politicians and bureaucrats participated in meetings in the
European Commission, under the Council and in COREPER. The Norwegian
administration participated in more than 430 committees in the Council. The
Interim period was an eye-opener for the Norwegian administration, and during
this period the traditional mode of organizing the public administration was
challenged. The dramatic increase in participation, flow of information,
deadlines and meetings created major difficulties in co-ordinating the activities.
The ‘Interim period’ unveiled that the Norwegian administration lacked
sufficient competence and knowledge of the actual working of the EU system,
and that the relatively small administration lacked administrative capacity.
As the date of the referendum got closer, the debate became increasingly more
intense. The issue had the priority of the political leadership and overshadowed
all other issues. Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland argued in general ways
and with a long-term perspective. Her concern was the future role of Norway in
the Post-Cold-War Europe (Ringdal 1995). In spite of the transformation in
Eastern and Central Europe, and the development within the EU, the topics
debated, as well as the pattern of voting, showed a striking similarity to the
pattern of 1972. During the campaign the dominating issues were; supra-
nationality vs. national control, economic growth vs. unemployment, security
policy and the right to self determination of natural resources (Ringdal 1995).
The strong counter-culture and centre-periphery dimension in Norwegian
politics, which were of such importance in 1972, were rediscovered and
reconstructed in 1994 (Todal Jenssen, Listhaug et al. 1995). In general, the
voters in the rural areas – along the coast and in the North – voted against
membership. A majority voted in favour of membership the southeastern part
of the country.
However, it was the strong ability to mobilize voters from all over the country,
and across the whole spectrum of political life that made the referendum into a
victory for the opposition. Farmers, fishermen, public employees, and blue-
collar workers organized a large coalition against the political and economic
establishment. The mobilizing capacity of the popular movement Nei til EU
was tremendous. The organization received their financial support from the
farmers and fishermen as well as their members. At the time of the referendum
there were 145,000 members, 470 local organizations and 19 regional
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organizations (Nei til EU 1994). In contrast, the leading organization on the
fragmented pro-membership side, Europabevegelsen, had only 33,000
members.  Their financial support came primarily from the industry and
various businesses.
After the Danish referendum in 1992, the Norwegian opinion polls continually
reported a majority against membership, and the Swedish and Finnish
referenda had little impact on the voters. Hence, it came as no surprise that a
majority voted Nei the 28 November 1994. Approximately fifty-two percent
voted against membership, with a record high turnout of eighty-nine percent.
3. 3 The EEA - a dynamic institutional linkage
Norway’s relationship with the EU is at present formally organized through the
EEA Agreement. The wide scale and scope of the EEA Agreement increased
Norway’s integration and relation with the EU. Through the EEA-Agreement
Norway committed itself to transpose most of the acquis communautaire
related to the free movement of: goods, capital, services and persons, as well as
the EU competition rules into its national legislation. Within the framework of
the EEA-Agreement there has been an increase in co-operation also in fields
like: environmental protection, the social dimension, consumer protection,
research and development, education, training, culture, company law, measures
for small and medium-sized enterprises, audio-visual services, tourism,
statistics, information services and disaster preparedness.
The EEA Agreement created a complex set of joint institutions to control and
monitor the political, legal, social and cultural co-operation. The EEA council
is the highest-ranking organ, and it holds two meetings per year. The EEA
council consists of members of the Council of the EU, members of the
Commission and one member of the government from each EFTA-member of
the EEA. The EEA Joint Committee is made up of bureaucrats from the EFTA
and the Commission, and they meets every month. This organ is supposed to
update continuously the Agreement by incorporating recent additions to the
community legislation. Decisions are made under the rule of unanimity, with a
formal right to veto for all parties. However, Norway has a formal possibility
to veto any new proposal coming from the EU, but the political consequences
of such action are rather uncertain. The political leaders have so far showed
limited interest in using the ‘exit’ or ‘voice’ option laid down in the
Agreement. Finally, a Joint EEA Parliamentary Committee was established.
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Here MPs from the EFTA countries meet Members of the European
Parliament. In addition to these joint institutions, EFTA created their own
Surveillance Authority (ESA) and a separate EFTA court (St.prp. 100 1991-
92).
The Agreement is dynamic. That is, when new legislation is developed within
the EU, in a field covered by the Agreement, it is also incorporated into the
legislation in the EEA countries. Through the agreement Norway is formally
linked to the stream of decisions that flow from the EU system. In addition, the
EEA Agreement is based upon a homogeneous interpretation and enforcement
of the legislation. Naturally, in most cases this implies that the legislation is
interpreted in Norway as it was originally interpreted in the EU. The
continuous and automatic transposition of newly elaborated EU legislation into
the Norwegian legislation imposes a strong continuous direct effect on the
Norwegian legislation. In addition, the EEA Agreement has led to changes in
legal reasoning, and in some legal principles (Sejersted and Arnesen et al.
1995). Furthermore, through the setting of agenda and deadlines the dynamic
aspect of the EEA Agreement has had a strong indirect effect on the
distribution of attention. The EEA legislation has so far been transposed into
the Norwegian legislation on a large scale and with a high speed. During the
first stage of ratification a total number of 1,300 legal acts were transposed.
When the ‘EEA II’ was passed in March 1994, additional 500 acts were
transposed. Since these two major ‘packages’, a total of 107 decisions were
made in the EEA committee, 44 in 1994 and 63 in 1995. The Norwegian
administration had transposed 94 percent of the legislation related to the
internal market by the end of 1995, which is a high proportion even compared
to the figures of the member states (ESA report 1995). Consequently, the legal
framework laid down by the EEA Agreement contributes creating
opportunities and constraints for decision makers and thereby shaping the day-
to-day policy in a number of fields and at all levels of governance. Few studies
of the actual implementation of the legislation in Norway exist, which goes
beyond the simple understanding of implementation as legal transposition.
The rapid implementation of the legislation was a result of a process of
gradually convergence, and good matching between the two systems. Norway
made multiple step-wise approximations of legislation prior to the application
for membership or the implementation of the EEA Agreement, which created a
relatively high degree of similarity between the two sets of legislation. The
gradual process of convergence stemmed from different and partly independent
processes. Firstly, it was a result of the changing perceptions of what was to be
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considered as technically superior solutions, as for instance in the case
changing the currency exchange control. Secondly, EC legislation had been
imitated in order to reduce the complications and transaction costs of applying
a different kind of legislation. An example of can be found in the gradual
development of the financial legislation (Skogstad Aamo 1995). Thirdly,
convergence of the legislation stemmed from bureaucratic anticipation of the
preferences held by the political leadership. The Norwegian political leadership
stressed the importance of a changing attitude towards EC in the Norwegian
administrations. In a letter from the Prime Minister sent to all ministries in
1988, a formal procedure for harmonization of legislation was laid down.
According to this procedure, the administration had to analyze how each new
change in the legislation differed from the acquis. If it was necessary to make
legislation, which differed from the acquis, such deviations should be given an
explicit basis. Political statements like this indicate the strong political will to
reduce differences in legislation, and to smooth the integration process.
Fourthly, the implementation could go rapidly due to institutional
characteristics. Since most of the adaptations of the EEA law was considered
as regulations, and thereby delegated to the administration, there was no reason
for the parliament to pass this as an act, which normally is a more time
consuming process. Both the internal dynamics of the institutions involved, and
the strong will of the political leadership, created a platform for rapid and
efficient transposition of EC legislation into the Norwegian legislation.
Consequently, in transposing the EEA Agreement, with some exceptions,
primarily minor adjustments were made in the Norwegian legislation. Changes
were perceived as a matter of minor technical adjustments, rather than any
dramatically change in the content of policy or shape of the polity.
3. 4 Political and administrative adaptation
For a small state with a relatively small administrative capacity, preparation for
membership was a critical test of its ability to adapt and cope with new
challenges and opportunities. In terms of the size of the administration Norway
is a small state, compared to other European states. However, Norway
experienced considerable growth in public sector spending during the last
decades, even in the 1980s, when most OECD countries tried to reduce their
spending. A total of 3,940 were employed in the Norwegian Ministries in 1990
(St.meld no 35 1991-92). The exact number of Ministries varies from time to
time, depending upon the match between the political traditions, the workload
of Ministries and various political priorities and trade-offs. There are currently
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sixteen Ministries, including the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has traditionally played the key role in co-
ordinating, developing and managing Norway’s international relations.
However, the process of gradual internationalization of the administration had
challenged their role as monopolist. Domestic institutions became increasingly
internationalized, and participated in the shaping of Norway’s relation to other
countries and organizations (Egeberg 1980).
Increased European integration did not lead to a dramatic increase in resources
to the administration. The objective of the Ministry of Finance reflected their
standard attitude towards expenditure: new tasks stemming from increased
European integration should not result in a corresponding increase in resources
to the Ministries (St. meld no. 35 1991-1992). The Ministries, which held the
budgetary responsibility for the Directorates gave the same instruction.
Consequently all institutions had to give priority to European affairs without
expecting budgetary compensations for increase spending. In general the initial
objective was achieved. Few new resources were given to the administration,
and most of the additional resources distributed in relation to European
integration had a temporary character. The underlying rationality was to work
as a fire department to prevent immediate crisis, rather than to permanently
strengthen the capabilities of the administration.
The number of bureaucrats in the Ministries increased with a total of 104
positions earmarked for European issues. Some Ministries, first and foremost
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, experienced a considerable increase in their
resources. In addition, some of the Directorates received a significant number
of new positions. Approximately two thirds of all new positions were
temporary, and a major share of them was related to the translation of
documents and legislation from various EU languages into Norwegian. Since
more than 15.000 pages of legislation had to be translated during a short period
of time, translation was a considerable and resource-demanding task. However,
budgetary figures do not provide us with an accurate picture of the resources
spent on European issues. Figures from a survey undertaken by a governmental
agency indicated that more than 400 labour-years were used to handle
European issues in the Ministries during the ‘Interim period’ (Statskonsult
1995:15). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which at the time had a total of 630
positions, spent more than 130 labour-years. The figures varied between the
Ministries; less than ten in the Ministry of Education, Research and Church
Affairs, and in the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs; between ten and
fifteen in Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Fisheries, Ministry of Justice,
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Ministry of Local Government and Labour and the Ministry of Cultural
Affairs. The highest relative number was found in the Ministry of Fisheries,
where approximately twenty percent of their labour years were occupied with
European issues.
Increased European integration imposed a considerable strain on the capacity
of the small sized Norwegian administration. The gap between new resources
and actually spent resources can not be understood without analyzing the
dynamics of capabilities. Firstly, since the institutions had to meet the new
tasks without any additional resources, they were forced to alter their priorities
and attention. European issues had top political priority and issues with less
political priority were delayed. For instance in a section in the Ministry of
Finance the number of ordinary tasks older than three months increased by fifty
percent during this period because of altered priorities. Secondly, institutions
compensated limited capacity by increasing the workload on the personnel.
The highly technical and specialized character of the European issues
prevented mobility between tasks and persons. A high level of specialization
made the administration increasingly dependent upon a relatively small group
of key bureaucrats. Consequently, the well-experienced personnel, which were
experts in their respective field and had experience form other international co-
operation, became the ‘Eurocrats’ of the Norwegian administration. Thirdly,
some institutions were able to cope with the new challenges simply because
they could reduce organizational slack. For instance, in the Ministry of Finance
a unit had capacity to cope with the new tasks, since previous liberalization of
exchange regulations had reduced their work load (Sverdrup 1994). Institutions
are considered as stable and inflexible arrangements, however, this discussion
on capabilities has showed that institutions often have a wide repertoire of
action and are able to show considerable flexibility within stable institutional
boundaries.
In order to adapt to increased European integration and to co-ordinate the
Norwegian positions an inter-ministerial co-ordinating apparatus was
established in June 1988 (Statusrapport 1989). The reason for the rapid build
up of this apparatus was the need to prepare and co-ordinate the negotiations
on the EEA Agreement. A slightly modified version of the apparatus was later
used in the negotiations on membership, and after the referendum this
apparatus remained more or less unchanged. The apparatus did not have any
formal legal status, and it did not alter the distribution of political and legal
responsibility between the Ministries. The formal responsibility for handling
EU-issues was placed in the respective sector Ministries. All of the Ministries
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were involved, in addition to a great share of the Directorates. However, the
co-ordinating role of the OPM was considerably strengthened during the
process.  Only to a modest degree did the reorganization challenge the
traditionally strong co-ordinating role of some Ministries: the Ministry of
Finance in budgetary matters, the Ministry of Justice in legal affairs, and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in foreign policy. In this respect, the newly built
apparatus represented a continuation of the administrative tradition of Norway.
There are three different levels of co-ordination of European issues in the
Norwegian government. Firstly, at the political level the Cabinet is the superior
organ for political co-ordination. If the issue at stake has limited relevance to
other Ministers, co-ordinations take place in a smaller European-committee
within the Cabinet, Regjeringens Europa-utvalg. Before a Minister can bring
an issue to the Cabinet, she must brief the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
advance, and they are given the opportunity to state their opinion. Secondly, at
the highest administrative level is the Co-ordinating committee,
Koordinerings-utvalget. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for
chairing the committee, as well as running the secretariat. All Ministries are
allowed to participate in the committee with one representative, but only if the
issue on the agenda affects them. However, the Ministry of Finance and the
OPM are obliged to participate in every session. A total number of twenty-one
bureaucrats, at the level of Permanent Under-secretary of the State or Deputy
Secretary, participate in these monthly meetings. Thirdly, there are a number of
various expert committees, which take care of the day-to-day administration in
a more technical way. There are twenty spesial utvalg, some are more active
than others. The guiding principle for the administration is that Norwegian
positions should be elaborated and negotiated as early as possible and at the
lowest possible administrative level. Ministries holding the formal
responsibility in a certain field are also responsible of chairing the relevant
expert committee. The Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as
well as the OPM has the right to participate in any of the expert committees.
In correspondence with the institutional apparatus, the political leadership laid
down a standard operating procedure for securing an effective adaptation of
legislation.  The standard procedure is based upon the initial instruction to the
administration, which was sent from Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland as
early as in 1988, long time prior to the negotiations on the EEA started.
According to the current procedure introduced in April 1995, any Ministry has
to write a ‘framework document’ for each new piece of legislation. This
document follows the case as it moves through the inter-ministerial apparatus.
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The document is supposed to cover the following: a description of the
background of the proposal, a description of the legal status of the legislation
and an overview of the current Norwegian legal position. Furthermore, the
document shall contain an analysis of the Norwegian interests, a description of
the status of the negotiations within the EU, and presentation of the view of
interest groups, and a short analysis of the consequences if Norway vetoes the
proposal. In addition, the responsible Ministry is also obliged to indicate how,
why and with which budgetary implications piece of legislation should be
implemented in the Norwegian legislation. A comparison with other
international treaties and the status in the other Nordic countries should also be
made. Finally, the responsible Ministry should draw an inference and
recommend an official Norwegian position.
It is currently too early to tell whether this very ambitious standard operating
procedure is actually followed or not. It seems that some Ministries and some
spesial utvalg are operating according to the procedure, while other institutions
give less priority to European issues. The way the administration was affected
by increased European integration differed considerably in terms of volume
and task. Some institutions perceived the development as a serious threat to
their traditional tasks, while other institutions saw new opportunities and
possibilities for increasing their influence or autonomy. The high-level of
political conflict over the issue, combined with the vital national interests at
stake, made the OPM a key institution. The Prime Minister and her advisors
played the role of the initiator, co-ordinator and controller of the process. Tasks
traditionally handled in the Ministry of Foreign Affair were governed by firm
instruction from the OPM. Thus, the OPM increased its importance and
influence substantially. Although, this was strongly related to increased
European integration, also this development had historical roots. In Norway,
the Prime Minister has traditionally been primus inter pares without any
privileged position, and there have been disputes on the role and strength of the
OPM. Until 1939, the Prime Minister was even responsible for operating a
Ministry at the same time as being the head of the Cabinet. The OPM was first
established in 1956 after a major parliamentary dispute. Carl J. Hambro the
conservative leader of the opposition argued that this was the ‘most
revolutionary proposal forwarded for the Parliament in fifty years’ (St. forh,
1955: 3417). In the 1960s the Office gained a co-ordinating role in
international issues related to the Nordic Council, and became increasingly
influential in international affairs (Bloch 1963:50).
95
However, there were several reasons for the increased role of the OPM in
relation to increased European integration. Firstly, according to the formal
procedures they had the responsibility for preparing the weekly meetings in the
Cabinet. Consequently the OPM became predominately occupied with
European issues simply because so many of these issues were discussed in the
Cabinet. Secondly, the strong role of the OPM was considered as important in
order to maneuver in an area with considerable domestic political conflict and
possible tension between different administrative institutions. Participation
from the OPM signaled the political priority devoted to the issue. Thirdly, as
long as the leading politicians considered membership in the EU as the
important political objective, it was expected that the Prime Minister, in
fulfiling her role appropriately, should play a key role and show responsibility
in this important issue. Nevertheless, we should not overestimate the
importance of the role of the OPM. The office had few resources. In 1991 a
special position for the co-ordination of EFTA and EC matters was established,
however, its international department still has only four positions. Thus, the
OPM has played the role of a competent commentator providing deadlines and
co-ordination of the ‘national interest’, rather than the active role of the
analysts or executor.
The Europeanization process has not only changed the mode of co-ordination,
but also the extent of co-ordination within the administration, the latter changes
was probably more significant. Institutions with a traditionally high level of
autonomy were put under pressure to obey an increasing number of
instructions and guidelines. Through extensive use of deadlines, guidelines and
political signals was the political leadership able to co-ordinate traditionally
autonomous institutions. During the initial period few disputes and
disagreements regarding co-ordination appeared within the administration. It is
likely that the transitional character, the clear objective of the political
leadership and the political importance of the issue contributed to ease the
conditions for deliberate design and political leadership. However, the extent of
the co-ordination varied in relation to certain stages of the process. In the early,
initiating stages the level of co-ordination was high, while in the later stages
the general level decreased. The political leaders had limited capacity and paid
sequential attention to some particular fields, which were considered to be of
vital importance, such as fishery, energy and agriculture. When the Norwegian
institutions became increasingly involved in highly specialized technical
issues, the amount and character of the information and documentation
increased (Engen 1995). This information overload led to sequential attention
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and thereby reduced the possibility and ability of political co-ordination within
some fields.
Reorganizing the relationship between different governmental in the state-
owned monopolies were particularly important. The EEA Agreement imposed
a clear distinction between operators and regulators of the market, two tasks,
which previously had been performed within the same organization. Some of
the state-owned monopolies – for instance the Norwegian Medicines Control
Authority, the import monopoly of Wine and the monopolies in postal- and
tele-services – lost their privileges. New formal-legal means replaced the
traditional trust-based and informal way of governing and regulating political
life. For a small state the informal system had worked efficiently, but when it
was integrated in a larger political community it became increasingly
formalized and regulated. A majority of these developments did not create
political or administrative problems. Rather, the EEA Agreement gave further
momentum to already ongoing processes of change, and the adaptations fitted
well with the general conceptions of good and effective administration.
However, in some cases anxiety about future prospects, and job security among
the employees slowed down the pace of the adaptation.
Increased European integration challenged and altered the relationship between
different units within particular governmental bodies. In general, the formal
structures of the Ministries remained unchanged. Since it is often harder to
change existing structures than to establish new ones (March and Olsen 1995),
new problems are often resolved by creating new units. In the 1970s planning
departments had been created, and during the 1980s administrative units were
established. During the preparation for membership, the political leadership did
not give any general guidelines for a preferred way of handling European
issues within the respective Ministries; neither did the Ministry of Government
Administration suggest one preferred standard model. Consequently, different
institutions were free to choose their own model, which reflected their
traditional way of solving problems and standard procedures of the
organization. Few new special units were established within the administration,
however, one major exception was the rapid build up of a secretariat for
European issues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but even this was based
upon the already existing structure of the former Ministry of Trade. A few,
among them the Ministry of Fisheries, had their own co-ordinating unit in a
specialized International or European department. Other institutions, like the
Ministry of Government Administration, distributed the co-ordinating role to
the generalists within the administrative units. But in most institutions, like in
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the Ministry of Finance, the experts in the most-affected unit carried out co-
ordination. Setting up special units for handling these issues was simply not
considered as an appropriate solution. European issues were interpreted as
integrated and natural parts of the normal tasks of the institutions, and the
formal organizational structures were never really changed when facing these
challenges.
Increased European integration also challenged the mode of vertical co-
ordination between different institutions within the Norwegian administration.
Like the Ministries, the Directorates went through a gradual process of
internationalization during the 1970s and 1980s (Holberg 1994). Some
institutions had considerable experience and were involved in different
European and international networks, which they operated with considerable
skill and a high degree of freedom. Others had less experience. Since the
Europeanization processes involved such a high degree of co-ordination, and
had such a political importance, many of the Directorates were controlled, and
instructed, by their respective Ministry in an unusually high degree and in
untraditional ways. One example is the Directorate of Fisheries, which lost
some of its traditional autonomy to the Ministry of Fisheries when they
prepared for increased European integration (Engen 1995). A relatively small
number of all the Directorates were given the possibility to participate in the
Norwegian co-ordination apparatus, or in any of working groups at the
European level. The Ministries primarily handled these tasks. For some
Directorates, for instance the Consumer Council of Norway, this was perceived
as exclusion and a major change in the vertical distribution of competence and
expertise between different levels of the government.
European integration challenged the boundaries and relationship between
government and non-governmental organizations. The tradition of giving
legitimate access and participatory rights to organized interests in public policy
making had been exposed to considerable critique during the last decade. From
being regarded as an extension of democracy and a complementary channel for
representation in the 1960s and 1970s (Rokkan 1969), participation of interest
organizations gradually came to be considered as a hindrance for reform and
administrative modernization during the 1980s. In spite of the change in the
normative environment, the traditional way of participation from the interest
organizations was exploited when the Norwegian political system faced the
European issues. Organized interests participated in the policy formation in
specialized reference groups within the inter-institutional apparatus. Their
participation was perceived as an effective method of distributing information
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and increasing the level of competence in various aspects of European politics
within the Norwegian society. However, the process of negotiating and
creating the Norwegian national interest was still the domain of the public
administration and the political leadership. In general, the interest
organizations took only a modest part in formulating the negotiating positions.
Nevertheless, this varied across sectors and segments. Ministries with well-
established routines and long traditions for collaboration with interest
organizations considered it appropriate to include them in the process of
Europeanization. While other institutions with less tradition for including
interest organizations did not invite to such participation. Within the
agricultural sector the relationship between government and non-governmental
bodies became increasingly difficult. In this sector there has traditionally been
a strong tradition of mutual support and co-operation between government and
interest organizations. Still, opposing views on the Norwegian positions and
the quality of the negotiation result created a high level of conflict between the
Ministry of Agriculture and the organizations of the farmers. The conflict
between the parties escalated and ended in reduced contact and co-operation
during the campaign. Nevertheless, short time later, the traditional relationship
seem to seem to be more or less reconciled.
3. 5 The significance of membership?
It is hard to assess the significance of formal membership in the EU. The time
past since the latest referendum is short. Furthermore, the distinction between
members and non-members are not easily drawn. As the discussion above
shows, the Norwegian political and administrative system has made substantial
changes in order to cope with the challenges and opportunities raised by
European integration. However, Europeanization of the Norwegian
administration is best interpreted as a process of series of incremental and step-
wise adaptation, rather than a dramatic and rapid break with the past. The
Norwegian political system did not respond to the process of Europeanization
by exploring or inventing radically new solutions, rather the opposite.
Solutions, which were found appropriate, reflected historical experiences and
traditional principles and methods of organizing political life in Norway.
Existing routines and capabilities were considered effective and appropriate. In
addition, the Norwegian administration had a considerable endogenous
dynamic and increased European integration gave further momentum to
ongoing processes of modernization. Since the Norwegian legislation had
gradually converged prior to formal membership in the EEA, it was possible to
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make rapid changes without any delay or any major conflicts within the
administration. In addition, the political priority given to the issue made it
easier to initiate changes and to adapt smoothly.
However, after the referendum, Norway is in a different situation. The
asymmetry in the relationship between the EFTA and EU increased
substantially. Shortly after the referendum the Norwegian government made
efforts to reduce uncertainty related to the EEA Agreement. During 1995 it
became clear that it was not necessary to re-negotiate the EEA Agreement. The
political leadership interpreted the result of the referendum as a no to full
membership in the EU, but as a yes to as close connection with the EU and
European countries as possible (Brundtland 1995). Since the referendum the
political leadership made attempts to deepen and widen both the formal and
informal linkages between the EU and Norway. This development followed
three different routes. Firstly, changes have been made to further develop the
EEA agreement. Towards the end of 1995 decisions were taken to extend the
co-operation on accompanying politics and in the social and cultural fields
(General Report 1995: 315-317). Secondly, Norway has played an important
role in the reorganization of the Nordic co-operation. Since Sweden, Finland
and Denmark are members of the EU, the Nordic countries are more strongly
linked to the EU than ever before. In order to cope with the new tasks the
Nordic co-operation and its political institutions have been reorganized. The
underlying idea is that European issues and particularly issues related to the EU
have a more important role on the Nordic agenda. Consequently, a
strengthened Nordic co-operation would give Norway better access, and
possibly, influence on the EU decision making process. Thirdly, the Norwegian
political leadership has tried to strengthen the linkage to other European
institutions and agreements, which are more loosely coupled to the EU, such as
NATO, and Norway is currently an associated member of the WEU and an
applicant to the Schengen-Agreement.
The discussion of the Norwegian case has showed some of the difficulties of
assessing the significance of membership. In some fields and it seems that non-
members are affected, and even as well adapted, as member states. However, in
other areas non-members are far less affected. In analyzing Europeanization of
small states it is therefore not very fruitful to start with a mono-causal analysis
of members vs. non-members. Nevertheless, participation in the regular
political and administrative co-operation has been reduced since the
referendum. Norway has reduced her formal possibilities to participate, and the
capability of EFTA is reduced. EFTA was left as an organization with
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considerable less influence and capabilities when the formerly important EFTA
countries – Sweden, Finland and Austria – became full members of the EU.
The staffs of the EEA-institutions and the EFTA-secretariat have been reduced
to about half their size. Furthermore, the Norwegian policy has changed from
being in a pre-accession period with rapid changes and clear political goals to a
situation with less clear political objective or long term vision. It is therefore
hard to foresee the future development of the relations between EU and
Norway. It is obviously impossible to have a look into the future. However, we
can identify three possible future developments. Firstly, Norway might
continue their policy of adaptation, which would most likely lead to increased
homogenization and convergence with the EU in a wide spectrum of fields.
This was the strategy of the Norwegian political leadership shortly after the
referendum, and it presupposes that the national institutions are able and
willing to make and implement changes. Secondly, Norwegian administration
might gradually alter its priorities, and start to benefit from some of the
positive effects for a small state with a small administration of being a non-
member. Less participation in EU institutions means fewer meetings, fewer
deadlines and fewer documents to read. De-coupling from the flow of
information has already reduced the strain on the Norwegian administration,
and made it possible to increase the attention and energy devoted to other and
possibly more important fields. Thirdly, it is possible to imagine a complicated
mixture of these two models. The linkages and pattern of contact will most
likely vary according to different sectors and different institutional traditions.
In some fields Norwegian politicians and administration will be out of sight
and out of mind as far as the decision-makers in the EU are concerned. In other
fields, with strong formal and informal linkages, it is likely that Norway will
participate in co-operation with the EU, one way or another. In this latter
model we will probably witness increased segmentation and fragmentation,
which in the long run would make overall democratic and political governance
of the Norwegian policy more difficult.
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Chapter 4: Fuzzy borders and adaptive outsiders -
Norway, Switzerland and the EU
4. 1 Europeanization and the boundaries of the European Union26
National states within the European Union (EU) are faced with two challenging
tasks: that of building effective and legitimate institutions at the European
level, and that of maintaining and developing democratic problem-solving
capacities at the national level (Scharpf 1996). Clearly these goals are
antithetical; there is some danger that ‘building Europe’ will undermine
national democracies and there is risk that demands for national autonomy may
hinder progress towards democratic European governance. These dilemmas are
captured by the concept of ‘Europeanization’. A process under which
European-level institutions and policy making grow in importance relative to
those at the level of national states (Olsen 1996). It denotes the partial
replacement of national policy-making by supranationalism, and it demands
substantial institutional reorganization and policy adaptation at the domestic
level. Such a process may generate deep ambivalence and give rise to
persistent political conflicts at the domestic level. And no wonder:
Europeanization, whether an aspiration or a menace – it is clearly seen as both
– is a historically significant phenomenon.
This article analyzes two interrelated questions in regard to the ‘reach’ of
Europeanization, or about the location and significance of boundaries. First,
within what area do the institutions and policy processes of the EU tend to take
over traditional functions of national states? Second, how extensive is the
adaptation of domestic institutions and policies: which states have to adapt and
how much? In exploring these questions, we challenge two assumptions that
underlie most of the current research on Europeanization. The first of these is
that the concept of membership in the EU is truly dichotomous (states are in or
out). The second is that there is a strong causal relationship between
membership in the EU and the extent of institutional reorganization and policy
adaptation at the domestic level.
Let us consider first the definition of ‘membership’. In a formal sense,
membership extends to those states that have signed the treaties; non-
                                                                
26 This article is co-written with Dr. Stephan Kux. It is published in Journal of
European Integration. The authors would like to thank Peter Leslie and Johan P.
Olsen and the reviewers for their stimulating comments on an earlier version of this
article
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signatories are not members. This is clearly an important distinction, as formal
membership carries both privileges and obligations. However, the in/out
dichotomy does not distinguish different forms of membership, and conceals
important aspects of Europeanization. Scholars have stressed the importance of
overlapping competence among different levels of government in the EU, and
they have shown that political actors interact across these various levels. The
term multi-level governance has been coined to describe the phenomena of
blurring, changing, and rebuilding of institutional boundaries (Jachtenfuchs and
Kohler-Koch 1996; Marks et al. 1996; Hocking and Wallace 1997).
Governance in the EU, according to Rhodes, is characterized by a ‘multiplicity
of actors specific to each policy area: interdependence among these social-
political-administrative actors; shared goals; blurred boundaries between
public, private and voluntary sectors and multiplying and new forms of action,
intervention and control’ (1996: 658).27 So far, the term multi-level governance
has referred to the processes of change taking place within the EU, i.e. across
internal boundaries. However, we can easily apply this concept to the
relationship between the EU and third countries, i.e. across the EU’s external
boundaries (Friis and Murphy 1999), thus casting new light on the significance
of membership.
In the EU, borders are blurred in two ways. First, there is an increasing
asymmetry among the member states. The EU is gradually becoming not only
a larger entity, but also an increasingly heterogeneous one. One consequence is
internal differentiation. The member states assume different statuses and
responsibilities within the EU, for instance: not all participate in the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) or in the Schengen Agreements; for several years
the UK refused to sign the Social Protocol; and the flexibility clauses of the
Amsterdam Treaty make provision for increasing asymmetry in the future.
Second, there is increasingly extensive use of different forms of ‘associate
membership,’ as a result of which the external boundaries of the EU are
becoming indistinct. Approximately 100 agreements link the EU to other
organizations and countries. For instance, the arrangements between the EU
and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), creating the European
                                                                
27 However, there is no shared understanding of the concept of multi-level governance
and interpretations seem to be numerous and ambiguous. Some authors use the term to
describe a specific outcome or a particular institutional configuration within the EU.
Others apply it to particular decision-making processes that are taking place within the
EU. Finally, some scholars use the term in a normative way to describe a future Euro-
polity considering multi-level governance as a politically more feasible and
fashionable term than, for instance, federalism or statism.
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Economic Area (EEA), bring most EFTA states within the EU’s Internal
Market. The East Central European applicant countries are less closely
associated with the EU through a set of Europe Agreements. Regional
agreements link the Asian and Mediterranean countries with the EU, and there
is also talk of creating a Trans-Atlantic Partnership with the United States.
Increased internal and external differentiation thus blurs the boundaries and
challenges the relevance of the formal concept of EU membership. Despite the
fact that fifteen states – not more, not fewer – are now signatories to the
treaties, and in this sense the boundaries of the EU are clear, internal
asymmetry, coupled with several gradations of associate membership, have
created an EU with ‘fuzzy edges’.
Our second major question about Europeanization is whether member states, as
compared with some non-member states, experience more pressure for change
in their domestic institutions. The dominant hypothesis claims that membership
in the EU involves a strong pressure for adaptation of domestic institutions of
national states (Toonen 1992). Consequently, EU member states are likely to
experience substantial changes in their political and constitutional systems, as
well as shifts in their political discourse, beliefs and understandings (Rometsch
and Wessels 1996: 357). According to this line of reasoning, non-member
states apparently experience less pressure for adaptation to European
integration than the member states. Moreover, it is assumed that, compared
with the member states, non-member states are less caught up in European
integration, they refrain from adapting to it, and they manage to preserve their
autonomy. Consequently, non-member states pursue a different policy and
follow different routes than EU member states (Ingebritsen 1998).
 The findings of our empirical research challenge this standard assumption. We
show that domestic institutions and policies are affected by the linkage
between the EU and the nation state, as well as by the domestic institutional
structures and the policies involved. Our evidence indicates that while
membership in the EU does matter, it is not the most important variable
determining the extent and direction of national institutional adaptation. We
demonstrate that non-member states and member states are linked to the EU in
formal and informal ways. Non-member states experience a higher level of
uncertainty regarding access to EU markets compared with the member states.
They also have fewer possibilities and capacities to influence and control
decision-making in the EU, than the member states, which raises questions
about the legitimacy of the institutional arrangements. In order to reduce
uncertainty and increase legitimacy non-member states make extensive
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adaptations in their political and administrative systems, enabling them to cope
with changes in their environment. They develop linkages to the EU system,
try to influence European policy, and activate side-arenas to promote their
interests. Aiming at reducing their costs of non-integration and at increasing
their effectiveness in European co-operation, non-member states adapt in more
or less similar ways as member states do.
The empirical basis of the article is a comparative analysis of Norway and
Switzerland, two small West European countries that are not members of the
EU.28 These two cases are highly relevant for developing a deeper theoretical
understanding of the processes of change that are taking place in Europe.
Norway and Switzerland represent the most highly developed countries of
Europe that have chosen not to become EU members. As such, attention to
these states helps us understand both aspects of Europeanization – the growth
of supranationalism, and institutional reorganization and policy adaptation at
the national level – as it may extend beyond the formal boundaries of the EU,
involving non-member states. It is a methodological fallacy to analyze
European integration without reference to the changes taking place outside the
EU-15. However, this observation is ignored in much of the current literature.
The article is organized as follows. First, we discuss the Norwegian and Swiss
cases and show that these states are embedded in a complex web with multiple
linkages to the EU. We show that the two non-member states are adapting their
institutions in ways that are similar to what Rometsch and Wessels (1996),
among others, have described regarding the EU member states. Second, we
analyze the sustainability of the flexible boundaries of the EU, and assess the
vulnerability of the Norwegian and Swiss positions. Finally, we conclude that
research on Europeanization can be improved. Less attention should be
devoted to the formal boundaries of the EU, while more attention should be
devoted to the complexity of formal and informal boundaries existing in the
EU, and the multiple processes of adaptation occurring at the domestic level.
4. 2  Pillar I: Incorporation of the acquis
                                                                
28  The focus on institutional adaptation is more extensively covered in two chapters
on Norway and Switzerland in Hanf and Soetendorp (1998), by Sverdrup and Kux
respectively; see also Sverdrup and Kux (1997) ‘Balancing effectiveness and
legitimacy in European integration: The Norwegian and Swiss case’ ARENA Working
paper no 97/31.
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From the early 1970s until the mid-1980s, the issue of European integration did
not receive much attention in Norway or Switzerland. Their linkages with the
European Community (EC) were formally regulated through the bilateral free
trade arrangements, as was the case also with the other EFTA countries –
Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Sweden. However, in the mid-
1980s, the increased momentum in European integration jeopardized the status
quo, institutionalize through the free trade agreements: the plan to create the
Internal Market formed a major challenge for the EFTA countries. With the
extension of EC liberalization to free trade in services and of labour, under the
Single European Act (1986), the EFTA countries feared exclusion from their
key markets and loss of contact with their main political partners (Norway
Utenriksdepartementet 1986-87). In spite of these concerns, the decision to
establish the Internal Market by 1992 was received positively in all EFTA
countries, since it created an opportunity to reconsider and reorganize their
relationship with the EC.
The vehicle for this was the slow-moving Luxembourg-process launched in
1984, under which high ranking EC officials high-ranking EC and EFTA
officials explored the possibility of extending the free trade arrangements and
developing a larger ‘European Economic Space’. The process accelerated
dramatically after 1989, when Commission President Jacques Delors invited
the EFTA countries to participate in a ‘European Economic Area’ (EEA), a
new association of EC and EFTA countries covering most aspects of the
Internal Market including the four freedoms. The EEA agreement, which
entered into force in 1994, is dynamic. When new legislation is decided in the
EU in a field covered by the EEA Agreement, the agreement provides that it
will be incorporated into the legislation in the EEA countries. Consequently,
the EEA Agreement created a permanent stream of decisions from the EU
system to the EEA countries. Furthermore, the agreement is based upon
homogeneous interpretation and enforcement of legislation throughout the
EEA.
A complex set of joint institutions was established to control and monitor
political, legal, social and cultural co-operation. The EEA Council is the
highest-ranking organ. It includes members of the Council of the EU,
Commission officials and one representative of each EFTA country
participating in the EEA. The EEA Council meets twice per year, but the
effective decision making, or rather, transmission of EU decision, is done in
the EEA Joint Committee composed of senior officials from the EFTA
countries and the Commission. It has monthly meetings through which the
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EEA Agreement is adjusted continuously by incorporating any new EC
legislation into the EEA Agreement. In a formal sense, decisions are taken by
unanimity: all parties have a formal right of veto. However, since the
legislation presented in the EEA Council is already agreed upon among the EU
member states in the Council of Ministers, it is presented as a choice between
taking it or leaving it. When an agreement on transmission is made in the EEA
Council, the new piece of legislation is then ratified by the national parliament
in the EEA country, and is identifiable as ‘EEA legislation’, distinct from other
national laws. Finally, the Joint EEA Parliamentary Committee brings together
members of the parliaments in the EFTA countries and members of the
European Parliament. In addition to these institutions, a European Surveillance
Authority (ESA) was established to monitor the implementation of the EEA
Agreement, and a separate EFTA Court was created to interpret and apply EEA
law (Norway Utenriksdepartementet 1991-92).
The structure of the institutions in the EEA agreement is asymmetric. During
the EEA negotiations the EFTA countries asked for effective co-decision on
market legislation, but the EU member states rejected the request. EEA
member states do have a formal right to veto any new draft law or proposal
coming from the EU, doing so they would jeopardize market access not only
for themselves, but for other EEA states as well. In fact, the EU countries may
threaten to suspend certain parts of or terminate the entire EEA Agreement, if
the veto is used. Thus the EFTA countries have so far shown limited interest
and willingness in using the ‘exit’ or ‘voice’ option laid down in the
Agreement. This disparity and political weight has its similarity in economic
power. While at the time of the signing of the EEA Agreement, the relationship
between the two organizations was fairly symmetric - trade between EC and
EFTA countries was much larger than with the United States and Japan
together – today the situation is very different. The EFTA side has fewer
members, and less economic power, and the EU side has become larger and
has gained increased economic power.
Norway accepted the constraints of the EEA, but Switzerland did not.
Although the Swiss government strongly supported membership in the EEA,
the voters rejected the proposal by referendum in December 1992, and
Switzerland was left with the existing bilateral free trade arrangement. Norway
and Switzerland thus represent two intermediary stages of European
integration. These two countries are linked to the EU in different ways: their
ties vary in regard to different aspects of the EU polity and to different policy
fields. Both have gone as far as their respective electorates have allowed. Thus,
110
neither the bilateral approach to partial integration (Switzerland) nor the
multilateral one (Norway) stemmed from the strategies and preferences of the
political leadership. In both countries, the governments and most of the
political elite wanted to strengthen their relationship with the EU. Thus, they
had to find a balance between policy effectiveness and institutional legitimacy
in their approach to European integration. For both countries, their linkages to
pillar I, i.e. the Internal Market, are the most important and fully developed.
Norway
The Norwegian relationship with the EC/EU has been punctuated by traumatic
incidents. Norway first applied for membership in the EC in 1961, but
withdraw its application when France vetoed Britain’s candidacy in 1963. A
decade later, Norway applied for a second time; a treaty was negotiated but
was rejected by the voters in a referendum (1972). The campaign created, and
unveiled, deep cleavages within Norwegian society, cutting across and dividing
all political parties (Furre 1991). Since most of the bureaucrats supported the
pro-membership side, the referendum resulted in a decline of confidence in the
administration, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gleditsch et al.
1974). With the 1972 referendum defeat, the issue of European integration left
the political agenda; interest in, and knowledge of, the EC and European
politics declined in every section of society. For a period of fifteen years the
relationship with the EC was not subject to any political debate in the
Parliament. The traumatic memories of the 1972 referendum prevented the
political leadership from taking any steps in the direction of membership until
the mid-1980s.
The Norwegian government drafted two white papers on its relations with the
EC and European integration in 1987 (Norway Utenriksdepartementet 1986-
87, Norway Departementet for handel og skipsfart 1986-87). Neither paper
recommended membership in the EC, but both suggested that Norway should
pay increased attention to developments within the EC. The two white papers
in the1980s therefore represented a brand new initiative, breaking with the past
and leading to Norway’s participation in the EEA, and just afterwards (1992),
to a new application for admission to the EC.
In this, Norway followed the lead of three other EFTA countries, Austria,
Sweden and Finland. All three were neutral states, and it is significant that the
EEA negotiations took place in a period of profound changes in the political
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landscape of Europe. While the European transformation did not alter the
content or pace of the EEA negotiations as such, it did change the evaluation of
the outcome by the EFTA neutrals. The traditional view that neutrality was
seen as incompatible with full membership was challenged. The result was that
the main EFTA countries applied for membership: Austria in July 1989,
Sweden in July 1991, Finland in March 1992, and Switzerland in May 1992
followed by a reluctant Norway in November 1992. The Norwegian
government initially wanted to slow down the adaptation process and to
implement the EEA agreement before applying for membership, but the
Swedish29 application for membership, which caught Norway off guard, forced
a reconsideration of the issue.
The negotiations between Norway and the EU started in April 1993. Since
most of the issues of the negotiations had already been resolved during the
EEA negotiations, the terms of accession were rapidly agreed on (Norway
Utenriksdepartementet 1993-94). In Norway, a referendum was held on 28
November 1994. The referendum had a record high turnout of 89 per cent, and
a small majority (52.2 per cent) rejected the treaty of accession. The result and
the pattern of voting showed a striking similarity to the first Norwegian
referendum in 1972 (Todal Jenssen et al. 1998).
Shortly after the referendum Norway formulated a policy of gradual
adaptation. Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland stated that the Norwegian
government regretted but respected the referendum result and confirmed that
the policy goals remained unchanged. She stated that Norway would ‘continue
to be a part of the Internal Market through the EEA Agreement. We will
continue to pursue our economic policy in accordance with the objective of the
Maastricht Treaty. We will pursue every opportunity for active participation in
international affairs’ (Brundtland 1994: 3). The objective was to participate in
as many policy fields, networks and institutions related to European integration
as possible. This policy of gradual adaptation had the support of the majority in
the parliament and of a majority of the voters. Even the current (1999)
Norwegian coalition government, despite the fact that it consists of political
parties that opposed membership and rejected adaptation to the EU, pursues the
same policy. According to this government the EEA agreement provides a
platform for broad-based co-operation with the EU, and the EEA Agreement is
the basis for their co-operation with the EU, its closest partner and a very
                                                                
29 The decision of the Swedish government to apply for membership in the EC was
formulated almost as a footnote in a larger economic crisis package.
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important market for Norwegian business and industry. The government
argued that it would make use of the EEA Agreement and develop it to serve
Norwegian interests (Vollebæk 1999). Consequently, the EEA offered a
legitimate fallback position and Norway’s present policy toward the EU is
continuing the process of approximation and gradual adaptation.
The EEA Agreement, of course, no longer applies to Austria, Sweden and
Finland, but it continues to associate Norway, together with Iceland and
Liechtenstein, to the EUs pillar I within a complex institutional and legal
framework. The comprehensive scope of the EEA Agreement has increased
Norway’s integration with the EU. Norway has committed itself to transpose
those parts of the acquis communautaire that are related to the free movement
of goods, capital, services and persons, as well as the EU competition rules,
into its national legislation (Sejersted et al. 1995). Moreover, within the
framework of the EEA Agreement, co-operation has increased in related areas.
For instance, Norway co-operates in issues related to environmental protection,
social affairs, consumer protection, research and development, education,
training, culture, company law, measures for small and medium-sized
enterprises, audio-visual services, tourism, statistics, information services and
disaster preparedness etc. (European Commission 1995). In most cases this
implies that the interpretation of EEA legislation by Norwegian courts is
similar to the interpretation of EU law by national courts in EU member states.
It has also changed the legal reasoning and introduced new legal principles into
Norwegian jurisprudence where EEA legislation is concerned (Sejersted et al.
1995).
EEA legislation has been transposed rapidly into the Norwegian law on a large
scale (Sollien 1996). During the ratification period a total number of 1,300
legal acts were transposed. When the ‘EEA II’ package, covering the EU
legislation developed in the EC during the negotiations on the EEA Agreement,
was passed in March 1994, an additional 500 directives and regulations were
transposed. By the end of 1995, the Norwegian administration had transposed
94 per cent of the legislation related to the Internal Market; by the end of 1996
the ratio had increased to 97 per cent. This was a relatively high proportion
even compared to the figures of the EU member states (ESA Reports 1995,
1996).30 There is increased awareness of EEA regulation among firms and in
public opinion. Consequently, the European Surveillance Authority (ESA),
                                                                
30  As in the EU in general, there are few studies of actual implementation that go
beyond the simple understanding of implementation as transposition.
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responsible for monitoring the agreement, has experienced an increasing
workload as legislation, earlier transposed, is actually being implemented.
However, because of its limited capacity and personnel resources, it can only
review one third of the legislation (Dagens Næringsliv 24.07, 1997). Moreover,
the EEA Agreement has indirectly affected the priorities of Norwegian
decision-makers by setting much of the policy agenda and fixing the deadlines.
The EEA Agreement is thus shaping the day-to-day policies and politics in a
wide range of fields and at all levels of Norwegian government and society.
The rapid transposition and implementation of EEA legislation has been
facilitated by the fact that Norway had already made several step-by-step
adjustments of legislation prior to the application for membership and the
implementation of the EEA Agreement. These changes had created a relatively
high degree of compatibility between the two sets of legislation (Farsund and
Sverdrup 1994). There has been a gradual and continuing process of
convergence brought about through bureaucratic anticipation and political
instruction. As early as 1988, the Norwegian government, in a letter from the
Prime Minister sent to all ministries, established a formal procedure for
harmonization of legislation (Norway Regjeringsutvalget for EF-saker 1989).
According to this procedure, the administration had to analyze to what extent
each new change in Norway’s legislation differed from the acquis
communautaire. If it was considered necessary to pass legislation differing
from the acquis such deviations had to be explicitly justified. A further step
was taken after the 1994 referendum, when a standard operating procedure for
securing effective adaptation to EU/EEA legislation was established after the
1994 referendum. According to a letter in 1995 from the Office of the Prime
Minister, each ministry has to write a ‘framework document’ for all proposed
Norwegian legislation that is related to the EEA agreement. (Norway
Statsministerens kontor 1995) This document is attached to the draft law as it
circulates through the inter-ministerial network. It is supposed to give both the
background and the legal status of relevant EEA legislation, and to provide an
overview of the current Norwegian legal position. The document also contains
an analysis of Norwegian interests, a description of the status of negotiations
on the subject within the EU, a presentation of the view of interest groups, and
a short analysis of the consequences if Norway chooses to veto the proposal. In
addition, the responsible ministry is also requested to indicate the budgetary
implications of the legislation. Moreover, a comparison with other international
treaties and a status report on the issue in the other Nordic countries must be
made. Finally, the responsible ministry is to draw conclusions and make
recommendations regarding the official Norwegian position. This standard
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procedure facilitates approximation and a gradual convergence between
Norwegian and EU policy and law.
On technical matters, implementation of EEA legislation has been eased by the
changing perceptions of what processes or standards are technically superior.
Imitations of EU legislation in order to reduce complications and costs of
applying a different set of rules have speeded up the process. Moreover,
standardized procedures have ensured rapid implementation. Most of the
adaptations to EEA legislation have been administrative regulations that have
not required parliamentary approval, which would be a much more time
consuming process (Sejersted 1996). Consequently, the internal dynamics of
the institutions involved, and the strong insistence of the political leadership,
have created a standardized procedure for rapid and efficient transposition of
EC legislation into Norwegian law.
Although Norway’s relationship with the EU is strongly asymmetrical –
Norway is mainly a rule-taker – Norwegian officials and technical experts are
allowed to participate in the meetings of the Commission in the preparatory
stage and implementation of new regulations and directives. At present,
Norwegian experts participate in more than 200 different joint committees
(Norway Statskonsult 1999). The number of civil servants in the ministries
dealing occasionally or regularly with international issues increased from 24
per cent in 1976, to 29 per cent in 1986, and to 33 per cent in 1996. Increased
European integration has led to significant changes in patterns of participation
and contact (Norway Statskonsult 1998). In 1996, seventy-two per cent of the
civil servants in the ministries reported that they were directly affected by the
EEA Agreement. Forty-eight per cent stated that they had been in contact with
the European Commission during the previous year, and 25 per cent even
reported that they had participated in a committee under the European
Commission during the previous year (Egeberg and Trondal 1996). In addition,
a total of 23 Norwegian bureaucrats now have positions, or secondments, in the
European Commission for a period of two to three years. The Norwegian
ministries cover the costs of these positions.
These contacts give Norway, like other EEA countries, an opportunity to have
input into the policy formation during the preparatory phases of new legislation
in the Commission, although their possibility to influence the work in the
committees under the Council of Ministers is limited. The consultation and
communication processes work fairly well; however outcomes vary according
to issue area, and of course are affected by political factors. For instance, it
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seems that the more technical the issues are, the more important is expertise,
and the less important is the national origin of committee members. Similarly,
when policy proposal raise moral or ethical issues, it is more likely that
arguments matter more than their point of origin. However, when proposed
policies affect strong political and economic interests in the EU, Norway can
have little or no influence. By contrast, in issues where Norway has strong
interests, and the EU is not vitally affected, it seems that the Norwegian
concerns has a higher probability of being taken into account, or at least
listened to. In two recent cases, one on salmon prices and accusation on
dumping, and one on a gas market directive, the Norwegian government has
been able to exploit its formal rights to influence EU policy. However, Norway
has also learnt that the formal right to participate is modest and often
insufficient. It is thus necessary for Norway to strengthen its formal and
informal contacts with the various European capitals and improve its linkages
to European political parties and the major interest organizations (Vollebæk
1999).
Switzerland
Switzerland has never held a referendum on the issue of full EU membership.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the 1972 Free Trade Agreement with the EC had
broad popular support. EFTA provided a viable institutional framework for
assuring Switzerland’s effective relations with the EC countries and facilitating
access to the country’s most important markets. Additional protocols were
added, covering technical issues and improving market access, gradually
extending the agreement. However, since it only covered trade in goods, not
trade in services or the free movement of capital – key elements of its
prospering economy – Switzerland’s free trade arrangement came under
pressure with the Internal Market project.
The Swiss government strongly supported the switch from a bilateral, goods-
only approach to a multilateral, comprehensive approach as reflected in the
EEA Agreement. In the negotiations leading to this agreement many of the
concessions granted by the EC to the EFTA countries were tailor-made to meet
the objections and reservations of the Swiss government. In return, the EC
countries pushed for a Transit Agreement guaranteeing free access to the Swiss
trans-Alpine transport routes. The accord, which required the Swiss
government to build two expensive new railway routes across the Alps by the
year 2004, was part of the EEA Agreement being signed at the same time.
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Strong majorities in the chambers of parliament approved the EEA agreement
and the companion agreement on the trans-alpine transport. The EEA was also
unanimously supported by the cantonal governments and by most of the
political parties (Goetschel 1994; Huth 1996; Sciarni and Listhaug 1997).
However, according to the rules of Swiss direct democracy, a popular
referendum is mandatory if the government wants to join a supranational
organization. In this respect, the EEA Agreement was a constitutional border
case. Since the treaty would have far reaching consequences for the Swiss legal
and political system, the Federal Council decided to put it to a referendum, in
which a majority of both the population and the cantons was required.
The EEA failed the referendum test. On 6 December 1992, a majority of 50.3
per cent of the population rejected the agreement, which was also turned down
by a decisive majority of the cantons – 17 out of 23. The compounded majority
was thus missed by only 0.4 per cent of the popular vote, but by six cantons.
Some of the main concerns of the voters included the loss of sovereignty,
concessions on trans-alpine transport, unrestricted freedom of movement and a
general uneasiness toward the EC which experienced its most serious monetary
crisis during that period (Goetschel 1994; Huth 1996). Indirectly, the
population also rejected the government's strategy aiming at full membership
over the long term. Spurred on by deepening integration in the Maastricht
process, and dissatisfied with the institutional arrangements of the EEA, the
Swiss Federal Council had submitted a formal demand for accession to the EU
in May 1992, following the example of several the other EFTA countries
(Scweizerischer Bundesrat 1992). However, the outcome of the EEA
referendum put a halt to the government's plan of gradual integration with the
EU, it suspended its application, and it left the Swiss society politically deeply
divided. The verdict of direct democracy also resulted in the preservation of the
status quo ante, i.e. there is no formal, institutionalized arrangement
associating the Swiss with the Internal Market. Switzerland returned to the
bilateral, sectoral approach based on the 1972 Free Trade Agreement.
In order to overcome this deadlock in Swiss integration policy, in the summer
of 1993 the Federal Council submitted a list of sixteen policy areas it wanted to
negotiate with the EU. In November, the Council of the EU agreed to start
bilateral talks with Switzerland in seven of these areas, namely air transport,
land transport, agriculture, free movement of people, public procurement,
research and technical barriers to trade. On 20 February 1994, however, the
Swiss people voted in favour of introducing an article into the Federal
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Constitution, which bars all international trans-alpine road transport after the
year 2004. This was another blow to the government’s integration strategy,
especially as the EU perceived it as a violation of the 1992 EC-Swiss Transit
Agreement. As a consequence, the Council of Ministers in the EU postponed
the start of the bilateral negotiations. Only after the Federal Council could
convince the EU member states that the alpine initiative would be implemented
in a non-discriminatory way, and in line with existing commitments, bilateral
talks began in late 1994 (Schweizerischer Bundesrat 1995).
Negotiations on these technical issues were extremely difficult, mainly due to
disagreements on the pricing of trans-alpine road transport and social
provisions in the agreement on free movement. On 11 December 1998, with
the support of the Austrian EU presidency and after the Swiss government
made substantial concessions; the seven agreements were signed. They have to
be ratified by the EU and the Swiss authorities as a package and are likely to
enter into force in 2001, assuming that none of the accords is defeated at the
ballot box. The seven agreements include partial integration, bring Switzerland
much closer to the Single European Market, and offer institutional linkages to
the EU in the form of mixed committees and participation in EU comitology.
Moreover, the agreements are likely to trigger further co-operation. The
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons provides incentives to start
negotiations on the liberalization of services. Thus there is a spill-over effect in
bilateralism. The seven agreements will have a deep impact on the Swiss
economy and the political system. Switzerland has to open its markets, will
experience more competition, and has to adapt its legislation and institutions to
the new treaty provisions (Schweizerischer Bundesrat 1999b).
Currently, the next step in Switzerland’s integration policy is under discussion.
A popular initiative to be voted on in 2001 demands the immediate start of
accession negotiations. The Federal Council is more cautious. In an Integration
Report published in February 1999, the current state of relations between
Switzerland and the EU is carefully analyzed. Four options are submitted for a
broad political debate: isolation, continuation of bilateral negotiations, an EEA
agreement and full membership. In this comprehensive report which examines
every aspect of Swiss - EU relations, the Federal Council comes to the
conclusion that the potential of bilateral agreements is almost exhausted and
that Switzerland has to redefine its policy toward the EU  (Schweizerischer
Bundesrat 1999a).
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In the meantime, the Swiss government pursues a policy of gradual
harmonization through autonomous, unilateral transposition of EU legislation.
EUROLEX, the package of legal amendments to EEA rules prepared in 1992,
has been implemented as SWISSLEX, despite the negative EEA vote. Indeed,
as early as 1988, almost at the same time as in Norway, the Federal Council
had decided that new laws should be examined as to whether the draft Swiss
legislation is compatible with existing EU law. The government stated that
‘this effort to achieve parallelism does not aim at an automatic transposition of
European law, but to avoid that unwillingly and unnecessarily new legal
differences are created, which hinder the aspired mutual recognition of legal
norms’ (Schweizerischer Bundesrat 1988: 380). Today, every communication
of a draft new law to parliament contains a so-called Europe chapter (chapter
5) which examines the relationship to existing or draft European legislation.
This test of Euro-compatibility follows a standardized procedure. The agency
in charge of the project analyzes itself the relationship of the draft proposal to
existing European legislation. The Office of Integration examines the draft in
the light of Swiss integration policy and assures that any important
developments in the EU are taken into account. The Directorate of
International Law reviews the legal implications. The International Section of
the Federal Office of Justice provides assistance and submits proposals for
changes in order to assure the compatibility of Swiss and European legislation
(Schweizerisches Bundesamt für Justiz 1995: 224f.). The cantons also adapt to
European integration, also to a lesser extent and in less systematic ways (Jaag
1999).
This systematic, institutionalized procedure of unilateral adaptation can be
compared to the transposition of EU law by the member states, and to the
Norwegian procedure. Approximately 85 per cent of Switzerland’s market
legislation is Euro-compatible. Some EU directives are copied word-for-word
in Swiss legislation as in the case of the new competition law (Amgwerd
1998). EU technical annexes and regulations form an integral part of Swiss
laws and decrees. Occasionally, the non-member state Switzerland tries to be a
Musterschüler and transposes EU laws into national legislation even before the
member states, as in the case of the 1997 directive on migrant workers. In
Switzerland, most market regulations are interpreted in the same way as in the
EU resulting in a relatively high degree of compatibility between the two sets
of regulations.
Technical norms and the statistical and budgetary systems have been adjusted
to meet EU standards. A branch of the German Technical Certification Agency
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offers Swiss producers EU quality and norms licenses. The Maastricht criteria
serve as targets in fiscal and budgetary debates, as they do in Norway. Swiss
companies prepared for the introduction of the Euro in similar ways as their
German or French competitors. Swiss banks established a Swiss Euro Clearing
Bank in Frankfurt in order to gain access to the European clearing system
TARGET (Schweizerischer Interdepartementale Arbeitsgruppe 1998). The
continuous, almost automatic adaptation to the EU acquis communautaire has
profound impacts on the legal reasoning and the principles of economic
regulation in Switzerland. The acquis, in general, has become the point of
reference for Swiss legislation.
Another aspect of the progressive Europeanization of Switzerland is the
adaptation of the political and administrative system. Especially after the 1992
failure of the EEA, many directorates and agencies have set up new sections of
European or international affairs. New co-ordination procedures have been
established in order to cope with the emerging European and global challenges
and to co-ordinate growing cross-border transactions. The role of the
parliament and the political parties in European affairs has also been upgraded
and a new procedure for the participation of the cantons has been was
established. Swiss mind maps are shifting too. Today, Europe has become a
general point of reference in the political discourse. A few years ago, it was
unthinkable that reference would be made to the Schengen Agreement at a
town-hall meeting dealing with asylum issues, but today it is virtually to be
expected. In many respects, Switzerland is adapting to European integration as
a member state would, despite the fact that its formal arrangement with the EU
has not changed since 1972 and remains at the EFTA (free trade) level. The
Swiss approach can be considered as successful in adapting to the requirements
of European integration, while taking into consideration popular concerns
regarding closer, institutionalized links to the EU, the preservation of Swiss
identity, and special features of the political system such as federalism and
direct democracy. As an outsider Switzerland has learnt to behave like an
insider.
The main motive for this voluntary, unilateral adaptation is the reduction of
economic uncertainty and transactions costs, as well as improved access to the
Internal Market. Since the Federal Council still pursues the long-term goal of
full membership, autonomous transposition is also viewed as another step in
the process of phasing-in and as a strategy to compensate for or to circumvent
the negative verdict on the EEA. For political reasons, the government insists
that unilateral adaptation – and the provisions of the bilateral agreements –
120
remain just below the EEA level. However, the scope and the speed of
Europeanization of Swiss legislation differ little from that of most EEA
countries, at least in the more technical fields of norms and regulations.
Comparison
In a formal sense, both Norway and Switzerland have adapted to European
integration on the basis of autonomous decisions by the national authorities.
Ostensibly, there is an in-built filter or firewall between the European and the
national system in both cases; intergovernmentalism, not supranationalism,
characterizes their approach to European integration. But it is equally obvious
that both have developed sophisticated and effective mechanisms to deal with
the downstream effects of European integration.
A closer look reveals some differences and difficulties in institutional
adaptation between Norway and Switzerland. The main difference is that
Switzerland transposes on a voluntary basis and in an informal way, while the
EEA countries are subjected to EC legislation, participate in the joint
institutions, contribute financially and face legal supervision and sanctions in
case of non-compliance. Thus, in the Swiss case, adaptation is unilateral and on
a voluntary basis; it is Switzerland's autonomous choice to decide which of the
EU regulations she introduces at what time and to which extent. Through
unilateral adaptation Switzerland may reduce transactions costs, but there is no
guarantee of equal treatment, and no reciprocity by the EU and the EEA
member states. Thus the country plays the game, but cannot enjoy the full
benefits of European integration. Norway, whose relationship with the EU is
more institutionalized and rule-based, experiences less uncertainty.
Switzerland is not yet involved in EU decision-shaping and decision-making
processes and does not participate in the numerous EU expert groups, working
parties and implementation committees. On the other hand, EEA co-ordination
within the EFTA organization does provide an informal platform for
Switzerland. Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein inform the Swiss delegation
on a regular basis on the progress of EU legislation and take Switzerland’s
opinion into account in their own decisions. Thus Switzerland has an
unofficial, indirect observer status in the EEA. The relatively open political
system of the EU and the extensive process of consultation in decision shaping
also offers some access points for lobbying by the Swiss government,
companies or organized interests. The bilateral agreements concluded at the
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end of 1998 offer some improved institutional linkages to the EU. Yet,
Switzerland has no, or only a limited, informal ‘voice of opportunity’ at the
European level. The official Swiss strategy of ‘participation without
integration’ is rather the opposite: ‘integration without participation’. Norway,
on the other hand, has a higher degree of formal participation in, and easier
access to, the decision-making activity within the EU.
The legal relationship to the EU is also different in the two countries.
Switzerland is subjected only to its own courts, while Norway is directly
subjected to the EFTA/EEA-Court and indirectly to the European Court of
Justice. For Switzerland, there will be no sanctions in case of delayed
implementation or insufficient transposition. At the same time, the country
cannot enjoy legal protection in case of infringements or violations by other
parties. One consequence of the different legal status is that adaptation is more
static in Switzerland, than it is in Norway. EU directives, as published in the
Official Journal, are the point of reference for Swiss legislation, while
subsequent addenda, consolidation, comitology work, implementation
regulations or ECJ judgments shaping, changing and up-dating the acquis
communautaire are not always taken into account. The bilateral agreements
concluded in December 1998 are also based on the current acquis, and future
adaptation requires renewed negotiations. New cleavages between
Switzerland's static adaptation and the dynamic Europeanization of EU and
EEA countries may therefore emerge.
Overall, institutional adaptation remains uneven and superficial in both
countries. In Switzerland, institutional adaptation affects mainly the central
government and administration; the non-central governments have hardly been
affected so far. In Norway, local governments are bound, as is the national
government, by the EEA rules, but implementation is not always consistent and
is often contested. In both countries, political parties and societal organizations
are only slowly reorienting towards Europe. In Switzerland, even within the
top layers of government, only a small group of approximately 150 officials –
or less than 1 per cent of the federal administration – are dealing with European
affairs on a regular basis.
Notwithstanding this weak institutionalization, both Norway and Switzerland
have a high degree of formal and informal association with the EU. The EU
has a strong policy impact in both countries, where it receives considerable
domestic attention and structures domestic decision-making. Neither of the
countries is fully integrated in the EU structures, but both play the game.
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Variations in domestic institutions, their traditions and their public opinion led
Norway and Switzerland into different relationship with the EU. Norway has a
stronger and more institutionalized linkage to the EU and is thus less
vulnerable than Switzerland. These two countries illustrate the fact that there
are important intermediary stages between membership and non-membership,
which need to be taken into account when analyzing processes of
Europeanization. Both countries have linkages to the EU that blur the
traditional boundaries of membership and non-membership. Certain boundaries
are formal and institutionalized, as in the case of Norway, while others are less
formal, bilateral and more based upon unilateral adaptation, as in the case of
Switzerland.
4. 3 Compensating strategies and side arenas – pillars II and III
Norway and Switzerland have developed compensatory strategies, and are
making use of side arenas, to overcome the disadvantages of non-membership.
This applies, above all, to the second and third pillars of European integration,
which are not covered by the EFTA or the EEA Agreement. In this respect,
there are important differences in the degree of participation between the two
countries.
Norway
In Norway, the political leadership interpreted the result of the 1994
referendum as a ‘no’ to full membership in the EU, but as a ‘yes’ to as close a
link with the EU and European countries as possible (Brundtland 1995). Given
this tacit mandate, the political leadership has made attempts to deepen and
widen both the formal and informal linkages between Norway and the EU.
This development followed four different routes.
First, changes have been made to further develop the EEA Agreement into new
areas. Towards the end of 1995, decisions were taken to extend the co-
operation on flanking policies, namely in the social and cultural fields
(European Commission 1995: 315-317). The EEA, as a dynamic agreement, is
in a permanent process of being enlarged to cover new programs and fields.
Second, Norway has played an important role in the reorganization of Nordic
co-operation. Nordic co-operation is characterized by a homogeneous culture
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sharing languages, identities, histories and certain values (Olsen and Sverdrup
1998). Since Denmark, Finland and Sweden are members of the EU, the
Nordic countries are more strongly linked to the EU than ever before. In order
to cope with the new tasks, Nordic co-operation and its political institutions
have been reorganized (Lindstrøm 1996). The underlying idea is that the
European integration should play a more important role on the Nordic agenda.
However, in certain areas the Nordic countries have conflicting interests, and
effective Nordic co-operation on European issues has proved to be very
difficult. Nevertheless, strengthened Nordic co-operation on European issues
increases the access of Norway to EU decision-making (Olsen and Sverdrup
1998).
Third, the Norwegian political leadership has tried to strengthen the linkage to
other European institutions and agreements which are coupled with the EU,
such as NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). In the post-war
period, Norwegian foreign policy was the outcome of the interplay between
three separate pillars: the Atlantic pillar, the Nordic pillar and the continental
European pillar (Riste 1991). In the period after the 1940s, the Atlantic pillar
dominated the orientation of Norwegian foreign policy (Riste 1995). Norway
does not participate directly in any of the activities related to the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, as a long time NATO member,
Norway is directly involved in the current discussions on the reorganization of
European security policy. Norway is also an associate member of the WEU.
Participation in NATO and WEU give the Norwegian government fairly good
access to information, and the possibility of participating in the current security
discussions in Europe. In 1999, Norway occupied the Presidency of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), making it a
visible actor on the international scene and improving access to the EU
decision-makers. The development of inter-institutional ties among the three
security organizations, as through Combined Joint Task Forces, also improves
Norway’s access to the second pillar of European integration. However, the
recent discussion on the possible integration of the WEU into the EU has
caused uncertainty in Norway. The Foreign Minister stated in 1999 that ‘if the
EU should become the framework for political decisions on European security
and crisis management to a greater extent than at present, the natural result
would be for Norway and the EU to deepen their existing co-operation within
the framework of the current arrangement for political dialogue’ (Vollebæk
1999: 8).
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Finally, in regard to the third pillar, Norway has signed an agreement to
become full member of the Schengen Agreement, an intergovernmental
arrangement among some of the EU member states on the removal of border
controls in Europe leading to a ‘Europe without borders’ (Norway Justis- og
politidepartementet 1996-97). Unwilling to sacrifice the Nordic passport union
and facing considerable costs for reinstalling controls along the borders with
Norway, Finland and Sweden insisted on the inclusion of Norway in the
Schengen process. The Norwegian government feared that this issue could
evoke the political cleavages that surfaced during the 1994 referendum
campaign. The level of conflict increased, but the parliament ratified the
agreement in June 1997, just before the European Council met in Amsterdam
to finalize revisions to the EU treaties. Since the heads of state decided to
include the Schengen acquis in the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU had to find a
new kind of arrangement for Norway and Iceland. During 1998, the parties
agreed on a new institutional arrangement between Norway and the EU on
Schengen issues. The association in the Schengen Agreement was based on a
complex institutional set-up allowing Norway to participate in policy making
institutions related to border control, asylum and migration policy as well as
European police co-operation. However, Norway did not get a right to vote
(Norway Stortingets forhandinger 1998-99, 1449-53). The Schengen
agreement is a good illustration of the blurring of boundaries in the EU.
Norway and Iceland are not members of the EU, but they participate in the
Schengen agreement, while Great Britain and Ireland are non-participating EU
members. Ironically, when Great Britain held the EU Presidency, she had the
responsible for negotiating the new arrangement with Norway and Iceland.
Switzerland
As long as the seven bilateral agreements signed in 1998 are not ratified,
Switzerland is constrained in developing additional links to the EU. The
European Commission seems deliberately to bar any attempt to negotiate other
agreements or to forge new ties with European agencies in order to put
pressure on the bargaining process. This is clearly the case in justice and home
affairs. During the bilateral negotiations, the EU member states refused to start
talks on Switzerland’s association to the third pillar and the Schengen
agreement. When the bilateral agreements were concluded in December 1998,
the two sides drafted declarations on the beginning of talks on closer co-
operation on asylum policy and the Schengen acquis. The member states,
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however, refused to support these declarations demanding further concessions
on customs control and the taxing of banking accounts.
While Switzerland is strongly interested in deepening co-operation in the areas
of justice and home affairs, the tradition of neutrality and domestic constraints
render co-operation in the field of foreign and security policy much more
difficult than in the case of Norway. Since Switzerland is a member neither of
the EU, NATO, nor of the United Nations, it does not participate in an
institutionalized coalition or alliance of states. The long-standing ties within
the group of neutral and non-aligned countries (N+N group), that included
Austria, Finland, the former Yugoslavia and Sweden, have also come to a halt.
During the Balkans conflict, Switzerland nevertheless started to adapt its policy
of neutrality to the new European realities. Just as most of the EEA and
candidate countries, Bern followed the EU’s policy of sanctions against
Yugoslavia - at least partially (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 30 June 1998). This is a
major departure from the traditional Swiss policy, which only supported
sanctions mandated by the UN Security Council, and not those decided by a
regional grouping such as the EU. This is a good example to illustrate how the
pressure to adapt to European integration is increasing and starts to spill-over
into areas of ‘high policy’.
The Swiss federal government and administration, nevertheless, try to make
use of side-arenas to promote Swiss interests toward the EU. The most
important platform is the EFTA. This organization provides Switzerland access
to the EEA process. Swiss officials take part as observers in the preparatory
meetings of the EEA bodies and occasionally, they can voice their opinion or
give expert advice. This provides Switzerland with timely information on new
EU legislation and facilitates unilateral transposition and adaptation.
Another important side arena is the bi- and multilateral contacts with
neighbouring states. In the alpine region, close ties among governments and
administrations have a long-standing tradition. Trilateral ministerial meetings
take place more or less on a regular basis addressing issues such as the
environment (Austria, Germany, Switzerland), transport (Germany, Italy,
Switzerland), or interior affairs (France, Germany, Switzerland). Not only
functional, but also cultural lines define the organization of politics among
these countries sharing common languages, interests, and identities.
Increasingly, these meetings focus on European integration issues, namely
Trans-Alpine transport, organized crime, or free movement of labour. In
negotiations with the EU, these neighbours, however, are sitting on the other
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side of the table. On transport questions, for instance, Switzerland fully
depends on Austria. Austria has a veto and wants to prevent the Swiss from
getting more favourable transit regime than it itself has. This example clearly
shows that it nevertheless makes a difference whether a country is sitting at the
EU table or not.
Switzerland also heavily relies on the WTO process in order to create a liberal
trade regime, to improve access to the Single Market and to compensate for the
negative consequences of non-participation in the EEA. In the WTO arena,
Switzerland is not subjected to EU co-ordination and is free to seek allies of its
own, in many cases Canada or the United States. More ambitious plans by EU
opponents to promote a trans-Atlantic free trade area between Switzerland,
Canada and the United States seem to be unrealistic, since it would cover only
a fraction of Swiss foreign trade and would undermine the existing free trade
regime with the EU. Switzerland is more isolated, faces a higher degree of
uncertainty in the international environment, and has to bear higher transaction
costs in European co-operation than Norway.
To summarize, there are a variety of compensatory strategies third countries
can exploit to promote closer co-operation short of membership. The examples
of Norway and Switzerland demonstrate that well institutionalized, culturally
and politically homogenous side arenas such as Nordic co-operation, or
membership in an alternative platform such as NATO or WTO, offer partial
compensation for non-membership in the EU.
4. 4 Conclusion: The sustainability of limited participation
The two cases of Norway and Switzerland challenge two commonly held
assumptions in the study of Europeanization: that membership is dichotomous,
and that there is a strong causal relationship between membership and the
extent of institutional adaptation at the domestic level. This analysis has
demonstrated that both assumptions are invalid. This is our first negative
conclusion. However, our analysis points to other, more positive, conclusions
about limited participation – its features, its costs and benefits, and its
sustainability.
The traditional formal definition of EU boundaries has been challenged
theoretically by the literature on multi-level governance, and empirically, as
concerns Norway and Switzerland, by the growing number of intermediary
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stages and patterns of integration that have been identified in this article. Both
these non-members, especially Norway, have developed considerable formal
and informal linkages to the EU. There are sectoral and institutional variations,
and they are adapting with limited participation. In relation to certain sectors
and policy areas, Norway, at least, can almost be considered as a full
participant in the EU. For instance, this is so, in the field of research, where
Norway pays its share and participates in EU programs. ‘Near –member status’
is also indicated by our empirical observations in relation to the EMU, the
CFSP, and the Schengen agreement on border controls, all of which indicate
increased fragmentation and differentiation within the EU, together with the
involvement of some non-members. However, we do not claim that the
boundaries in the EU are completely blurred. There are numerous and
important differences between member states and non-member states in
relation to Europeanization; formal institutional arrangements related to
membership are important: but it is remarkable to what extent formal and
informal arrangements can, and do, compensate for differences in statuses.
Adaptation to European integration has also led to attitudinal changes. There is
ambivalence and ambiguity; attraction towards the EU is combined with
mistrust and desire for autonomy. It has been argued (Ingebritsen 1998) that
after the negative votes on European integration in 1992 and 1994 respectively,
Norway and Switzerland turned their back on Europe and that they moved in
another political direction than the EU member states. We argue the opposite.
These two countries conduct a policy of approximation and adaptation; they
have developed strong administrative and institutional linkages and deepened
their co-operation with the EU. The roots and routes of these adaptations
cannot be explained solely by reference to the pressures of European
integration. They require an understanding of the internal dynamics and
particular institutional and historical features of the two countries. In order to
explain Europeanization we must therefore understand the particular match
between external pressure for change, the dynamics of the domestic institutions
involved, and the variations in historical experiences and legacies (Olsen
1996).
Limited participation has certain attractions, and it helps these two countries to
preserve some of their autonomy. Selective transposition and flexible
adaptation seem at first glance to be the tailor-made strategy for these two
small states. Liberalization, regulation and market access are not tied to
participation in joint, supranational institutions, the pooling of sovereignty and
the contribution to a common budget. This integration requires less co-
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ordination, less management and remains at the level of intergovernmental co-
operation. In the case of Norway, for instance, the intensity of co-operation
with the EU at the administrative and political level actually decreased after the
EU referendum and the government can pay attention to matters that were
postponed due to the EEA and EU issue. Within a given legal framework,
Norway and Switzerland have some – but limited – leeway when and how to
respond to the changing EU environment. The current arrangements allow for
transitional rules and exemptions in critical areas. There are safeguards that
protect certain industries like fisheries and agriculture in the case of Norway or
banking and transport in the case of Switzerland. There is also a perception,
particularly in Switzerland, that as a full member it would be more costly and
more difficult to extract concessions from other member states or to get
exemptions and transitional rules from the EU. It is believed that limited
participation and selective transposition permit a small state with scarce
resources to reduce transactions costs and control its involvement, providing an
efficient way for small states and small administrations to participate in
European affairs without being absorbed too much by day-to-day EU business.
Thus a process of gradual adaptation may help to absorb external shocks and,
whatever the actual effects, does serve to protect consensus-oriented, low-
conflict societies in the difficult process of Europeanization. Overall, the wait-
and-see attitude of Norway and Switzerland helps to keep options open and to
reduce risks during a critical period in European integration.
However, this step-by-step approach of limited integration is not the outcome
of a deliberate strategy, or a smart design. It has been, for the governments and
most of the political elites in the two countries, a second best solution, an
attempt at damage limitation, an implicit compromise, and a cease-fire
agreement with a dissident population. The governments of the two countries
both preferred the path of full membership or participation in the EEA instead.
Both were defeated at the ballot box – in the case Switzerland, at the moment
of decision on membership in the EEA, in the case of Norway, on the moment
of decision on membership in the EU.
In Norway, concurrently with increased adaptation and Europeanization, the
opposition against European integration remains strong. The 1994 referendum
unveiled, or perhaps produced, deep cleavages within society, cutting across
and dividing political parties (Ringdal 1995). The strong counter-culture and
centre-periphery dimension in Norwegian politics, which were of such
importance in 1972, were rediscovered and reconstructed (Todal Jenssen et al.
1995). With the EEA, Norway has reached a state of a relatively stable
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equilibrium, both in its relations with the EU and in the domestic debate.
Moves to cancel the EEA are highly unpopular. The EEA has a legitimacy-
building role; it allows the Norwegian government to keep the myth of
sovereignty, while deepening co-operation with the EU. The EEA is a
structure, although complex and overloaded, that dynamically adjusts to the
acquis communautaire and provides a bargaining arena.
In the case of Switzerland, policy toward the EU also remains one of the most
contested and divisive issues upsetting a long tradition of consensus and low
level political conflict in Swiss politics. The Swiss government is thus
confronted with the difficult task of satisfying the expectations of its European
neighbours and the veto positions of powerful domestic constituencies. Given
this dilemma, the federal authorities seem to be forced to develop strategies
that allow them to assert their interests and to preserve their sovereignty in its
relations with the EU. During the period of nation states and European wars,
neutrality served to preserve the precarious cohesion within Swiss society.
Today, in the period of European integration and globalization, limited
participation and unilateral adaptation seem to be at least a short-term solution
for balancing effectiveness and legitimacy.
The present status of Norway and Switzerland places constraints on what the
governments can do. They face a dilemma in dealing effectively with the
growing challenges of European integration, while being constrained by
popular veto. A step-by-step approach of gradual, limited adaptation short of
full membership is their response. Incrementalism is less visible, less
conflictive and enjoys stronger domestic support than big steps such as full
membership. However, both governments face difficulties in articulating
national interests in the European arena. While not violating public
sensitivities, they have opted for a remarkable process of ‘integration by
stealth’. Despite the defeats in the referenda, the two countries are more closely
related to Europe today than ever before.
The outsider positions of Norway and Switzerland have their costs, which raise
doubts regarding the sustainability of present arrangements. Their legitimacy is
not to be taken for granted, and could start to erode. There are several reasons
for this.
First, there is a discrepancy between the strong formal autonomy of Norway
and Switzerland, and the ritualistic decision-making process in EEA
institutions. Present, institutional arrangements were originally designed for
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organizing the relationship between EFTA and EC at a time when these
organizations were fairly balanced. However, the accession of Austria, Finland
and Sweden has changed the balance of forces considerably. Today, the
political power, the economic importance and the institutional capacity of
EFTA are reduced substantially. The staff of the EEA institutions, and the
EFTA secretariat has been cut to about half their original size. Furthermore,
Norwegians officials are increasingly populating these institutions, which
threaten their status as independent and unbiased EEA bodies. Moreover, the
EU pays less attention to the EFTA countries. Meetings within the EEA
framework do not have high priority, they have a short duration, and the
representatives from the European Commission are not high ranking.
Second, internal reforms in the EU, the introduction of the EMU and
preparations for enlargement to Eastern and Central Europe are far more
important to the EU than the low-conflict, routine administration of the EEA.
The EU has developed a series of association ties with third countries. Norway
and Switzerland no longer enjoy a privileged relationship with Brussels. In the
light of the demanding tasks of widening and deepening, the EU countries may
pay less and less attention to these two odd partners as is already the case in the
EEA arrangement with Norway and in bilateral relations with Switzerland. The
two countries have to vie for attention and they experience marginalization and
isolation in an increasingly overcrowded EU policy arena. Full integration may
become a necessity to guarantee access and attention in the EU context. In
daily politics in Brussels, these countries get limited attention and have
restricted access to policy shaping. Since they are out of sight, they are also out
of mind.
Third, the sectoral approaches of these countries are mainly limited to the first
pillar. Even within the first pillar, the different environments change at
different speeds; the different sectors are adapted to different degrees. Thus,
co-ordination and an overall political leadership of their relation to European
integration is difficult. Both Norway and Switzerland are relatively affluent
countries and can afford partial integration for the moment. Norway relies on
offshore gas and oil, Switzerland on offshore banking and other services. For
the time being, partial integration helps to fend off EU interference and
protects these profitable sectors. Should Norway or Switzerland face a decline
or crisis in these industries or experience a recession, improved access to, and
involvement in the EU may become more pressing.
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Fourth, both countries, Norway to a larger extent than Switzerland, have
changed from being in a pre-accession period with clear political goals and
rapid changes, to a situation with less clear political objectives or long term
visions, making the policy of adaptation fragile and sometimes inconsistent.
Consequently, it seems that participation in regular political and administrative
co-operation has been reduced. Gradual approaches are also retrospective and
reactive. The point of reference of Norway and Switzerland is the Single
European Act of 1987, not the 1992 Maastricht treaty, the 1997 Amsterdam
Treaty, nor the EMU. These countries are not involved in shaping the new
framework of European integration.
Fifth, while Norway and Switzerland hardly participate in the decision-making
process setting EU rules, their transposition remains unilateral. This is a major
restriction on the sovereignty and self-determination of the two countries. The
process they are involved in remains formally intergovernmental, but the
effects they experience are supranational. The limited participation remains a
restricted area in domestic politics. A limited number of political actors are
involved in the relations with the EU, mainly mid-level administration and
government officials fulfil these tasks. This technocratic and bureaucratic
approach to the EU results in a depolitization of the integration policy. By the
use of administrative regulation instead of legislation, the administration often
circumvents the parliament. There is a lack of transparency and political
control, which is creating a democratic deficit that, in some respect, is worse
than in the member states.
Sixth, the two countries try to benefit from the advantages of European
integration, while contributing little to share its burden. This free rider
approach may face growing criticism and opposition by the net contributors,
especially in view of the enormous costs of integrating the countries to the east
and south of the EU. For instance, the legitimacy and sustainability of the EEA
Agreement have recently been put to a test in relation to budgetary
contributions. According to the EEA Agreement the former EFTA countries
had to pay about 24 million Euro annually to Spain and Portugal during the
first five years. However, when this period came to an end in 1998, Spain
demanded continuing support. Spain blocked the decisions in the EEA
framework, refused to accept Norwegian participation in preparatory
committees, and even threatened to end the EEA Agreement. After months of
negotiations, the EFTA countries gave in and accepted to continue to transfer
the same amount of money to the lesser-developed regions in Spain for another
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five-year period, and to contribute financially to the applicant countries from
the East and Central Europe (Aftenposten, 21.04, 1999).
In light of these considerations, Norwegian and Switzerland – governments and
their electorates – are weighing the costs and benefits of the present
arrangements. In Norway, there have been attempts to reactivate the issue of
European integration. The Schengen Agreement and the new directives in the
field of veterinary control, gas licenses and food additives have challenged the
effectiveness and the legitimacy of the current arrangements with the EU.
Moreover, the introduction of the EMU, increased interest rates, and monetary
turmoil has demonstrated the vulnerability of Norway’s Alleingang. Internal
disputes related to the lack of parliamentary participation and control has
questioned the democratic legitimacy of the EEA arrangement. Accordingly,
by the end of 1998 one could observe a significant shift in public opinion on
the issue of EU membership. There is now an increasing interest in having a
critical review of Norway’s relationship to the EU. Recent polls indicate, for
the very first time, a majority supporting membership (Aftenposten 11.12.
1998, Aftenposten, 16.01.1999). The Norwegian government has promised to
present a white paper in the year 2000 analyzing Norway’s relationship with
the EU (Vollebæk 1999).
Switzerland still struggles to redefine its relations with the EU. During the
multilateral EEA negotiations, the coalition of EFTA states was in a good
bargaining position and could gain major concessions from the EU. After EU
enlargement, the EFTA coalition has lost its importance and Switzerland has
been left on its own in bilateral talks. The difficult, conflictive and protracted
nature of these technical negotiations suggests that the EU pays less attention
and Switzerland has less leverage than in the EEA. Thus Switzerland seems not
to have reached the optimal state in regard to effectiveness, but probably in
regard to legitimacy. Yet the status quo of the Free Trade Agreement plus
bilateral treaties has become untenable in view of the dynamic evolution of the
EU. Especially EMU has a strong impact on the Swiss economy and financial
industry (Interdepartementale Arbeitsgruppe 1998). A new equilibrium in the
form of a new EEA treaty or a renewal of the accession request that can pass
the test of a referendum has not yet been proposed. However, attitudes toward
the EU and the EEA have changed substantially over the last two years. Today
(1999), a majority of the population would prefer an EEA Agreement to
bilateral treaties or full membership. In the year 2000, the Swiss population
will vote on a peoples’ initiative ‘Yes to Europe’ which will force the Federal
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Council to revive the request for EU membership submitted in 1992 and
suspended in 1993.
At the European level, the future development of the EU is uncertain. One
scenario is suggesting increased conflict within the EU, which would probably
reduce policy effectiveness and make membership, or closer ties to the EU in
any form, less attractive to Norway and Switzerland. While they would not
benefit from declining European integration they would nevertheless face less
pressure for adaptation, and experience a lower level of political conflict at
home. A second scenario assumes a gradual flexibilization of membership, as
suggested in the Amsterdam Treaty. This could result in growing tolerance
toward different degrees of participation, encouraging the present Norwegian
and Swiss policy of selective, partial integration. A third scenario imagines a
dynamic EU, which successfully completes widening and deepening. This
would challenge the effectiveness of the current arrangements and put pressure
on Norway and Switzerland to opt for full-status membership. This would most
likely create problems in both countries, and would raise the level of domestic
conflict. In other words, the more integrated the EU, and the more sharply
drawn its boundaries, the more difficult it would be for Norway and
Switzerland to sustain their present status as ‘adaptive outsiders’.
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Chapter 5: Europeanization of the national statistical
systems
5. 1 Europeanization of statistical institutions *
How and to what extent has European integration affected national policy
making and national institutions? In this chapter, I analyze how and to what
extent the creation of a European statistical system in the European Union
(EU), particularly in relation to the implementation of the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU), affected the national statistical institutions (NSI). I
show that European integration has changed the statistical system in Europe; a
European statistical system has emerged, a European statistical unit has been
strengthened, and the national statistical institutions have adapted and
responded to European integration. The term Europeanization can refer both to
the development of new institutions, resources and capacities at the European
level, and to the adaptation and change between and within institutions at the
national level (Olsen 1996). I argue that the process of Europeanization is best
explained as a distinct match of, an environmental pressure for change,
deliberate reform attempts by the political leadership and the professional
statistical community, and the properties and histories of the domestic
institutions involved.
The reasons for investigating the Europeanization of the statistical system are
both theoretical and empirical. An important element in democratic governance
is to govern the accounts. Accounts provide interpretations and explanations of
experience and make actions imaginable and consequences interpretable
(March and Olsen 1995: 141). Formal accounting systems and statistics are
critical in creating accounts of political processes. Numbers attract attention
and shape alternatives, options and choices. Numerical accounts secure
accountability and legitimacy for decisions that are made, and are important in
evaluating and assessing the outcome of political processes (Alonso and Starr
1983, Porter 1995, Olsen 1989, Hopwood and Miller 1994). Consequently,
analyzing changes in democratic governance as a result of European
integration requires an understanding of how and to what extent the numerical
accounts are affected. Secondly, since statistical systems are heavily
                                                                
* A previous edition of this chapter was presented at the Workshop:  "Western Europe
in an Age of Globalization", February 26-28, 1999, Minda de Gunzburg Center for
European Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA. I wish to thank Johan P.
Olsen, Theo. Barth, Linda Sangolt, Svein S. Andersen, Morten Egeberg and Ingrid
Mohn Sverdrup, and the participants at the Harvard seminar for comments.
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institutionalized systems at the core of the nation-state, such an examination
contributes to develop our theoretical account of processes of Europeanization
and how it affects well-institutionalized systems. Finally, the European
statistical system is an important building block in the new European polity,
and many of the debates on the EMU have been related to statistics, making it
an interesting object of study in itself.
The chapter is organized in the following way: Firstly, I present three different
theoretical perspectives on the dynamics of change in the national statistical
systems. Secondly, I demonstrate that these systems are institutionalized
systems at the core of the nation state and that they have been important in
constituting the nation state. Thirdly, I show that a new European statistical
system emerged. European integration has changed the procedures and rules
regulating the production of statistics, the relationship between and within
different producers of statistics, and it has altered the perception of statistics.
Finally, I show that the national institutions have adapted to these
developments. I conclude that a distinct match between environmental
changes, political leadership and domestic institutional structures best explain
the Europeanization of the national statistical institutions.
5. 2 Dynamics of the statistical system
 Organizational theory provides three different views on institutional dynamics
(Olsen 1992), that are relevant for this analysis. The environmental
deterministic perspective argues that the structure of the statistical system is
determined by contextual factors (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Consequently,
accounting and statistics are less likely to reflect the technical work processes,
than the resources or opportunities of the environment (Meyer 1994: 122).
Within this school there are yet two traditions. The first sees the environment
as a power structure imposing problems on the organization. The stronger the
pressure and power, the greater the probability for organizational changes and
adaptations. The second tradition considers the most important aspect of the
environment as supplying immaterial resources and legitimacy, not its power to
demand responses from the organization (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The
environment creates the standards of the accounting and statistical system. To
reduce uncertainty organizations seek to adapt to these cultural and statistical
standards upheld by the environment. The organizations applying such
statistical standards are ‘by definition more legitimate than others’ (Meyer
1994:122). Competition and selection by the environment eliminates inefficient
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or illegitimate institutions. Within this perspective the development of a
powerful, or a legitimate organization at the European level will bring about
change in the statistical bodies at the national level.
 
 The design perspective advocates statistical systems as a result of design,
driven by human intention and power. The statistical system is perceived as a
tool for implementing policies and achieving political results (Starr 1983:184).
Different goals, strategies, resources and insight of leaders determine the
different structures of the system. Another version of this perspective is that the
functional needs and tasks determine the design and shape of the organization
(Perrow 1986). The technical activities of the organization are the most
important predictors of the accounting system. Statistical systems are perceived
as technical necessities for controlling modern differentiated organizations
expanding in size. According to these perspectives, changes in the goals or
preferences of the leadership, or changes in the technical needs of the statistical
system will smoothly and rapidly be reflected in the national accounting and
statistical system.  New political tasks and aspirations in the EU will thus lead
to changes in the national system for the production of statistics.
 
 The institutional perspective views the relationship the between the
organization and its environment as more complex (March and Olsen, 1995).
Decision-making is viewed in a certain historical, institutional and temporal
context. Institutions have a certain level of autonomy, creating and constraining
the possibilities for design and buffering the environment (March and Olsen,
1995). Decisions are made on the basis of rules and norms that are accumulated
through past experiences and learning, rather than on the calculations of
preferences and the anticipation of future events or future pressure from the
environment. Decision-making combines a set of procedures that are believed
to fit a particular role or situation. Resources and capabilities are linked to
certain statistical systems and categories, thereby contributing to uphold
specific categories and stabilizing interpretations of the world (March 1994:11-
12). Statistical systems, like institutions in general, are difficult to change as
they evolve in a path-dependent way. A decision made at one stage creates
opportunities and constraints for decision making at a later stage. In most cases
institutions change slowly and incrementally within the existing procedures
and norms. According to this perspective, statistical systems are not driven by
technical problem solving or determined by pressure of the environment, but
rest upon institutional characteristics. The relationship between the
environment is seen as complex. It is assumed that there is a mutual process of
adaptation. The environment adapts to the institutions, but concurrently the
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institutions adapt to their environments (March and Olsen 1995: 42). Changes,
however, are not considered impossible. Occasionally dramatic crisis and
external shocks may lead to a situation where the existing rules and categories
do not facilitate the interpretation of the world.31 Under such conditions, the
systems fail to make meaningful accounts of the world, and consequently, the
statistical systems may change rapidly. In general, new accounting instruments
and measures tend to stimulate interest in new dimensions of organizational
description and redefine alternatives (March 1994). From this viewpoint
changes are rare, involving the matching of existing institutions with
environmental pressure and deliberate reform attempts.
 
 
5. 3 Counting and constituting the nation state
 In its simplest understanding, the concept of statistical system refers to the
production, distribution and the use of numerical information (Starr 1983).
Statistics can be interpreted in an instrumental manner, as an instrument or
prerequisite for intelligent and enlightened decision making. Numerical
information and statistics are thus the objective collection of facts about
society. Statistics is frequently perceived of as simply mirroring the
environment.32 Consequently, statistics becomes a neutral tool that enables
decision-makers to act and make qualified decisions.
 
 However, statistics can also be interpreted in a constructive manner. Scholars
of organizational theory have questioned the objectivity of statistics, and
challenged the view that accounting and the production of statistics are purely
technical practices (Sangolt 1997). Numbers and statistical systems, like other
political and institutional systems, can be treated as systems that mobilize bias
(Schattschneider 1960). Equally, accounting and accounting standards can be
seen as arenas of power and power politics (March 1988: 387). It is therefore
important to examine accounting and statistics in their political and social
context (Hopwood and Miller 1995).
                                                                
31 On statistical absurdities see for instance Daily Telegraph 1 December 1996. The
figures presented by Eurostat to ECOFIN showed that the EU had a $102 bn trade
surplus with self (sic!). The article also refers to an analysis finding that ‘even with the
restricted group comprising six countries, discrepancies in the data are so massive as
to forbid any serious knowledge of trade position of this zone and the way it has been
developing in recent year. The monetary policy committee of the European central
bank is simply going to operate in the dark from this point of view’.
32 Fittingly, the Statistical Society in Britain had as its motto: Aliis exterendum (to be
threshed out by others) (Porter 1995:78).
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 The statistical system, as a tool and as a constituting system, is firmly linked to
the nation state. The term statistics derives from the German term Staat and the
discipline evolved from the German Staatenkunde in the seventeenth century.
Hence, statistics referred to the systematic collection of facts about a state.
Statistics is closely connected with the construction of the state, with its
unification and administration (Desrosières 1998: 8) Historically, statistical
institutions emerged in parallel and as a prerequisite to the state-building
process. In this state building process, the organization of the military, the tax
system and the police were key features (Tilly 1975). Where there were taxes,
there were also statistics. Taxation spurs a dissent over the power of the purse,
which have been important in developing democracy (Wildavsky and Webber
1986). Statistics is thus instrumental to democracy.
 
 Statistical systems can be viewed as a national institution with established rules
infusing the interpretation of the world. During the course of time, categories
and standards have become taken-for-granted. The boundaries of inquiry,
presuppositions about social reality, systems of classifications, methods of
measurement, as well as rules, routines, organization, resources and capacities
for interpreting and presenting data have been structured along the boundaries
of the territorial nation state. There are, for instance, few statistical data at the
regional level, and cross border statistics is rare and underdeveloped.
Consequently, the territorial boundaries of the nation state became the
boundaries of the statistical universe.
 
 The legitimacy and the effectiveness of statistics are based upon comparability
in space and time. Since these comparisons are important for reliable
knowledge, any change in the statistical categories reduces the possibilities for
comparisons.33 A statistical system creates and represents the present in the
categories of the past and is per definition a conservative system that is
historically constituted. It develops both slowly and in a path-dependent way.
 
 Statistical agencies have developed in directions reflecting various state
traditions. Certain statistical agencies have autonomy and authority, while
others are more closely linked to the political system. For instance, in Greece
the leader of the statistical agency is politically appointed, while in most of the
                                                                
33 To illustrate, in Germany, a large EU inspired reclassification exercise at the
beginning of 1995 involved 6000 specific types of goods. As a result, only a fifth of
the figures gathered and reported in 1996 were comparable with those reported 16
months earlier. Financial Times, 9 April 1996.
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member states the statistical agency are secured autonomy by legislation. In the
centralized France there is one statistical office, while in the more
decentralized Germany there are 16 regional statistical offices, as well as the
federal statistical office in Wiesbaden, the Bundesbank and various ministries,
many of them applying different methods. In most countries, the profession of
statisticians holds considerable autonomy and authority. Statistics and
statisticians are perceived as neutral observers, dull, avoiding political
controversy etc. This reputation, however, upholds their authority (Porter 1995:
51). In the welfare state statistics plays a key role in economic governance and
represented an important instrument for redistribution. As a general rule, the
more extensive the scope of the state authority over economic and social life,
the greater the scope, detail, and volume of statistical investigation and inquiry.
 
Statistics infuse the normative judgments of the decision-makers. Numbers are,
for instance, not only carriers of information, they also seem to generate more
trust, giving a stronger impression of objectivity and rationality than regular
text written in words (Porter 1995). Moreover, statistics contribute in shaping
national identity and upholding the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’
(Anderson 1983). A national census ‘is a kind of collective self-portrait that
serves to reinforce national identity’ (Starr 1983: 19). Consequently, statistics
has been important in constituting the nation, as well as the state. For example,
ideas about shared and average values, standard deviation and normality, which
are important in ‘imagining the community’ are all statistical concepts.
Consequently, stories told about the nation, its identities and properties, are
often stories told by accountants and statisticians. The rise of statistical
thinking and statistical representation took place during the nineteenth century.
Statistics and statisticians played a crucial role in generating a national image
of the state. For instance, in Italy the statistical institutions were important in
creating Italian nationhood and a national image of Italy, however, statistics
also contributed to accentuate the internal territorial visions of Italy (Patriarca
1996).
To summarize, the territorial boundaries of the state were important in the
political structuration and organization within the nation state (Bartolini 1997).
Statistics and the statistical institutions were important in building, governing
and constituting the state and the nation. The production of statistics is thus
‘firmly entrenched in national administrative structures and practices’ (De
Michelis 1997:48). Consequently, any processes of boundary extension of the
statistical system will have important consequences on the political
structuration and governing of the nation state.
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5. 4 The building of a European statistical system
 
 In the European Union it is an increasing interest in developing reliable and
trustworthy data and figures. In order to have legitimacy the EU is dependent
upon sound and effective management of the resources at its disposal. Fraud
and mal-administration reduces the legitimacy of the EU institutions.
Furthermore, in order to have a democratic and legitimate Union it is necessary
to have adequate measuring instruments for just contribution to the EU budget
etc. Otherwise, it would be difficult to develop trust and mutual understanding.
As a consequence, institutions like the Court of Auditors, and the Eurostat are
becoming increasingly important in developing the future European polity. In
parallel to the harmonization of fiscal, social and economic legislation in order
to allow for free movement of people, goods and capital, the EU is in need of
harmonizing the statistical system. To create a political space involves and
enables the creation of a space of common measurement, within which things
may be compared, because of identical categories and encoding procedures
(Desrosières 1998: 8-9). This harmonization process is work intensive and
demanding.
 
 The Eurostat is the statistical body of the European Union. The mission is to
provide the European institutions and member states with reliable, comparable
and relevant statistical information covering the whole of the EU. That is,
supplying simple, reliable and timely statistics to the European institutions, the
member states, the market and the public (Eurostat 1998a: 1). The Eurostat
aims both to create common classifications and methods, and developing
organizational structures for comparable statistic by facilitating greater co-
operation between the EU and the Member states and by developing a uniform
European Statistical System (ESS). Historically, the Eurostat has been in the
backwater of European integration. However, it has gradually increased its
importance.
 
The role of the national statistical institutes is not clearly defined in the Treaty
of the European Union and the role of the Eurostat was first included in the
Amsterdam treaty. The statistics division of the High Authority of the Coal and
Steel Community was first established in 1953. In 1959, with the introduction
of the EEC and the EURATOM, it was renamed ‘The Statistical office of the
European Communities’, which is still the formal name of the Eurostat. The
Eurostat is not independent but organized as a Directorate General (DG) in the
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European Commission. From an institutional point of view the Eurostat is not
independent. This comes into conflict with the view of the professional
statisticians at the domestic level, at least in some of the member states. The
independent NSIs are accustomed to making their own plans and to act on the
basis of statistical arguments and a statistical logic of appropriateness. The
Eurostat, on the other hand, has the first draft of its programme initiated by the
European Commission. The European Commission draws their programme up
more or less on the basis of political needs, and policy needs, rather than on
statistical arguments.
 There have been different attempts to reform Eurostat and to design it as an
independent body in the EU. Henning Christophersen, who was Vice president
of the European Commission and who was the Commissioner responsible for
Eurostat in six years expressed such views. He argued that ‘the best and most
coherent solution is to see how we can establish an independent statistical
service for the EU - with its own resources and its independence guaranteed by
Community legislation and by working with independent national statistical
offices’ (Sigma 1995, Winter p 38). This institutional model for Eurostat would
then be parallel to the European Central Bank. Independence is believed to be
good for improving the credibility of the EU and the Commission proposals, as
well as for monitoring and implementing policy within the community. If
member states were well aware that statistical information came from a
completely independent body, taking its own decisions in accordance with their
professional standards and based upon an economic foundation, rather than
being influenced by political considerations, it could generate more trust and
support. However, there are also difficulties in making the Eurostat a more
autonomous and independent unit. One of the most important problems with
this development is that the European Commission controls the budget. And it
is unclear if the European Commission would be willing to pay as much as
they do now for the production of statistics in Eurostat. It is perhaps as likely
that they would start producing their own statistics within the various DGs or
perhaps even out-source it to other agencies, like they do in many other fields
and issues.
 
 Eurostat is organized with six different Directorates (departments). The
Eurostat has increased in size from a staff of 58 people in 1959 to
approximately 720 in 1997, including registered experts on temporary
assignments, as well as permanent European civil servants. However, Eurostat
is, as many of the European institutions, small compared to its counterpart at
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the domestic level. 34  The total staff of the domestic statistical institutes is
calculated to approximately 70,000.35 To cope with a limited staff, the Eurostat
has encouraged the transfer of staff from the national to the European level,
and stimulated the development of various exchange programs.
 
 The financial resources of the Eurostat are limited. A committee of the
European Commission grants the Eurostat financial resources for
implementation of the statistical program. The first statistical program was
initiated in 1989 directed towards the development of statistics for the internal
market. The 1993-1997 statistical program initiated in 1992, which also
included the EFTA countries, emphasized the importance of statistics in
relation to the EMU. In spite of a recent increase in workload the budget has
been reduced during the last few years from approximately ECU 100 million to
approximately ECU 47 million in 1998 (Eurostat 1998b).36 There is a striking
imbalance between the ambitious tasks and its limited capacity. The limited
financial resources at its disposal have triggered extensive criticism. Officials
at the Eurostat have argued that ‘politicians tend to think that statistics can be
produced for no money out of thin air’.37 Particularly, in relation to the EMU
there was a pressing need for additional resources to produce reliable statistics
within ‘extremely tight deadlines’ (De Silguy 1995:3). As a consequence of
limited resources, European statisticians have argued that ‘there may not be
high quality data acceptable by 1999’.38
 
 One of the consequences of limited resources at the European level, is that
Eurostat rarely collects statistical data. It is dependent upon the transmission of
data in an aggregate form from the member states. However, data is supposed
to be checked by the Eurostat, compiled in the required form and, in some
cases, harmonized. Member states failing to meet the standards are persuaded,
encouraged and pushed to improve their statistics and measurements. This is a
complex, time consuming process and the end results may turn out dubious.
For instance, frequently, the Eurostat uses data collected by the Member State
for national purposes, which often requires lengthy processing to make them
comparable.
                                                                
34 The French Statistical office, INSEE, for instance, has a staff of 6500 people.
Statistics Norway has approximately 900 employed in 1998 (Statistics Norway 1998).
35 Financial Times, 15 June 1998.
36 Statistics Norway, has a budget of approximately ECU 42, 5 mill (Statistics Norway
1998).
37 Financial Times 24, June 1996
38 Financial Times 24, June 1996.
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 However, in some cases the Eurostat has a legal base for collecting data. If new
statistics are required in the EU, the Member states’ data is harmonized as a
result of legal acts from the Council. In most cases, the European Commission
demands new statistics. The Eurostat co-operates with the relevant DG and
seeks ways to meet this demand. However, in developing a European statistical
space, the EU builds upon and exploits pre-existing patterns of international
statistical co-operations. International co-operation in the field of statistics has
a long history. International organizations like OECD and the UN have
historically been important in organizing international statistical co-operation.
After consultation with expert reports and working groups within the EU
system, and after recommendations from international organizations such as
the UN and the OECD, the Eurostat submits a proposal to the Statistical
Program Committee. Representatives of the national administrations are
present during most phases of the policy process. For example, in relation to
the harmonization of statistics, there are approximately 200 meetings of
working parties every year, attended by between 10 and 60 representatives
from the NSIs and from European institutions (Sigma 1997: 49).39  In addition,
the staff of the NSIs stays in regular contact with the Eurostat and the leaders
of the NSIs often encourage such contacts.
 
 Statistics is not only instrumental to economic governance, but also to
democracy. The Eurostat views its role not purely as an instrument for
economic governance. By securing increased transparency, knowledge for
informed decision making and political accountability, it views itself as a key
factor in the democratization of the EU. The motto of Yves Franchet, the
Director General of the Eurostat, reflects the link between statistics and
accountability: ‘European statistics - serving the people so that democracy may
flourish’ (Eurostat 1998a). Moreover, the Eurostat sees itself as advancing the
development of a European identity. For instance, the first version of the
European statistical yearbook, published in 1995, was a book ‘for and about the
Europeans’, stressing its importance in developing knowledge and trust by
enabling its citizens to know their ‘European neighbours just a little better’
(Eurostat 1995: i). In the same way as ‘territorial currencies’ can be viewed as
symbols expressing the identity and sovereignty of the nation state (Helleiner
1997), the Euro combined with the development of European statistics have the
potential to increase identifications with the EU. For instance, ‘Europe’ and
‘Europeans’ increasingly refer to information presented and counted in the
                                                                
39 An average of 30.
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tables and rows published by the Eurostat. Although presently there are only 15
member states in the EU, the information is referred to as ‘European’.
 
 The development of European statistics is also a matter of developing a shared
language. The lack of one common language in the EU increases the
importance of European statistics. Eleven languages have the status of official
languages in the EU. Finding solutions to overcome the technical, cultural,
economic and democratic difficulties related to languages have proved to be
difficult. In the EU there is, at least to some extent, a ‘culture of no culture’. In
the creation of a unified political and administrative system the ‘neutral’
language of quantification may prove to be more important than English,
German or French (Porter 1995:77). Numbers and statistics are seemingly
interpreted as a language that replaces culture and national languages with
systematic and rationalistic methods. Consequently, the Europeanization of
statistics is literary an important element in the creation of a new European
language.
 
 To summarize, the Eurostat plays an important role in providing decision-
makers with statistical information, increasing democracy and furthering the
development of a European identity. The limited staff, capacity, powers and
rights of the Eurostat makes it a relatively weak institution with limited
possibility to impose changes on the national statistical system. Nevertheless,
the Eurostat is a requisite in developing the statistical system. By authorizing
new statistical standards and measuring systems, it provides legitimacy to the
users of this new system. Among statisticians the Eurostat is often viewed as a
‘professional body whose work confirms with internationally accepted
accounting procedures’.40 The Eurostat is important in facilitating
harmonization and co-operation in Europe, being at the centre of co-ordination,
operating the secretariat and submitting the relevant papers to the member
states (De Michels 1995: 4). The base of legitimacy appears to depend upon a
legal, political and economic commitment of the states in facilitating co-
operation in general, and implementing the EMU in particular. The European
statistical system does not impose changes on the national institutions, as
suggested by the environmental deterministic perspective. However, it does
have certain legal and immaterial powers at its disposal.
 
 
                                                                
40 Financial Times, 2 January 1997.
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5. 5 Developing the instruments for statistical measuring in the EMU
 
 One of the greatest challenges for the Eurostat and the statistical community in
Europe has been the introduction of the Euro in January 1999. According to
article 109 j in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) there were four criteria
for evaluating convergence; inflation, debt, exchange rates and long term
interest rate.
 
 Inflation: This criterion has been defined as having a rate of inflation,
measured by consumer prices, over a period of one year before the
examination, at the most, 1,5 percentage points above the average of the three
best national performances.
 
 Debt: The sustainability of the government financial position; this will be
apparent from having achieved a government budgetary position without a
deficit that is excessive as determined in accordance with Article 104c(6). This
criterion is defined as the deficit in the budget shall not be exceeding more than
3 per cent of GNP. The criterion can be considered as fulfilled if the deficit
declines substantially and continuously, and if it has reached a level that is
close to the reference value. Furthermore, the public debts should not be more
than 60 per cent of GNP. The debt criterion shall be interpreted as fulfilled, if
the debt has been significantly reduced or are converging with the reference
value.
 
 Exchange rates: The observance of normal fluctuation margins provided for by
the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least
two years, without devaluing against the currency of any other member state.
That is, the member country should be a member of the EMS during the last
two years, and without devaluating its currency on its own initiative.
 
 The Long-term interest rate: The durability of convergence achieved by the
Member State and of its participation in the exchange rate mechanism of the
European monetary system being reflected in the long-term interest rate. That
is, the long-term interests during the last 12 months shall not exceed by more
than 2 percentage points that of the three best performing member states in
terms of inflation.
 
 To enter the EMU, the member states were obliged to budget and pursue an
economic and monetary policy enabling them to meet the convergence criteria.
Consequently, in order to make informed assessments and legitimate choices,
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the EU needed reliable statistics assessing each and every member state.
Moreover, the European Central Bank, (ECB) needed trustworthy data and
knowledge of both the current and the historical situation for sound governance
of EMU.
 
 As a result of the creation of the EMU and the formulation of these
convergence criteria, statistical information has been the focus of attention of
political discussions in Europe during the past last years. Statistical indicators
were perceived as invariable objectives. The criterion of the budget deficit not
exceeding 3 % of the GDP, for instance, was ‘constructed as the benchmark by
which the future quality of the Euro’ should be judged (Risse 1999:31). The
convergence criteria almost became ‘magic numbers’. It was believed that
success or failure of European integration, which is normally perceived as
something complex, could be expressed, measured and decided on the basis of
a few figures. Certain academics, like Risse (1999) attribute the absolutism in
interpreting the convergence criteria as reflecting German history and interests.
However, it is not only a specific German interpretation. Good and sound
accounting and auditing of economic indicators is a universally praised
technology of effective allocation of responsibility and a technology of risk
reduction in modern societies (Power, 1994). The seemingly strong expression
of precision and exact quantification thus matched the universal demand for
reliable accounting standards. While most people ignored the obvious fact that
economic measurement is not a precise science (Morgenstern 1963), and that
economics is, at best, a one-digit science, in which nobody can take the third,
fourth and fifth digits seriously (Tufte p. 51 in Starr 1983).
 
 At the same time as the convergence criteria established an absolute standard
or a clear ‘benchmark’, the measurement of the convergence criteria triggered a
pragmatic discussion among statisticians on improving the statistical methods
and standards. The Eurostat had the responsibility for creating a harmonized
index of consumer prices, securing compliance with standards for calculating
debt and deficit, and harmonizing the calculation of Member States’ GDP and
GNP. Two technical instruments were designed to measure and monitor
convergence. Both of these instruments seeked to exploit and refine already
pre-existing patterns of international co-operation, rather than representing a
break with the past.
 
 Firstly, to measure inflation, the European Council adopted a regulation in
1995 concerning a harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP). The Eurostat
devised the HICP in co-operation with the NSI. It served as a framework for
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further detailed harmonization measures, and set out a step-by-step approach
for harmonizing price indices. The first HICP was published in January 1997,
and historical data was available back to 1995 (EMI 1998: 283). According to
the HICP, the NSIs calculated monthly indices of their own countries and
transmitted them to the Eurostat. Procedures used by the National statistical
institutes were monitored by the Eurostat, which then calculated the European
Index of Consumer Prices, the weighted average inflation rate of the EU
member states.
 
 Secondly, according to Article 104 c of the TEU the European Commission
monitored the development of the budgetary situation in the member states.
Statistical information on member states’ budgetary transactions were
presented by the member states and evaluated by the Eurostat on the basis of a
standard national account manual. A Council regulation of November 1993
defined ‘government’, ‘deficit’, ‘interest expenditure’, ‘investment’, ‘debt’ and
gross domestic product’ by reference to the second edition of the European
System of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA), also called ESA 79. The ESA
79 is a modified and elaborated version of a system standardized by the UN.
Regular production of national accounts began during the Second World War,
with the first international guidelines emerging in 1947. The OECD expanded
these guidelines in 1952. At the global level, these OECD recommendations
became the first UN System of National Accounts (SNA) in 1958. A Revised
Version of SNA was produced in 1968.  In parallel to this development within
the UN, the EC needed a set of comparable national accounts to formulate and
monitor economic policy. The first European System of Accounts (ESA) was
published in 1970 and a modified version was created in 1979.
 
 In specific cases where accounting procedures were not clarified, or cases
which were not covered by the ESA 79, a clearly defined procedure existed for
reaching decisions. A task force prepared consultation on methodology and
interpretation. The statistical problems were delegated to two expert groups:
working parties on ‘national accounts’ and on ‘financial accounts’. Finally, the
Eurostat consulted the Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of
payment statistics (CMFB).
 
 The view of the professional statistician was primarily instrumental, that is, the
lack of good statistics was perceived as resulting from a lack of precision of the
measuring instruments. In relation to the EMU there were significant problems
with precision. Firstly, the standard classification system in use was not
updated or adequate. The difficulty arose because the structuring of the
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government finances were evolving more rapidly than the statistical systems
measuring them. The standardized European system of accounts, introduced in
1979, did not cover important technological and economic changes occurring
in the past 15 years. A huge number of studies were made in various working
groups under the EC, OECD and at the global level during the 1970s and 80s,
leading to the new global SNA in 1993 (SNA 93). Since the key national
accounts aggregates had gradually been used for administrative purposes in
calculating the contributions to the EU budget, entitlements to social and
regional funds, and in particular the attempts to create the EMU, the EU
decided to create a new ESA consistent with the SNA 93. The ESA 95 is an
evolution and refinement of the old system, rather than a revolution.
 
 The ESA 95 is not only an improvement in terms of harmonized statistical
measuring, but also in relation to the transmitting of national accounts date
from the member states to the Eurostat. However, there are still considerable
variation in the data that are transmitted, since certain member states have been
granted exceptions until 2005 in respect of volume, detail, transmission
methods and deadlines. ESA 95 was also an improvement in terms of its legal
status. ESA 79 had no legal basis and could therefore be perceived of as an
internal manual for the Commission, while ESA 95, on the other hand, has
been implemented through a Council regulation.
 
 Nevertheless, in spite of the much better ESA 95 the member states still used
ESA 79 to present their budgetary operations, and the Eurostat checked that it
was properly applied (Regulation EC 3605/93). The new system ESA 95 was
first implemented by March 2000, after the third stage of the EMU was
implemented. The new standard, when applied, is expected to produce changes
in the size of some countries’ GDP, thus distorting budget calculations.41 In
order to reduce uncertainty about the implementation of the EMU, the
decision-makers refrained from implementing the new and improved standards.
Dieter Glatzel, head of the Eurostat unit responsible for the excessive deficit
procedure, argued that the delay was a result of the economic situation in the
member states, fearing that the introduction of a new standard could tilt the
creation of the EMU.  He argued that the ‘[b]ackground to the delay in
applying ESA 95 to the excessive deficit procedure was the economic situation
in 1994-95. At that time very few countries were able to achieve or improve on
the reference values laid down in the Protocol: 60 per cent for ratio of
                                                                
41 According to the Council Regulation of June 1996, the second edition of ESA will
be applied until 1999. Thereafter it will be replaced by ESA 1995 (EMI 1998: 283).
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government debt to GDP and 3 per cent for ratio of government deficit to GDP.
Therefore the move to third stage of monetary union on 1 January seemed
possible only for a small number of member states’ (Glatzel 1999: 31-32).
 
 Secondly, in relation to the debt criterion the inconsistency between reported
deficits and increases in debts were left out of the accounts and in the official
statistics subsumed under the category ‘stock flow adjustments’.42 Finally,
some economists argued that much of the public controversy over the
convergence criteria focused on parameters that may in some cases be of
secondary importance to the economies (Sutherland 1997).
 
 The discussions on the development of reliable measuring instruments have
been highly technical and dominated by professional statisticians. The rationale
has been finding superior technical solutions and developing institutional
arrangements able to sort out professional disputes and realize the EMU. This
view of statistics is consistent with the design perspective, which advocates
statistical systems as a result of design, driven by human intention and power.
The statistical system is thus a tool for implementing policies and achieving
political results and the functional needs and tasks determine the design and
shape of the system.
 
 However, this perspective on statistics was challenged by a politically and
institutionally grounded discussion on the significance and relevance of
statistics.  The very introduction of the convergence criteria, and the national
attempts to adapt and meet them, triggered important political and normative
debates on the role and content of national and European statistics. Among
economists, the convergence criteria have gradually come to be seen as
universally accepted targets for sound finance and good economic
management. However, in the political discussions the relevance of the
convergence criteria has been questioned. Why are these particular statistical
indicators chosen? What are the future consequences of measuring exactly
these four criteria? One such discussion, for instance, has been related to why
the decision-makers have left out a criterion specifying the maximum level of
unemployment acceptable for the member states, 43 or for instance, leaving out
                                                                
42 For Greece, for instance, the stock flow adjustment is more than 20 per cent of the
GDP. ‘Still, there has been no official explanation of these inconsistencies and no
comment on them of the interpretation of the fiscal convergence criteria’ (Gros and
Thygesen 1998).
43 For instance, during the IGC in 1996, Sweden launched the idea of making
unemployment a specific convergence criterion for the EMU. France also took
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any data on the deep variation in demography among the member states and
how they are affected differently by the growing ‘aging crisis’ in Europe.
Another criticism has been that some states are more affected by the new
statistical systems than others, since any statistical system is biased. In the
politicization of national economic indicators member states have referred to
their own standards and traditions for statistical measuring. Their arguments
have reflected their national institutional procedures.
 
 
5. 6 Adapting and implementing the convergence criteria
 
 The member states faced a situation were they needed to adapt both their
statistical institutions and their economy to the convergence criteria.  However,
the Europeanization of statistics took place in a period of extensive domestic
reforms of the NSIs, loosely coupled to European integration. Firstly, NSIs
gained increased autonomy from the political authorities. Consequently,
statistical institutions became increasingly more oriented towards both the
users and the market, perceiving themselves less as an instrument of the
political leadership. This implied the strengthening of the press offices, the
fixing of the deadlines for publication of data, increasing the security of
information, reducing the texts and increasing the numbers in the statistical
publications etc. Secondly, the NSI experienced rapid changes in technology
and methods. For instance, they relied increasingly upon electronic measuring
of data instead of paper questionnaires. Thirdly, the structural changes in the
economy required a development of statistics in new fields like for instance
international industry, trade, travel, IT technology and environmental issues
etc.
 
 In the transformation of the NSIs the European statistical co-operation was
perceived with ambiguity. On the one hand, the Eurostat provided the national
statistical institutes with possibilities to improve the harmonization and
comparability of European statistical information. The harmonization efforts in
the EU were not solely based on recommendations alone, as in the UN and the
OECD, but on a legal foundation as well.  The attempts to strengthen the
international co-operation were consistent with the goals of the NSIs to
strengthen international co-operation.
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
important initiatives during the final negotiations on the Amsterdam treaty to integrate
the issue of employment into the EMU.
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 On the other hand, the Eurostat was considered an institution creating
difficulties for the NSIs by increasing their workload. Meeting the new
European standards was time consuming and demanded considerable
resources. The NSIs were frustrated by the fact that the Eurostat imposed a
financial and practical burden on the national institutions. In turn, the
technology was outdated. In particular the small states like Denmark, Ireland
and Sweden had difficulties meeting the demand of European statistics.
Carrying the budgetary costs of the statistics proved difficult. Nevertheless,
national statistical institutions made great efforts to comply with the statistical
demands within short deadlines. Adaptations of the statistics were made within
the existing institutional framework, and there were few major attempts to
reorganize the organizational structures.
 
 The adaptation of the member states to the convergence criteria implied a
balancing between political and financial accountability. In a situation where
there are considerable difficulties in reforming the institutions, but where a
strong willingness to make changes exists, it is often easier to alter the accounts
than to make real changes in the economy (March 1988: 392). In spite of
extensive and successful efforts to adapt the economy, meeting the criteria also
involved creative accounting. Creative accounting is the deliberate attempt to
alter the evaluation and assessment of the activity of the organization by
altering its accounts and bookkeeping methods and standards. Creative
accounting is thus the attempt to adapt to the pressure from the environment for
economic and rational financial accountability, and at the same time meet
certain standards for acceptable and appropriate solutions which are entrenched
in the national political institutions. Political accountability can be understood
as giving persuasive accounts in a realm where there may be disagreement of
the currency (Day and Klein 1987). That is, in political processes and
discourses different values, standards and norms might come into play, and
different actors may hold different ideas of appropriate action and compliance.
Financial accountability is about keeping true and accurate accounts in a realm
where there is agreement about the currency: money (Day and Klein 1987:8).
 
 In adapting the national accounts the member states used different techniques
to balance financial and political accountability. In their attempts to meet the
criteria, most member states used various one-offs and bookkeeping
techniques. Since 1997 deficits were used to determine whether or not a
member state was allowed participation in the EMU, the spring of 1997 was
particularly hectic in terms of creative accounting. Certain attempts were
strategically motivated, while others simply resulted from different national
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traditions for bookkeeping. Consequently, the member states were conducting
a balancing act between the technical definitions established by the Eurostat,
the boundaries of what was seen as politically acceptable, and what was
achievable in the relatively rigorous path-dependent systems of the NSIs.
 
 The Eurostat was responsible for monitoring. Moreover, it gave validity to the
various attempts to make changes in the accounting systems according to
established European procedures. The European statistical community tried to
uphold their legitimacy and professional autonomy, thus repudiating the
accusations of creative accounting. The Eurostat argued that it always had
‘taken the utmost account of the opinions of CMFB and other expert groups
consulted’. Every decision, it claimed, was based on opinions adopted
unanimously or by large majority of the member states. Further, these
decisions were made ‘solely on the basis of statistical principles that comply
with the harmonized rules for national accounts’ (Eurostat 1998c). Statisticians
took deep professional pride in their work. Suggestions that the numbers were
fiddled were rejected. Officials of the Eurostat argued that there are ‘absolutely
no statisticians who are manipulating figures’.44 The European professional
network of statisticians, with established patterns of contact and a shared model
of the world reduced the difficulties in the domestic adaptation process.
 
 Nevertheless, the Eurostat experienced strong political pressure to accept the
data provided by the member states. The role of the Eurostat, both as an organ
for ‘neutral’ statistics and as a branch of the European Commission, a strong
supporter for the creation of the EMU, made it vulnerable to pressure. For
instance, in relation to the French attempt to make one-offs, it was argued that
‘we do not want all our attempts to build the credibility of data to be
undermined’ and alarmed that ‘the credibility of statistics is at stake’.45The
Eurostat expressed a wish not ‘to be pushed around by politicians’.46 However,
Alberto de Michelis, a senior Eurostat official, suggested a relaxing of the
interpretation of the statistical figures. For instance, when commenting upon
the Italian attempts on creative accounting, the introduction of an Euro tax, he
claimed that nothing in the text of the Italian government signaled a legally
binding commitment to reimburse citizens. To him it was ‘only a political
commitment’. He argued further that the task of the Eurostat was to create a
playing field in the application of statistical rules. He claimed to know some
governments accused each others of cheating, but that it did not concern the
                                                                
44 Financial Times, 10 September 1996.
45 Financial Times, 31 October 1996.
46 Financial Times, 31 October 1996.
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Eurostat.47 This pressure for accepting manipulated figures was not fairly
distributed among the member states.  For instance, the decision to not accept
the Belgium creative accounting left some Belgian officials arguing that it
‘seems to be one rule for large countries and another for small’.48
 
 To summarize, environmental changes and shifting political goals triggered
institutional adaptations of the NSIs. However, the responses of the NSIs were
primarily a process of exploitation of national traditions, and pre-established
international standards, combined with responsiveness to the strong political
willingness to implement the EMU. In this perspective, the target figures in the
TEU were indicators of the institutional ability and political willingness of
each national political system to conform to the general objective.
Consequently, the final decision on the first wave of member states of the
EMU was based on the trustworthiness of the political and institutional systems
of the states, not on the basis of the fixed and reliable economic indicators.
 
 The difficulties in creating a trustworthy European statistical system with
comparable data are not uniquely related to the European integration process.
In fact, these difficulties could just be transitional. European statisticians have
been among the first ones that have had to cope with a much more complicated
system of integrated markets and trans-national trade at a large scale. European
economies were the first ones to be gradually de-nationalized as a result of the
creation of the Single Market. The statistical institutes of the member states
have been the first statistical institutes that have been subject to an extensive
harmonization programme. In spite of the fact that Eurostat and the member
states have seeked to increase comparability, there is still a general tendency of
loss of policy relevance of their economic statistics.
 
 This is partly due to creative accounting and institutional robustness at the
domestic level, but it truly also one important dilemma in the globalization of
markets in general. As economies and governments are becoming more and
more integrated, depending more and more on accurate, comparable and timely
statistical information, they ‘will not be able to prevent the further erosion of
the policy relevance of economic statistics’ (De Michelis 1997: 50). This
development raises serious challenges for democratic governance. Politicians
will have to cope with a situation with increasingly loose couplings between
the policy processes and the democratic channels, rooted in the nation state,
                                                                
47 Financial Times, 22 February 1997.
48 Financial Times, 31 October 1996.
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and the economy and information on the economy rooted in the European and
global level. Since the World War II, statistical production has been
increasingly concerned itself with questions related to methods and techniques.
Questions related to purpose, content and need for certain data have played a
less prominent role (Biederman 1972). However, European integration has
nevertheless allowed a redefining, reinterpreting and rediscovering of
important national accounts and traditions of the nation state, perhaps also in
the longer run triggering a more important discussion on the role of statistical
information in democratic governance in an integrated Europe.
 
 
5. 7 Conclusion: adaptation, ambiguity and exploitation
 The point of departure of this paper was three possible explanations on the
Europeanization of the national statistical institutions. This analysis suggests
that a proper understanding of the dynamics of change has to take into account
the interplay between the pressure for change from the European level, the
deliberate attempts of the statisticians to design the institutions, and the
national institutional characteristics.
 
 Firstly, the European statistical system can be perceived as an environment
imposing changes and providing new standards. The Eurostat had some,
although limited, administrative, legal and financial capacity to impose such
changes. The Eurostat proved its legitimizing power in developing and
authorizing the statistical system. However, the legitimacy for statistical co-
operation stemmed more from the legal, political and economic commitment of
the states to introduce the EMU, not the idea of the Eurostat functioning as an
independent professional body. During this process, Eurostat has seeked to find
its role as a ‘living institution’ in the new European polity. This process has
involved a balancing act between on the one hand, professional standards and
autonomy, and on the other hand responsiveness to political demands and
pressures from the European and national level, within strict deadlines and
limited resources.
 
 Secondly, the new statistical system was an instrument designed for measuring
and monitoring economic activity. The new tasks and political goals of creating
the Economic and Monetary Union sparked a wave of efforts to develop a new
statistical system. To some extent, the statistical system reflected the technical
work process and the ambitions of the political leaders. Reforms were initiated
to make the statistical system of the nation state meet the functional
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requirements and political ambitions of the leadership. However, as the EMU
triggered a wave of increased technical specialization and refinement of
statistics, it also fostered a wave of politicization of statistics. Consequently,
the legitimacy and quality of the statistics in use were questioned, spurring a
general discussion on the normative bias of statistical indicators.
 
 Thirdly, the statistical adaptation to the new standards and tasks proved to be
an uneasy process. Statistical systems are firmly entrenched in the nation state.
Statistical agencies differ in their capacity and political legitimacy. The
difficulties of institutional reform, combined with a strong willingness to meet
the convergence criteria, led to extensive use of creative accounting, instead of
actual economic changes. Consequently, the widespread use of creative
accounting may thus be understood as the national institutions’ inability to
meet the requirements for financial accountability. However, creative
accounting may also be interpreted as an attempt to redefine or to develop a
common understanding of the economic and political indicators involved,
transcending the simplistic figures of the convergence criteria. Hence, creative
accounting may be interpreted as an expression of the institutional and political
specificity of the various nation states. These characteristics reflect traditions
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Chapter 6: Precedents and Present Events in the
European Union - An Institutional Perspective on
Treaty Reform
6. 1 The dynamics of institutional reform49
The 1996-7 intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which resulted in the
Amsterdam Treaty, was convened to prepare the European Union (EU) for the
challenges of the next century, for which a radical review and reform of the
EU’s institutions was considered to be of paramount importance. During the
IGC, issues related to institutional reform ranked high on the agenda and
played a prominent role in the discussions. In this chapter I investigate and map
the organizational factors that constrained and facilitated institutional reform in
the EU, and I challenge the liberal intergovernmental perspective (Moravcsik
1993, 1995), which argues that the preferences and power of the member states
are the key factors explaining the dynamics of European integration. Based on
the empirical investigation of the 1996-7 IGC, I suggest that an institutional
perspective of governance (March and Olsen 1989, 1995) reveals important
aspects of political reform that have previously been neglected.
Formally, an IGC is a conference where the representatives from the member
states consider amendments to treaties. The outcome of the conference has to
be agreed upon unanimously and ratified by all member states (Bainbridge and
Teasdale 1996: 282). In the history of the EU, a total of six IGCs have taken
place, four of which were held between 1986 to 1997. A certain tradition for
arranging IGCs in the EU has gradually emerged, encompassing both
procedures and practices. The 1996-7 IGC was formally opened during the
Italian Presidency in March 1996, but the initial preparation had already started
some year before with the publication of papers, media coverage and political
statements and so on. The formal negotiations during the conference lasted for
fifteen months, and the initial draft was first agreed upon during the Dutch
Presidency in Amsterdam, in June 1997. After extensive re-negotiations,
                                                                
49 This chapter is published as an article in Karlheinz Neunreither and Antje Wiener
(eds.): ‘Amsterdam and Beyond: Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy
in the EU’ Oxford University Press, 2000. I want to thank Johan P. Olsen, Andrew
Moravcsik, Markus Jachtenfuchs, Beate Kohler-Koch, Alexander Stubb, Fabrice
Larat, Bjørn Otto Sverdrup, Bent Sophus Tranøy, Karlheinz Neunreither, Peter Leslie,
Antje Wiener, Fiona Hayes-Renshaw, Peggy Brønn and Ingrid Mohn Sverdrup for
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
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modifications and even a re-numbering of certain articles in the draft, the final
version of the Amsterdam treaty, as it was named, was officially signed in
October 1997. The member states were expected to ratify the treaty during
1998 and to implement it by the beginning of 1999, but by October 1988 this
timetable was already in arrears. In May 1999 it entered into force.
Three main theories compete to explain the driving mechanisms of European
integration, and differ as to how they evaluate the importance of grand
bargains. First, the liberal intergovernmental perspective (LI) argues that the
dynamic of European integration is primarily a result of negotiations between
the most powerful member states in key bargaining situations (Moravcsik
1991, 1993). Second, the supranational approach argues that the transformation
of the legal system in Europe is the key driver of European integration. For
instance, it is claimed that the ‘Court of Justice constituted the European
Community’ and that the ‘Court created the present-day Community’ (Shapiro,
1992, 123). Within this approach the dynamic of European integration is
primarily interpreted as the well-structured and rule-bounded activity of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ). Third, the multi-level governance approach
argues that the main driving forces are the day-to-day processes of negotiation,
competition and co-operation within, and between, networks at multiple levels
of governance. The activity in these networks is often characterized as
functional problem solving among technical experts (Héritier 1994,
Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1996). It is argued that the development of
policies and institutions is more or less independent of the IGCs and primarily
a matter of daily political practice. And that unco-ordinated, decentralized
action and uncontrolled shifts shape the living constitution of the EU (Kohler-
Koch 1998: 2).
These three approaches highlight different mechanisms (bargaining, rule
following and problem solving), and they emphasize the importance of
different actors (the national governments, the European Court of Justice, and
the different multi-level networks). It has been argued that there are not only
three theoretical approaches, but also three modes of governance in the EU
(Weiler et al. 1995: 25). In other words, various aspects of European
integration are driven by different mechanisms and each theoretical perspective
reveals important aspects of European integration (Peterson 1995). If this is so,
the theoretical challenge is to eliminate inconsistencies in the existing models,
to specify their area of validity, and to show the interaction between the
different dynamics.
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I maintain that there are good theoretical, empirical and normative reasons for
an examination of grand bargains like the IGC in the EU.
First, it is a basic assumption in democratic governance that political decision-
makers are able to decide on, and to design institutions. It is assumed that
decision-makers are neither driven purely by accident nor merely victims of
their environment. If the latter were the case, issues related to democratic
accountability, transparency, representation, and so on, would be of limited
relevance. In order to facilitate democratic governance in a realistic way, we
therefore need to specify the set of factors which enable or constrain the
decision-makers in the specific historical and institutional setting (Olsen 1997).
An investigation of the IGC, therefore, could potentially highlight some of the
most pertinent theoretical questions related to democratic governance: What
are the conditions for institutional reform in a democratic context? What are
the key driving mechanisms in processes of institutional design? And finally,
how can political systems in a democratic context learn from experiences and
increase their capacity to govern and shape political institutions?
Second, the dominant theoretical approach in the field of European integration
has been the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), which focuses
particularly on the grand bargains, arguing that investigating key bargaining
processes are particularly important in developing our theoretical accounts of
the EU (Moravcsik 1991, 1993, Urwin 1995, Wallace 1996, Laffan 1997). The
aim of the LI perspective is to explain ‘the substantive and institutional
development’ of the EU through the sequential analysis of national preference
formation and intergovernmental strategic interaction (Moravcsik 1993: 480).
The LI perspective is thought to be particularly well suited to a key bargaining
situation of a constitutional nature, such as an IGC (Weiler et al. 1995: 24).
Although the LI perspective has been subject to much criticism, it remains the
most consistent and rigorous theoretical approach in the field of European
integration, and its core assumptions are grounded in a strong tradition in the
social sciences (Moravscik 1997, 514-15). The IGC, it seems, offered a unique
match between a theoretical model and an empirical situation which is
supposed to fit the theory particularly well. This good match gives us a unique
opportunity for testing the theory on the basis of a crucial single-case design,
that is, a situation where the theory being tested has specified a clear set of
propositions and some circumstances within which the propositions are
believed to be true (Eckstein 1975).50 If the theory cannot be applied under
                                                                
50 We should of course be careful in drawing conclusions on the basis of a single-case
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such circumstances, clearly it should be modified.51 Finally, the IGC attracted
considerable political, intellectual and administrative attention, capacity and
prestige, which in itself makes it an interesting object of study.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, the two theoretical perspectives of
institutional reform are outlined. Next, an empirical investigation demonstrates
how both the IGC and the outcome of the process were constrained by: (1) the
EU’s well-defined historical course; (2) a distinct set of organizational
procedures and norms regulating the decision-making process; and (3) a series
of pressing events which were relatively loosely coupled to the IGC itself. I
argue that a complete understanding of the IGC is impossible if the analysis is
based solely on the preferences and powers of the member states. I argue that
the LI perspective is important but not sufficient for understanding institutional
reform processes. The institutionalist perspective is more illuminating and
offers a theoretical framework which is more consistent with some of the
empirical observations than is the case with LI perspective. I suggest that a
proper analysis of institutional dynamics and reform processes in the EU
requires a dynamic perspective on decision making. The decision-making
process needs to be situated in a distinct historical, institutional and
environmental setting, revealing how actors are embedded in a web of
structuring elements. By developing our theories and mapping out how history,
procedures and present events constrain and facilitate decision-making we also
contribute to increasing the possibility of a successful design.
6. 2 Two theories of institutional change
Political institutions, like the EU, are not static; they are continually changing
and adapting. Changes in organizations are frequently characterized as small
steps and incremental modifications. Continuous processes of change rarely
form parts of large-scale reform programs, and they are hardly ever firmly
controlled and well co-ordinated. Sometimes, well-planned and precisely timed
reform attempts are made in order to review and reorganize the institutional
apparatus of a political sector, a nation state or an international organization.
                                                                                                                                                                          
test. However, a single-case design is both powerful and fruitful when the case
represents a unique situation and when we seek to explore other alternative theoretical
approaches (Yin 1994).
51 Eckstein (1975:127) argued that a single-case design can ‘score a clean knockout
over a theory’. Others are more sceptical about single case design (King, Keohane and
Verba 1994).
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Such large-scale reform efforts might lead to dramatic and significant changes,
but experience has shown that most of them fail to make significant short-term
impacts (March and Olsen 1983). It is a basic assumption in democratic theory
that the demos has the possibility to decide and shape political agendas and to
design political institutions that enable the implementation of decisions (Dahl
1989). However, institutional design in a democratic context is difficult
(Goodin 1997, Olsen 1997). In this section I argue that the LI perspective is
overly optimistic, while the institutionalist perspective is more pessimistic and
at the same time more realistic in evaluating the possibility for design.
In the field of European integration, the liberal intergovernmental perspective
assumes that the member states are able to master and design institutions that
secure effective implementation of political decisions. This perspective is
based upon three basic premises (Moravcsik 1993: 480-82). First, state action
reflects the bounded rational action of national governments, who try to
achieve clear objectives, acting and calculating upon the basis of an identifiable
utility function. Second, the policy objectives of the member states are not
stable; they vary according to shifting domestic pressures and alliances. These
shifts in domestic opinion are smoothly aggregated through the political
institutions in the member states. The preferences are dependent upon the
domestic configuration of the societal preferences, which are first and foremost
determined by constraints and possibilities imposed by economic
interdependence (Moravcsik 1993: 488-96). Lastly, an intergovernmental
negotiation process involves two consecutive steps: first the national
governments define a set of state interests, and second, they engage in
negotiations in order to realize these interests. The relative bargaining power of
the member states determines the outcome of these negotiations. Consequently,
according to the LI perspective, the most important actors for understanding
IGCs in the EU are the powerful and large member states such as Germany,
France and Britain. The logical starting point, therefore, is a detailed analysis
of the preferences and powers of the member states.
Moravcsik (1993:498) presents us with four specific assumptions on key
bargaining situations. First, key bargains are voluntary bargains, not imposed
on any of the governments. Second, the national negotiators have easy access
to information about the preferences and opportunities of their counterparts,
and they are able to communicate at low transaction costs in an environment
rich in information. Third, the negotiations take place within a flexible and
protractible period of time, which makes it possible for the member
governments to extend numerous offers and counter-offers at a low cost.
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Finally, it is assumed that it is possible to design efficient institutions that are
able to monitor and enforce the agreements made at all levels.
The institutional perspective on design, however, is less optimistic. It assumed
that decision-making is embedded in a certain historical, institutional and
temporal context which helps to create and constrain the possibilities for
deliberate choice. This perspective is also based upon three assumptions
(March and Olsen, 1989, 1995). First, political life functions according to fairly
stable rules and procedures. Decision-making involves finding a match
between a particular role, on the one hand, and on the other hand, a set of
procedures that are believed to fit the particular role and situation. Decisions
are made on the basis of rules and norms accumulated from past experiences
and learning, rather than on the calculations of preferences and the anticipation
of future events. Second, the rules and the procedures are institutionalized.
Rules and understandings are taken for granted and they guide decision-makers
in their efforts to interpret and create meaning out of the situation. Certain
abiding rules inform the decision-makers’ normative judgements and their
understanding of appropriate alternatives and actions. Resources and
capabilities are linked to certain rules, thereby helping to uphold specific
interpretations and world views. Third, institutions evolve in a path-dependent
way (i.e. a decision made at one stage creates opportunities and constraints for
decision-making at a later stage). In most cases institutions change slowly and
incrementally within the existing procedures and norms. Occasionally,
however, dramatic crisis and external shocks might lead to a situation where
the existing rules and procedures are unhelpful for interpreting the world and
creating meaning. Under such conditions, institutions may change rapidly.
Generally speaking, institutional design is a complex process of matching
existing institutions, actions and contexts in ways that are complicated and of
long duration.
Most institutions have their own internal dynamic and operate in relatively
separate spheres. Over time, institutions gain some autonomy and are able to
buffer themselves against their environment. Despite a general tendency of
differentiation, decisions in one field are nevertheless structurally or
accidentally coupled with decision opportunities in other areas (Cohen, March
and Olsen 1972, Kingdon 1984). Decisions observed in a particular field are
therefore often purely artificial or by-products of decisions made in other fields
(Olsen 1972: 48). In general, the more established and institutionalized the
political system is, the more capacity it has to buffer the reform process. The
EU is an adolescent and weakly institutionalized system; it therefore finds it
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difficult to separate issues and buffer the agenda. Furthermore, we can assume
an increased probability for inter-linkages between different spheres as an
increasing number of cross-sectoral issues are addressed. Constitutional issues
do not pertain to one particular sphere, but frequently regulate the relationship
between different spheres. Consequently, the more issues of constitutional
character dominate the IGC agenda, the more difficult it will be to buffer the
agenda.
These inter-linkages may lead to deliberate attempts to pair issues or to
sequence events in order to achieve a goal. However, the coupling is frequently
accidental and at times structural. The manner in which decision-makers
distribute their attention is often determined just as much on the timing of the
arrival of the problem as by any assessment of its relative importance (Weiner
1976, Cyert and March 1992). Due to the importance of timing, deadlines
function as action generators, thereby triggering attention and decision-making
activity (Starbuck 1983, Bromiley and Marcus 1987). This does not, however,
imply a state of anarchy. It is rather an organized anarchy. The timing of the
emergence of a particular problem, solution or choice opportunity is often well
organized and structured. Several deadlines are institutionalized and constitute
important parts of the political organization at the national and European level.
For instance, the budget and the election cycle create fairly predictable rhythms
of political life (Sverdrup 1996). According to this view, a distinct temporal
location of a decision-making process contributes to shaping the pitfalls and
possibilities for reform.
6. 3 The path-dependency of the IGC
The 1996-7 IGC was not a voluntary process with few constraints, as the LI
perspective assumes, but a conference structured by past regulations and
statements. Three different mechanisms gave rise to the path-dependency of
the IGC. First, the Maastricht treaty (the Treaty on European Union – TEU)
laid down regulations that helped to shape the agenda. The IGC was convened
at this particular time because of German, Belgian and Italian dissatisfaction
with the outcome of the Maastricht negotiations in 1991. These countries
managed to persuade the other representatives to assemble a new IGC in 1996
(Bainbridge and Teasdale 1995), and the agreement was formalized and
incorporated into the TEU as Article N. According to this article: ‘A
conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States shall be
convened in 1996 to examine those provisions of this Treaty for which revision
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is provided, in accordance with the objectives set out in Articles A and B’
(Council of the European Union 1993).
The fact that the convening of the IGC was provided for in the treaty was
novel. The idea was to bind the parties to meeting within a short space of time
to evaluate the treaty and to negotiate further some unresolved elements.
However, between the end of the Maastricht conference in 1991 and the
opening session of the IGC in 1996, some of the premises for convening the
IGC had changed dramatically. The aim of the IGC was initially to evaluate
and improve the TEU (Laursen 1997), but due to the delay in the ratification of
the treaty, by 1996 the member states had had little experience of how it
actually worked in practice. For instance, certain aspects of the co-decision
procedure had actually never been implemented. To some extent ‘superstitious
learning’ was therefore possible where the link between past action and
outcomes did not exist or was ambiguous (March 1994: 89). Despite these
limitations on learning from experience, the IGC was opened according to the
regulations laid down in the Treaty because the member states were formally
obliged to negotiate a new treaty.
A similar self-binding mechanism was inserted in the Amsterdam treaty, in
Article 2 of the ‘Protocol on institutions with the prospect of enlargement of
the European Union’, in which the parties agreed that a new IGC ‘carry out a
comprehensive review of the provisions of the Treaties on the composition and
functioning of the institutions’ at least one year before the number of member
states exceeds twenty (Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997). Declaration 6, signed by
Belgium, France and Italy, requests that the next IGC concern itself with
institutional reforms and criticized it for failing to meet the ‘need (...) for
substantial progress towards reinforcing the institutions’ (Treaty of
Amsterdam, 1997). This IGC will be convened in 2000 during the Portuguese
Precidency.
The issues on the 1996 IGC agenda were also structured by the text of the
treaties. The TEU listed a number of issues that were meant to be on the
agenda of the IGC in 1996 (Council of the European Union 1993). For
instance, Article B stated that the conference should discuss the maintenance of
the acquis communautaire and to what extent the policies and forms of the co-
operation needed revision. Article J. 4 called for a discussion on the
relationship with the West European Union (WEU). Article J.10 stated that the
conference should examine whether or not any amendments are needed to the
provisions relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
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According to Declaration 1, the IGC should consider whether the EU should
extend its competence to include issues related to civil protection, energy and
tourism. In Declaration 16 it was made clear that the IGC should review the
possibilities for establishing a hierarchy of different categories of community
acts. Most of these issues received considerable attention and played a
predominant role in the discussions on the preparation and negotiations of the
IGC.
Furthermore, because of the fact that the IGC was framed and perceived as a
revision of the TEU, the latter had an indirect impact on the IGC. Comparisons
were frequently made between the IGC and the negotiations on the Maastricht
treaty, and the IGC was often referred to as the ‘Maastricht II negotiations’.
For instance, one commentator wrote that ‘the Maastricht treaty looks like it is
heading for a 5,000-mile service’.52 Many of the statements referred implicitly
to the TEU by asserting, for example in the 1996 IGC, the discussions should
be more open, it should not surprise, it should be simpler, more easy to
understand, it should be more inspiring (Laursen 1997, 59-61). These
references to the past contributed to structure the problems, the solutions and
the causal beliefs of the decision-makers.
Second, national adaptations to past treaties also influenced and eventually
structured the IGC’s new decision-making process. In the aftermath of the
Maastricht negotiations national institutions made several adjustments in their
domestic administrative institutions in order to implement the TEU.  Most
importantly, as regards influencing European-level decision-making, certain
national courts sought to draw and contest the boundaries of European
integration by testing the legitimacy of the Europeanization process and the
legal status of this transformation. The most influential ruling was made by the
German constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht (BvG)) in October
1993 (Weiler 1995), defining the boundaries of further integration which
imposed limitations on the issues on which the German politicians could
decide during the IGC. In Denmark, the courts have also tested the
constitutional validity of the Danish ratification of the TEU (Rasmussen
1996).53 This case occurred during the negotiations and the ratification process,
                                                                
52 Financial Times, 10 May 1995.
53 The case concerned the conflict between Art. 235 of the TEU and §20 in the Danish
Basic Law, which states that it is only possible to delegate sovereignty in a limited and
clearly defined area. The Danish Supreme Court (Højesteret), in their 150-page ruling,
established the rule that Højesteret has the final say on such issues, and stated that the
ratification of the TEU was not in conflict with the Danish Basic Law (Weekendavisen
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preventing the Danish negotiators from suggesting further transfers of
competence or any increase in the use of majority voting.  In addition to the
legal case, the Danish negotiators were constrained by the referendum to which
they had bound themselves on the ratification of the outcome of the IGC. The
referendum was held in May 1998 and a clear majority of 55.1 per cent of the
voters supported the ratification of the Amsterdam treaty. 54
These two cases show the mutual interdependencies between and within the
many levels of governance within the EU. On the one hand, national
constitutions and courts respond and adapt to EU decisions, and this response
in turn imposes restrictions upon the EU. In the judicial ruling of the national
courts, the legal reasoning and decision-making activity in the EU is important.
However, the member states also have to anticipate or take into account the
structuring effects of national constitutions and rulings on the decision-making
process in the EU (Rasmussen 1996:66, Weiler 1995). European integration is
a large-scale process of mutual adaptation, rather than a one-dimensional
process of national adaptation to European integration. Constitutional reforms
inside the member states will alter the system of co-ordination, thereby also
necessitating doctrinal modifications at the Community level (Llorente 1998:
28). Furthermore, the legal rulings of the national courts are not a direct result
of the TEU or the IGCs. Their history can be treated as responses to a long-
term, gradual increase in competence for the EU, as well as the gradual
development of legal reasoning and consciousness within the member states, at
best triggered by the IGCs. In processes of Europeanization, one can therefore
observe layers of adaptation and incremental change, which in turn lead to the
triggering of disputes on the distribution of competence and power between the
legal and the political institutions within, and between, the member states.
Political declarations and statements shape future discussions. There is no clear
beginning and end to the IGC as a decision-making process. Statements prior
to the formal opening of the IGC structured the discussions and the issues on
the agenda. The statements on the future enlargement of the EU to the Central
and Eastern European countries (CEECs) were of particular importance for the
IGC. At the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, it was decided that
the EU would be enlarged to include the countries of East and Central Europe,
as soon as they were able to satisfy the political and economic requirements of
membership (European Council, June 1993). At the Essen European Council in




December the following year, the heads of state and government concluded
that the ‘institutional conditions for ensuring the proper functioning of the
Union must be created at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, which for
that reason must take place before accession negotiations begin’ (European
Council, December 1994). Prior to the IGC, it was decided that the formal
negotiations on accession should start six months after the IGC was completed.
Both statements were repeated systematically during the preparations. These
political statements, based on weak economic or political analysis, increased
the pressure to address certain issues on the agenda, in particular the issue of
institutional reform. The issue of enlargement was an underlying element
during the negotiations, and even became the criterion for determining whether
the IGC had been successful or not.
In the IGC, the course of the decision-making process was structured by the
past. This path-dependency challenges the theoretical notion of the conference
as a voluntary process, in which member states control the agenda and have
leeway to design the resultant institutions. In principle, ‘nothing in the
assumption or causal mechanism of LI analysis denies the historical and path-
dependent quality of integration’ (Moravcsik 1995:613). However, how and to
what extent this path-dependent quality comes into force remains unresolved
and unspecified in the LI model.
One argument consistent with the LI perspective entails considering the
dominant parties as being capable of planning for future steps and designing
historical routes. Equally, past decisions will lead to an effective change in the
preferences and distribution of power and resources within, and among, the
parties. This implies the creation of new dominant coalitions and, ultimately,
new policies and institutions. The empirical material of the IGC does not
support such a view. For instance, it is virtually impossible to find a vision or
position relating to the 1996 conference during the Maastricht negotiations
(Laursen and Vanhoonacker 1992, Ross 1995). The decision to convene a new
conference in 1996 can instead be interpreted as a by-product of the separation
of problems and sequencing of attention in order to reach an agreement during
the Maastricht negotiations.
Furthermore, if any of the member states had a clear position on the IGC 1996
during the Maastricht negotiations, these positions must have reflected a
completely different political climate. The understanding of what was
appropriate, possible, reasonable and effective in terms of European integration
had changed dramatically since the previous IGC, because of the changes in
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East and central Europe, German unification, the economic and monetary
union (EMU), new applicant countries, a new economic situation and so on.
For instance, after the TEU, Laursen (1992: 259) wrote ‘[I]t can therefore seem
odd that references to a federal goal for the Community had to be taken out at
Maastricht to allow the British to accept a new Treaty. But the “F-word” may
be back to haunt the anti-federalists again at the next IGC in 1996’. However,
support for federalist ideas was at the IGC, and it was virtually impossible to
find any references to the concept.
Finally, for some of the member states, the IGC was certainly not a result of
their own previous calculations and voluntary actions. For the new member
states - Austria, Finland and Sweden - the IGC was a review and reorganization
process shaped prior to their entry into the EU. Their participation was
mandatory and not voluntary.
From an institutional perspective, the path-dependency does not create
analytical problems, because adaptation to the past is considered to be less
effective and more multifaceted than in the LI perspective.  In general, it is
assumed that there is a mutual process in which the environment adapts to
institutions, and at the same time institutions adapt to their environments
(March and Olsen 1995: 42).  The cases of the national courts clearly illustrates
this web of adaptiveness (Weiler 1995 b, Llorente 1998). Good matches are
difficult to find in processes of continuous adaptation both to and of the
environment. Present solutions cannot easily be equated with past ones: there
are many equilibrium points, and they are largely dependent upon internal
characteristics of the member states and their institutions (March and Olsen,
1989). As a political system becomes more complex, these co-evolving
processes become more intricate. Consequently, it can be claimed that the
leeway for voluntary action is reduced when the ability to shape and control the
agenda in key bargaining processes is reduced. It is likely that in previous key
bargains and IGCs the legacy of the past thus played a less structuring role.
This path-dependent development does not make decision-makers slaves of the
past. The evolutionary development stems from a sequence of choices. Because
of the path-dependent character of the development, the impact of small, well-
timed interventions can be multiplied by other forces and enabling reforms
(March and Olsen 1995 44). Past decisions are both enabling and constraining
factors. As the IGC shows, the possibility for interventions in a complex
political system like the EU is limited. Treaty texts, adaptations of national
administrative and legal institutions, and finally, political statements on the
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future direction made at top-level political meetings seem to be particularly
important in the structuring of the agenda. These findings are consistent with
the argument that key bargains are important, but they are proceeded by deeper
and profound changes in the legal, political and cognitive developments in
European integration (Weiler 1991: 5).
6. 4 From closed and diplomatic to open and democratic
Organizations and decision-making situations are not merely tools for
achieving certain goals. The belief that the organization of a decision-making
process affects its outcome is a basic premise in organization theory. In any
decision situations, certain resources, sets of information, rules and procedures,
participants, networks, problems and solutions, technologies, expectations and
norms, visions and causal beliefs exist (Scott 1981, 7). The composition of
these organizational factors helps to shape the outcome of decision making.
Organizations are not neutral, but rather represent a mobilization of bias
(Schattschneider 1975: 30). Three organizational factors shaped the IGC: (1)
the procedures for arranging the conference;  (2) the increasing number of
participants; and (3) the democratization of the method for making treaty
revisions in the EU. I argue that the IGC’s agenda was overloaded with issues,
and the exchange of opinions, contrary to what liberal intergovernmentalists
assume, was both costly and time-consuming.
In the history of the EU, committees have been established to prepare the
agenda of the IGCs. Traditionally, the decision has been made either to set up a
‘Committee of wise men’ or else to depend upon high-ranking staff or
politicians. The Dooge committee established at the European Council in
Fontainebleau in 1984 leading to the Single European Act (SEA), was of the
first kind (Edwards and Pijpers 1997, 8), while the 1996-7 IGC followed the
second approach, which needed a less clear mandate. These expert committees
have been influential in setting the agenda, drafting the initial texts and
ultimately shaping the outcome of the conferences, whose work they had
prepared. Experts in the field of European integration and prominent European
politicians sat on these committees. At the Corfu Summit in 1994, it was
decided, in line with tradition, that a Reflection group should be created, whose
task it would be to manage, protect, and prepare the IGC’s agenda.55 The
reflection group was chaired by Carlos Westendorp, a Spanish diplomat and
                                                                
55 Presidency Conclusions - Corfu 24 and 25 June 1994, (SN 150/94).
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very experienced EU expert. The group consisted of representatives from each
member state, in addition to two representatives from the European Parliament,
and one from the European Commission. The members of the group were
meant to act as the personal representatives of their Foreign Ministers, as free
thinkers with some autonomy.56 Their mandate was briefly to learn from and
correct the errors of Maastricht, and to rethink the institutional set up of the EU
and its future challenges. However, even the composition of the group reflected
the path-dependency of the IGC. Five out of the eighteen in the group
participated in the Maastricht negotiations, and many of the members were
well-known Brussels bureaucrats and politicians, a fact which made radical
proposals less likely.57
The Reflection group had high ambitions and addressed some of the
fundamental questions in relation to the EU, such as; -- what are the problems
facing the organization (i.e., the EU), and are the traditional methods and
principles for integration still valid and legitimate? The members used political
imperatives like: ‘the EU must dramatically adapt and radically change their
institutions’.58 Its opening session was arranged in Taormina, Sicily, coinciding
with the 40th anniversary of the Messina Conference. It was overloaded with
symbols and references to the success of the past treaty making. The IGC was
set to be perceived as a Messina II rather than a Maastricht II. The choice of
location referred to the success of the treaty on the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1956, which was initiated at a Meeting in Messina in
1954, rather than the crisis of legitimacy following from the ratification of the
Maastricht treaty. The president in the European Parliament (EP) argued that
the new IGC should demonstrate the ‘same bold political vision and the same
strength of political will’ as the Messina Conference 40 years before.59
Despite this and other similar calls for major reforms, when the Reflection
group presented their preparatory report at the Madrid Summit in December
                                                                
56 Agence Europe, 6 July 1995, interview with Mr Carlos Westendorp.
57 The members of the Reflection Group were as follows (those participants whose
names appear in italics also participated in the Maastricht negotiations): Carlos
Westendorp (Spain). Michel Barnier (France), Werner Hoyer (Germany), Silvio
Fagiloio (Italy), Donald Davis (UK), Joseph Weyland (Luxembourg), Gay Mitchell
(Ireland), Niels Ersbøll (Denmark), Stephanos Stathatos (Greece), Franklin Dehousse
(Belgium), Michel Patjiin (the Netherlands), Andre Concalves Pereira (Portugal),
Manfred Scheich (Austria), Ingvard Melin (Finland), Gunnar Lund (Sweden),
Elisabeth Guigou (European Parliament), Elmar Brok (European Parliament),
Marcelino Oreja (European Commission). Agence Europe 31 May 1995.
58 Agence Europe, 6 July 1995.
59 Agence Europe, 3 March 1996.
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1995, it became clear that the group had failed to create a consistent agenda
and a platform for further discussion. 60 The report did not reveal a common
understanding of the shape of the future European polity, the problems facing
the EU, nor the proposed solutions. In contrast to previous conferences, the
IGC’s preparatory group was unable to limit the agenda and present a set of
solutions.
The ambiguity of the agenda prevailed during the conference. Even during the
Dutch Presidency and the work in the Patijn group (a group named after the
Dutch secretary of state for foreign affairs Michel Patijn, who led the final
negotiations) during the last weeks of the reform process, it proved difficult for
the parties to manage the agenda. During the final negotiations in Amsterdam,
which lasted for more than eighteen hours, the agenda shifted. Issues central in
the initial stages of the conference were aired in the last minutes, while issues
more or less unrelated to the initial aim of the IGC attracted considerable
attention during the final hours.
The ambiguity of the agenda was due in large part to the organization of the
IGC. Briefly, the parties met two days each week; the presidency was
responsible for preparing the agenda for the meetings, which was usually
circulated among the parties on the Wednesday of the week before the meeting,
allowing the delegates a few days for preparations with their national
politicians, parliamentary groupings, and different national experts. These
work-intensive and time-consuming discussions and preparations lasted for
more than fifty weeks. In addition to the regular meetings at the administrative
level, the EU Foreign Ministers met regularly for discussions and attempts to
give political impetus to the process. Thus, the IGC engaged a considerable
attention and capacity of the administrative and political system in the EU and
in the member states.
The methods for discussing treaty revisions had changed since the Maastricht
negotiations, during which parties were presented with a full text, of which
they were required to negotiate only the items in square brackets and the
footnotes. This method allowed a gradual accumulation of the number of points
where the parties had agreed and considered settled. The negotiations were
aimed at reducing the number of reservations and items in square brackets by
means of textual compromises, eventually achieving a final version that was
                                                                
60 Reflection group’s Report (1995) ‘A Strategy for Europe - An Annotated Agenda’
Brussels, 5th December, 1995
180
acceptable to all (Petite 1998: 3). During the 1996-7 IGC, on the other hand,
there was neither an initial agenda nor a draft treaty drawn up by a preparatory
committee. Most of the working documents were position papers which were
not drafted as legal texts. The first draft was presented to the summit in Dublin
at the end of 1996. Prior to this, the parties had discussed issues without
reference to a clearly defined text. Later, the presidency was responsible for
presenting a ‘Presidency Introductory Note’, which was discussed by the
delegates, while the presidency took notes of the discussions. The proceedings
of the next session were based on the previous discussion, and a ‘Suggested
Presidency Text’, which was then discussed by the parties, each of whom could
state their opinion and even back out of previous agreements. The IGC was
therefore a continuous process of studying proceedings, presenting views,
rewriting opinions and adjusting texts, thus making the progress strongly
dependent upon the organizational abilities of the presidency. These new
procedures made progress difficult, and it was not possible for the text to be
examined closely by legal experts before being presented to the heads of state
and government (Petite 1998: 4). It also proved difficult to protect the agenda
from relatively loosely coupled issues which were attracting attention.
The increased complexity was also a function of the increased number of
participants. Since the previous IGC, the EU had expanded from twelve to
fifteen member states. To state the obvious: it is easier to organize informal
discussions and easy communication in a unit with few participants than in a
larger unit with many participants. The Reflection group, for example,
consisted of eighteen members, and each member was allowed to bring two
assistants.  Even the group of eighteen was considered to be too large for the
purpose of the discussions.61 The format of the Reflection group was simply a
hindrance to personal relations and a trusting informal atmosphere. The
number of participants also constrained the possibility of reaching agreements.
If each of the participants were to speak for ten minutes the session would last
for more than three hours. Enlargement of the EU and the agenda of the IGC
had increased the flow of information, the number of languages, the amount of
issues on the agenda, the number of potential coalitions, and the duration of the
meetings. Both the speaking time of each member and the chance of reaching a
consensus was thus limited. The EU in general, and the IGC in particular, had
become a radically more complex process for effective decision-making and
problem-solving.
                                                                
61 This view was expressed by the former Secretary General of the Council, Niels
Ersbøll, at a speech in Humlebæk, Denmark.
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In addition, the member states and the domestic administrative institutions had
become more Europeanized and the boundaries within and between the
member states had become unclear (Olsen 1995, Wessels and Rometsch 1996,
Hanf and Soetendorp 1998). Today, the boundaries between foreign and
domestic policy are blurred and key bargains in the EU are no the preserve of
the Foreign Ministries, with representatives from various national and even
regional units taking part in the negotiations. For example, the German
government circulated a questionnaire to all its ministries, in an attempt to
determine those fields in which the different ministries would welcome
increased majority voting. The Foreign Ministry supported majority voting in
most issues, but the questionnaire revealed that a majority of the other German
Ministries rejected did not.62 The difficulty of upholding the idea of one
national interest was also apparent in relation to flexibility. For instance, during
the Dutch Presidency, cleavages emerged between the Foreign Ministry and
the Ministries of Finance and Social Affairs and Employment in the
Netherlands (Stubb 2000).
As co-ordinating capacity in the Europeanized administrations is impaired, it
becomes more difficult to uphold the analytical assumption outlined in the LI
perspective of certain national preferences or dominant national positions in
key bargaining processes. Furthermore, ideas, problems and solutions diffuse
across the borders between the member states. National administrations are
fused together in a larger European web of administrative bodies, making it
difficult to distinguish between the position of one member state from another
(Wessels and Rometsch 1997).
As is the case with most political processes, the IGC was not solely motivated
out of its functional outcome; it also helped to create meaning and legitimacy.
The member states’ view of the IGC differed according to their possibilities to
influence the agenda. However, they also partly viewed the IGC as a possibility
to increase their knowledge of the EU system, a possibility to resolve national
political conflicts, and as an opportunity to stimulate the public debate on
European issues and thereby educating their citizens. The aim was to initiate
research in the field and partly stimulate the public debate on the key issues of
the conference, and to give parties an arena for public deliberation and
argumentation (SOU 1996: 24, 1).
                                                                
62 See ‘Kreuze beim Nein’, Der Spiegel, no 40, 1996 pp 22-4. The pattern seemed to
be that they were sceptical in the fields for which they had responsibility, and
supportive of it in other fields.
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The manner in which the member states prepared their positions was
determined by well-established national procedures. In Sweden, for instance,
the preparation of the IGC position reflected the tradition of extensive public
debates and information campaigns, as well as a strong belief in enlightenment
and trust in expert analysis regarding political reform processes (Brunsson
1993). A special parliamentary committee, EU 96-kommitén, was created
which was responsible for making suggestions, analyzing the challenges, and
contributing to the Swedish position. This committee was perhaps even more
important in stimulating the Swedish debate and in educating the public on EU
issues. It had a sizeable budget, and arranged public hearings and conferences
with representatives from a large number of interest organizations. In addition,
the committee commissioned and published relevant research, and invited
foreign scholars and politicians to contribute to the Swedish debate. A large
number of free publications and newsletters were available from the committee
and were widely distributed (SOU 1996, von Sydow 1997). In responding to
the challenges posed by the IGC, the Swedes exploited their traditional
procedures for arranging political debates and reform. This method increased
the likelihood of different parties participating and expressing their views.
Furthermore, as was the case in other member states, the openness of the
Swedish government created hindrances for flexibility during the bargaining
process in the IGC.
Organizational features at the EU level influenced the IGC as well. The EU
institutions had no formal right to participate in the final negotiations, their role
being limited to the initial stages. For instance, the EU institutions presented
their evaluation of the actual working of the Maastricht Treaty prior to the
negotiations.63 These documents were important in structuring the discussions
in the Reflection group and in the IGC in general. During the IGC, the EP
continually briefed and updated. The EP and the European Commission
devoted significant administrative resources to monitoring and influencing the
IGC. Both established special task forces and arranged hearings and debates
related to the IGC; these bodies also had the administrative power to collect,
sort, rank and reinterpret the position papers presented by the member states. In
terms of personnel, the task force had considerable capacity, and the members
                                                                
63 The Committe of Regions was the first to present its paper, on 20 April 1995. The
European Commission’s report was submitted 10 May 1995, and those of the EP and
the ECJ on 17 May 1995. The Court of Auditors also submitted its paper in May. The
Economic and Social Committee’s paper was the last to be presented, in November
1995.
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enjoyed high legitimacy in EU circles.64 The information overload and the need
for information-processing capacities in the IGC increased the importance of
administrative bodies at the EU level.
The greater importance of the EU institutions as regards effective decision-
making does not imply that the European institutions were necessary, nor that
they were successful in their attempts to shape the agenda. Prior to the IGC, the
European Commission decided to limit its aspirations and to avoid institutional
conflicts. It had not expected or advocated a great leap forward towards more
competence during the IGC, and it sought enhanced powers neither for the
European Union or for itself (Dinan 1997: 197). However, it should not be
forgotten that increased complexity in the EU leads to a greater dependency of
the national governments on the administrative and information-processing
capacities of the supranational institutions. Since the smaller states, in general,
have less capacity to process information, they are also more dependent upon
the supranational institutions than the larger member states.
Changes in the organizational procedures and the increase in complexity of the
EU helped to shape the IGC. From a LI perspective, on the other hand, the
preferences and positions of the member states are believed to explain the
outcome of decision-making. Such interest-based explanations are truly
important. For instance, the absence of a shared agenda has been interpreted as
a consequence of the scepticism of the British Conservatives.65 For a long time,
the British position of upholding the status quo influenced the IGC (George
1996). At the same time, the delegates were waiting for a joint Franco-German
position paper -- joint papers from these countries had strong influence on the
agenda on earlier conferences and reforms in the EU (Menon 1996). Between
the Franco- German Summit in Baden-Baden in 1995 and the Amsterdam
meeting in June 1997, the two countries continually sought to develop a paper
which could ‘imprint a political impetus on problems of substance’.66 From
May 1996 onwards, the French and German governments met informally every
six weeks to address issues related to European integration and the IGC.67
However, they failed to come up with a final joint position paper. They
                                                                
64 The Task forces were composed of prominent persons. Michel Petite, who had held
the same position during the Maastricht negotiations, headed the Commission’s Task
Force. Former President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, also had an
office at his disposal in this unit.
65 For a typical expression of this view see for instance Agence Europe, 28/29 May,
1996.
66 Agence Europe, 6 June 1996, and Agence Europe, 13 June 1996.
67 Agence Europe, 2/3 September 1996.
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presented papers in December 1995, February 1996 and a paper on WEU, and
they were able to present, in October 1996, an eight-page long paper on
flexibility or ‘enhanced co-operation’.68 During 1997, the Franco-German co-
operation intensified but there was still no Franco-German agreement or
solution in sight. The IGC met difficulties when the traditional driver of the
EU, the Franco-German co-operation, ran into issues related to institutional
reform, enlargement and financial burden sharing.
This suggests that analyzing the preferences and power of the member states is
insufficient in determining the outcome of the IGC. A systematic analysis of
the positions of the member states was undertaken by the European
Commission’ and the EP’s Task Forces on the IGC.69 Furthermore, a group of
Austrian political scientists collected and systematically sorted the different
views presented by the various member states in their position papers (Grillier
et al. 1996). These extensive documents reveal the enormous amount of issues
on the IGC agenda, as well as the complexity of the conference and the
difficulty of correctly mapping-out vague positions. Under such circumstances,
communication between the parties becomes difficult and costly, and the
sequence of the negotiations is unclear. The LI perspective assumes that
domestic negotiations occur first, and are followed by negotiations among the
European parties. However, the analysis shows that national positions in the
IGC were to a large extent generated in response to the contributions of other
member states and of the European institutions. In principle, we would assume
that the smaller states, with less capacity and negotiating power, were more
responsive to the papers of the larger states than vice versa. However, large
states like France (Menon 1996), Britain (George 1996) and Germany (Goetz
1996) also demonstrated ambiguity and uncertainty about their national
positions. The uncertainties in the 1996-7 IGC were greater than in previous
conferences. This time, the preferences of the member states were not
exogenous and decided a long time in advance of the IGC, as suggested by the
LI perspective; instead, they were elaborated within a larger process of mutual
preference formation. It is thus difficult to uphold the assumption of a clear
separation between domestic preference and position formation on the one
hand, and negotiation among the parties on the other.
                                                                
68 Agence Europe, 23 October, 1996. The Franco-German paper was reprinted in
Agence Europe, 29 October 1996. The idea of enhanced co-operation and flexibility
was unclear and there was no support for a common interpretation.
69 ‘Summary of the Positions of the Member states and the European Parliament on
the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, Task Force on the IGC, 12 May 1997.
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These preference and power-based explanations may be important for
understanding the IGC but they are not a sufficient explanation, nor are they
able to take into account the important impact of the crisis that hit the
traditional methods for treaty revisions. The need for a new organizational
method of treaty revisions arose from the changing normative context and the
ongoing democratization of the EU. IGCs have traditionally been the domain
of diplomats and of foreign policy experts, and even more so of legal experts.
Treaty revision has thus been conducted within an atmosphere of technicality
and secrecy. Media and domestic politicians have paid limited attention to the
IGCs, and popular participation has largely been limited to debates on
ratification. For instance, the 1985 IGC on the Single European Act was
conducted largely without a major debate. Also the deliberations on the
Maastricht Treaty followed the same methods. However, during these
negotiations the press became increasingly more skilled and eager in collecting
and obtaining information.  For the first time documents and position papers
circulated in the press, and an increasing number of people and politicians took
an interest in the EU. However, not all national governments adapted to the
new situation with increased demand for transparency. The British
government, for instance, refused to make the draft treaty presented by the June
1991 Luxembourg Precidency available to the House of Commons because
they considered that its publication would prejudice the diplomatic bargaining
process.70 Still, the Maastricht negotiations represented a relatively closed and
bureaucratic decision-making process.
The method of Treaty revision was challenged further by the ratification of the
Maastricht treaty, which plunged the EU into a major crisis over legitimacy.
From being a celebrated success at its signature in Maastricht, the Treaty was
soon considered as an unreadable and unpresentable fiasco. In Denmark, a
small majority of 45,000 voters voted no in the first referendum, 2 June 1992.
After the negotiation of a special exemption clause at the Edinburgh summit,
however, a majority of 56.8 per cent voted yes on 18 May 1993 (Bainbridge
and Teasdale, 1995, 111). President Mitterand called for a referendum the day
after the first Danish referendum, and the Treaty was subsequently accepted by
the narrowest of margins: only 51 per cent of French voters voted ‘yes’ in
September 1992 (Bainbridge and Teasdale 1995, 245). In Britain and Germany
the ratification was equally conflictual, and in the referendums on membership
                                                                
70 A formalistic and perhaps silly decision as long as the document was available in
the press and via traditional news service (Bainbridge and Teasdale 1995:283).
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in the new applicant countries -- Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway -- the
lack of popular support for the Maastricht Treaty was very marked (Luif 1995).
Several factors contributed to the perceived crisis of legitimacy for the EU,
evident from the results of the various referendums and the decline in
popularity of the TEU. It was partly due to the content of the Treaty itself, and
partly to the method of organizing constitutional processes within the EU. As a
response to the crisis of legitimacy crisis, the IGC were required to address the
issue of  democracy -- in short, to make the EU more ‘effective’, ‘open’,
‘democratic’ and ‘responsive to its citizens’.71 These aspirations were regularly
referred to in the preparation of the agenda, and in all the Reflection Group’s
reports. Similar conclusions were drawn by the presidency at the Amsterdam
summit. A democratization of the EU implied that not only the issues, but also
the procedures regulating the process would have to be adapted in order to
respond to this new logic of appropriateness.
The character of treaty reform in the 1996-7 IGC was very different to that in
the Maastricht negotiations. First, the European Commission initiated a 7
million ECU programme, called ‘Let’s Build Europe Together’, aimed at
increasing public knowledge about the IGC; it sought to develop a permanent
dialogue with citizens throughout the negotiations.72 Most member states had
substantial budgets for initiating public debates and discussions on the future of
the EU. In addition to the governmental initiatives, populist, and professional
conferences were held all over Europe, and thousands of publications were
produced and distributed widely. An Internet homepage devoted to the IGC
kept people informed, making the downloading of documents and position
possible a short time after their presentation. 73 National governments talked
readily about their positions and most major newspapers followed the process
closely, publishing their comments and analyses of the IGC.
Second, the number of issues on the agenda was greater. An enormous number
of domestic, regional, and European institutions, parties, scholars and interest
organizations all tried to gain attention to their respective interpretations,
concerns, ideas and interests. Some of the proposals came from powerful and
influential organizations such as the European Union of Employers’
                                                                
71 Report of the Reflection Group (1995): A Strategy for Europe - An Annotated
Agenda, Brussels, 5 December 1995, and Presidency Conclusions of the European
Council, Florence, 21-22 June 1996.
72 Agence Europe, 30 May 1996.
73 http://europa.eu.int/en/agenda/igc-home/index.html
187
Confederations (UNICE) and the European Labour Organization (Euro-LO),
others from rather small and marginal interest organizations, such as Animal
Welfare; European Disability Forum; and the National Board of Italian
Psychologists (Mazey and Richardson 1996). In making these preparations and
proposals, an increasing number of interest groups sought an EU in which the
citizens would be able to participate in the process of constitution-building, and
the development of rights, norms, institutions, and visions in and for the EU
(Wiener and Della Sala 1997: 604). However, as the number of issues and
expectations increased, it became impossible to maintain firm control of the
agenda, because no single unit had an overview of all the contributions.
Third, the IGC had to be conducted in accordance with the new and more
democratic norm of openness and public deliberation. While the Maastricht
process was dominated by legal reasoning, the 1996-7 IGC concerned itself
with the political and democratic issues, pushing for commitments from the
member states. A leading bureaucrat expressed his frustration as follows:
‘Gone are the days of when we had the articles in square brackets, and the
processes were purely technical; now decision-making in the IGC is open,
unclear, and democratic’.74 Increased openness made it more difficult for
politicians to show flexibility and to change their views during the
negotiations, and the increase of information made it more difficult for the
national governments to communicate easily and secret.
The LI perspective pays limited attention to the impact of changes in the
normative context on decision-making. For instance, in commenting upon the
agenda-setting process as regards the French referendum, Moravcsik argued
that: ‘[t]he Maastricht referendum in France is an exception that proves the
importance of secrecy and agenda-setting power, in that it demonstrates the
potential consequences when governments lose firm control of domestic
agendas or take needless risks in ratification’ (Moravcsik: 1993:516-17). True,
the referendums and the public debates resulting from the Maastricht Treaty
represented dramatic breaks with the past, but they also represented an
emerging new political and democratic order with increased interest and
demand for popular participation in Europe. As students of European
integration, we must develop theoretical models which enable us to interpret
how integration and disintegration ultimately leads to these changes in the
basis of legitimacy and the character of decision making. By applying a
                                                                
74 Michele Petite, European Commission, at a speech delivered in Brussels 10 July
1997, at the IPSA seminar on the Amsterdam treaty.
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dynamic perspective to the EU, as the institutional perspective suggests, we
can interpret the shifts in the mode of decision-making, and show its impact on
the dynamics of European integration. Such a reflective perspective on
legitimacy and legitimate decision-makers is also consistent with the idea of
decision-making as deliberation and argumentative interaction, rather than
solely focusing upon voting rules and treating certain actors and their interests
as given and legitimate (Neyer 2000).
6. 5 Present events and the temporal location of the IGC
The 1996-7 IGC did not take place within a flexible and easily protracted
period of time, as suggested by the liberal intergovernmentalists. Rather, it was
situated in a distinct temporal order which affected the content and duration of
the conference. In institutional reform, timing is of key importance. In relation
to the IGC, both unexpected and expected events, as well as external and
internal events shaped the conditions for design.
First, the IGC was affected, directly and indirectly, by unexpected external
accidents beyond the control of any of the decision-makers. It was affected
directly, in that the events were linked immediately to the agenda, and
indirectly, in that attention is a scarce resource, and the attention and energy
which would otherwise have been allocated to the IGC was drawn to other
issues, such as the war in Bosnia, the crisis in Rwanda and Zaire, and the BSE
(bovine spongiform encephalopathy) crisis. The latter, which concerned
infected British beef, captured attention around the time of the formal opening
of the IGC, and at a point when the conference badly needed political impetus.
Thus, the opening session in Florence more or less ended in a discussion on
how to handle the BSE crisis. The issue was also used as an excuse for the
British government’s refusal to participate in both day-to-day decision-making
in the EU, as well as in the negotiations at the conference. During a short
period of time, therefore, the adoption of more than seventy pieces of
legislation was prevented and the British also managed to obstruct discussions
in the IGC.75
Some issues were more predictable than others. Routine internal day-to-day
decisions in the EU influenced the IGC’s agenda. As a weakly institutionalized
                                                                
75 See the article ‘Florence peace talks await UK’s cease-fire declaration’, Financial
Times, 21 June 1996.
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system, the EU lacked the capacity to separate out day-to-day issues from
constitutional issues. For instance, when the ruling by ECJ forced Britain to
agree to a standard 48-hour working week, it was argued shortly after that the
British Prime Minister ‘should go to the IGC and insist on rewriting this
legislation’.76 A few days later these changes were proposed as modifications
to Article 118a.77 During the IGC, several issues regarding public health,
competition rules and state aids, which were normally managed within the
normal EU procedures for problem solving, were easily linked to the
conference and helped to halt the constitutional process. As long as the
decision-makers were unable to separate or buffer ordinary issues from
constitutional ones, the agenda tended to be overloaded and crisis-driven,
rather than reflecting enlightened discussions on a limited set of issues.
The IGC was convened in an environment made turbulent by other important
ongoing reform processes in the EU. Of particular importance in shaping the
IGC was the plan to create the EMU by 1999. During the initial stages of the
conference, most parties tried to keep the design and institutions of the EMU
out of the discussions of the IGC, but it continually overshadowed the IGC,
and the interlinkage between the two was obvious. Towards the end of the
IGC, when it was clear that the changes would be marginal, the Commission
President, Jacques Santer, even expressed doubt that there would have been an
agreement during the IGC negotiations without the French initiative to strike a
bargain on employment in relation to the EMU. 78  The EMU also affected the
duration of the IGC, as the member states had to find a solution to the IGC
before they could enter into the final stages of the EMU. In addition, the need
to find an agreement on the new budget before the Delors II package ran out in
1999, before the scheduled reforms of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP)
came into force, and before the negotiations with the new applicants began, all
pressurized the parties to reach a final agreement.79 When the IGC ended, it
was even expressed explicitly that the IGC had been a success because ‘after
all they had agreed upon the EMU’. Leading politicians were happy to
continue with more small-scale and incremental adjustments, and claimed to
have avoided the major crisis of failing on all fronts simultaneously. 80 Thus,
                                                                
76 Cited in Agence Europe 12/13 November 1996.
77Agence Europe, 16 November 1996.
78 Santer at the seminar ‘Amsterdam and Beyond’ in Brussels, 11 July 1997.
79 DOC/97/9: Agenda 2000 - For a stronger and wider Europe’, Brussels, Press release
IP/97/660.
80 See the descriptions of the Amsterdam Summit in Agence Europe, 18 and 19 June
1997.
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ignoring the fact that the initial aspiration of the conference, and the criterion
for evaluating whether the IGC should be judged as success or failure, had
been a totally different one at the opening of the conference. It seemed easier to
change the evaluation criteria than to make actual institutional reforms.
Election and budget cycles in the member states also structured the IGC’s
agenda, and determined the amount of attention decision-makers were able to
pay to it. During the IGC a high number of national elections were held,
perhaps the most important being the British elections, which took place on 1
May 1997. The Dutch Prime Minister, Wim Kok, argued, at an early stage, that
the British election campaign was interfering with the IGC and creating too
many uncertainties.81 As a consequence of the election, the British negotiators
changed and the new Labour government only had six weeks in office before
the new treaty was completed in Amsterdam. During this time, they had to
develop new positions in a process that had already lasted for almost two years.
Any changes introduced at this stage could have reduced the continuity of
decision-making in the IGC, and eventually destroyed any agreement
reached.82 This election directly altered the issues on the agenda; for instance,
the intense focus on flexibility during the IGC was linked to a large extent to a
desire of the other member states to bypass the ‘problem’ of the British
Conservatives. When Labour won the election, interest in the concept of co-
operation and flexibility decreased.
The parliamentary election in France also affected the IGC, with the date of the
beginning of the work of the Reflection Group being postponed until the
beginning of the Spanish presidency in order to avoid a clash with the elections
(Menon 1996: 242). During the 1996-7 IGC negotiations, the French called for
a modest IGC agenda in order to end the conference rapidly, thereby
decreasing the likelihood of any interference with the French parliamentary
elections, originally scheduled for 1998.83 At one stage, the French government
also wanted to speed up the IGC by extending the mandate of the negotiating
group ‘to elaborate draft treaties’.84 The extraordinary meeting of the IGC held
                                                                
81 Agence Europe, 4 October 1996.
82 However, in the British case, both the Conservatives and the Labour parties had
been kept regularly briefed by the Foreign Office. Labour also had an arrangement
with a former official of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), who
travelled around Europe visiting governments and presenting different views on the
proposed reform, making the transition from opposition to position more smooth.
Thanks to Simon Bulmer for informing me on this issue.
83 See ‘Showdown Time’ and ‘IGC timing’, Financial Times, 18 September 1996.
84 Agence Europe, 22 June 1996.
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in October 1996 in Dublin was also largely a result of the French politicians’
perceived need to speed up the negotiations. However, President Chirac called
for an election at the end of May 1997, primarily because of the timetable of
the final stages of the EMU. The surprising victory of Lionel Jospin meant that,
in the final stages of the IGC, France had a new regime which was
inexperienced, but nevertheless held firm positions. By presenting radical
solutions during the Amsterdam meeting, they brought employment to the top
of the agenda, and insisted on parallelism between economic and monetary
policy in relation to the EMU, thereby creating uncertainty and turmoil during
the final days of the IGC. The French focus on the EMU distracted the
discussion of the issues on the agenda and shaped the outcome in Amsterdam.
Treaty revisions have to be approved by every member state, and this formal
rule also influenced the duration of the IGC. Some member states ratify treaties
by parliamentary votes, while others use referendums, and no government
wishes to fail. In Denmark, for instance, it was decided that a referendum
would be held on the IGC. The referendum was held in May and 55.1 per cent
of the Danish voters voted in favour of the Treaty, and 44.9 per cent voted
against. 85 In general, processes of ratification represent an opportunity to
express all sorts of ideas, not only support and frustration. Ratification
processes do not necessarily focus on a limited set of issues; other issues which
are loosely coupled to the issue itself frequently come to dominate the
discussions. Consequently, the interlinkage between ratification and national
elections, as well as other important reforms such as the EMU, made it difficult
to extend the duration of the IGC.
The above discussion shows that timing and temporal location were important
in structuring the IGC. However, it is difficult to conceptualize the importance
of timing and the significance of a certain temporal order. Theoretical ideas
differ as regards the importance of timing and the role it plays in decision-
making. For instance, the sequencing and ordering of decisions can influence
the outcomes, while the distribution of costs and benefits of being a first mover
in strategic bargaining or of being a copycat, the use of filibustering tactics and
the more trivial, nevertheless important, dynamic of the ‘iron trouser
phenomenon’ are all determined by timing (Goodin 1995).86 The issue of
                                                                
85 Agence Europe, 30 May 1998. The idea of a Danish Referendum was confirmed a
short time after the completion of the Draft Treaty.
86 The latter is mentioned by the ‘insider’ Christopher Matthews who argued that ‘
whoever can hold out longest before having to go to the toilet can dictate terms to the
others’ (Goodin, 1995:12).
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timing in relation to the IGC has been addressed by several scholars, for
instance Patterson, who wrote: ‘[t]here is now much talk in Bonn on agenda
management. That is, to prevent the timetables for the enlargement and EMU
in colliding with each other and to design decision points at the most propitious
times’ (Patterson 1996: 174). The underlying idea here is the possibility of
designing and sequencing events in a manner that maximizes expected utility,
consistent with the LI perspective. However, sequencing events and designing
the timing of political decisions is very difficult, and many of the temporal
structures cannot be manipulation.
The institutional perspective focuses less on the possibilities of design and
more on how a decision-making process is embedded in a distinct temporal
order. Two issues are thus important from an institutional perspective: first,
protecting the agenda from unpredictable, loosely coupled issues; and second,
operating in accordance with the predictable, well-established, and demanding
rhythms of political life. Several temporal structures, such as elections and
budget cycles, are beyond the control of national governments; in fact,
temporal orders are often written into constitutions just in order to prevent their
manipulation. Furthermore, these temporal orders function as deadlines, in that
they help to focus attention, and to create meanings, and frames of reference.
Fixed and structured deadlines limit the possibilities for searching for new and
acceptable solutions, with final solutions tending to be close to existing ones,
thereby largely maintaining the status quo (Bromiley and Marcus 1987). The
IGC was a process where the demanding internal rhythms of the nation states
had a significant impact on the content and duration of the conference, and the
fixed temporal location limited the search for solutions to ones close to existing
institutional arrangements, thereby making radical reform less likely.
6. 6 Conclusions
This examination of the decision-making in the IGC has shown that three
mechanisms were particularly important in structuring the conference. First,
past decisions created the framework for the IGC. This path-dependency
dictated the issues on the agenda, and determined the manner in which manner
they were framed, limiting the possibility of radical solutions to existing
problems. Instead of an adaptation to the future, therefore, the 1996-7 IGC
represents an adaptation to the past. Second, the increase in the number of
member states and the changes in the procedures for handling the IGC
increased the complexity to the bargaining process, and made information and
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communication more costly and more complicated. The very model of
intergovernmental bargaining was challenged, because of the importance of
organizational factors at both the European and national levels. The
Europeanization of the domestic administrative institutions of the nation states
has made it difficult to maintain the idea of a clear separation between
domestic position formation and international negotiation. The logic of the
two-level game is therefore problematic. Furthermore, the normative crisis
concerning the democratic deficit in the EU has ultimately transformed the
mode of institutional reform in the EU. The gradual democratization of the EU
makes the dynamic of institutional and constitutional design different to that of
secret bargaining within a system of technocratic diplomacy. Finally, a series
of other pressing events, as well as the location of the conference in a distinct
temporal order, affected the distribution of attention and the issues addressed
during the treaty revision process.
In conclusion, this examination has questioned the basic assumptions of
institutional reform processes according to the LI perspective, that is, that key
bargains in the EU are characterized by their voluntary nature, easy
communication, and flexibility as regards time. I have shown that the 1996-7
IGC did not represent a voluntary process, the processing the information was
difficult, and it was not flexible in time. This chapter has demonstrated that a
careful analysis of the constraints and possibilities created by the path-
dependent development of the EU, the internal dynamics and the decision-
making procedures in the IGC, and a distinct temporal location help to increase
our understanding of the EU. The institutional approach reveals important
aspects of decision-making which have all too often been ignored in the past.
The LI perspective is fruitful, but it is not sufficient to explain the dynamics of
key bargains in the EU. By enriching our theoretical dimensions and
categories, we can improve our understanding of the dynamics of institutional
reform in general, and of the EU in particular. This analysis has suggested an
alternative approach, based on institutional theory. The EU is currently facing
new institutional reforms in the IGC in 2000, related to include the countries of
Eastern and Central Europe. The institutional perspective outlined here
suggests that successful design is more likely if reformers understand some of
the most important dynamics which constrain and enable them to design
effective institutions in a democratic context, and in particular if they can
exploit the possibilities related to path-dependency, organizational factors in
decision-making and the importance of timing and a distinct temporal location.
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